PROJECT: SRMS ASS'Y NOMENCLATURE: DEC PANEL SYSTEM: D&C SUBSYSTEM

SHEET: \_\_

	MEA	FMEA REV.	NAME, QTY, & DRAWING REF.	FAILURE MODE	FAILURE EFFECT ON	HOWR / FUNC. RAYIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE
<u> </u>			DESIGNATION	CAUSE	END ITEM	CRITICALITY SCREENS: N/A
	1090	5	DISCRETE INPUT/OUTPUT CIRCUIT GIY-3 ED 87300	HODE: DATA ERRATIC FROM DAC TO MCIU.  CAUSE(S): (1) RC FILTER FAILURE. (2) LOSS OF ADDRESS SIGNAL. (3) LOSS OF AND/OR SELECT GATE OUTPUT. (4) LOSS OF OUTPUT DRIVE TRANSISTOR.	DATA ERRATIC FROM D&C TO MCIU. EFFECTS VARY DEPENDING UPON WHICH WORD/81T FAILS. IF IN EE AUTO HODE, POSSIBLE PREMATURE RELEASE. COULD DROP IN OR OUT OF RATE HOLD, MAY HOT BE ABLE TO STOP AUTO SEQ, WITH STOP SWITCH. MAY NOT LIMP IN EE MODE MANUAR. MAY NOT BE ABLE TO CANCEL MCIU SAFING. GPC MAY DROP INTO IDLE.  CAUSE (1) ONE D&C TO MCIU BIT FAILS LOW FOR ONE WORD.  CAUSE (2) THE DATA FOR ONE D&C TO MCIU WORD WILL BE ALL ZEROS. POSSIBLE LOSS OF EE AUTO COMMANDS AND LOSS OF LINPING DURING CAPTURE.  CAUSE (3) SAME AS ABOVE.  CAUSE (4) ONE D&C TO MCIU BIT FAILS LOW FOR IND WORDS. IF BIT FAILS INCORRECT. EE COMMANDED AS SOON AS EE MODE SMITCH SET TO AUTO.  WORST CASE	DESIGN FEATURES  DATA TO THE MCIU/GPC IS COMPRISED OF D&C SWITCH STATUS BITS. A 10YOC SIGNAL DERIVED FROM A SWITCH OPERATION IS CONDITIONED BY A SIMPLE R-C FILTER TO COMMERCATION IS CONDITIONED BY A SIMPLE R-C FILTER TO COMMERCATION IS BOUNCE EFFECTS. ALL RESISTORS ARE RATED 1/2 WATT WITH A MAX. STRESS LEVEL OF SIMILLIWATIS. ALL CAPACITORS ARE RATED AT 50V MITH A MAXIMUM STRESS LEVEL OF 10V. OUTPUT TRANSISTORS ARE JINV22ZA TYPE, OPERATING IN A SWITCHING MODE AT LOW STRESS LEVELS. THE ADDRESS SIGNALS ARE ROUTED THROUGH A MATING PAIR OF PCB COMNECTORS.  THE CIRCUIT IS PACKAGED ON A PAIR OF BOARDS MECHANICALLY JOINED BY MACHINED SPACERS ALONG TWO EDGES TO FORM A MODULE. THE MODULE IS SUPPORTED IN MACHINED GUIDEWAYS. THE LOWER EDGE OF EACH BOARD INTERFACES VIA A PRINTED CIRCUIT BOARD CONNECTOR, AND THE MODULE IS RESTRAINT IS PROVIDED BY THO PAIRS OF BOM SPRINGS ENGAGING THE GUIDEWAYS. THE LOWER EDGE OF EACH BOARD INTERFACES VIA A PRINTED CIRCUIT BOARD CONNECTOR, AND THE MODULE IS RESTRAINED BY THE ELECTRONICS PONTAGE CÓVER WHICH BEARS ON A PAIR OF COMPRESSIBLE WEDGES ON THE UPPER EDGE OF THE MODULE. THE CONNECTORS WERE SUBJECTED TO CONSTRUCTION ANALYSIS TO ENSURE THAT MATERIALS AND DESIGN ARE SUPPORTIVE OF RELIABLE PERFORMANCE.  EEE PARTS HAVE BEEN SELECTED AND CONTROLLED IN ACCORDANCE WITH SPAR-RNS-PA 903. THIS DOCUMENT OF SINES THE PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS FOR MONITORING AND CONTROLLED IN ACCORDANCE WITH REQUIREMENTS FOR MONITORING AND CONTROLLED AND TRESSTRESS LEVELS, AND ADECUATE DERATING OF PART STRESS LEVELS, PROCEDURES AND ACTIVITIES ARE SPECIFIED TO ENSURE AT LEAST EQUIVALENT QUALITY FOR MONSTANDARD AND IRREGULAR PARTS. RELIABILITY ANALYSIS HAS CONFIRMED NO PARTS WITH GENERICALLY NICH FALLER RATES, ARROSPACE DESIGN STANDARDS FOR DETAILING ELECTRONIC PARTS PACKAGING, MOUNTING AND STRUCTUREL/MECHANICAL/INTEGRITY OF ASSEMBLIES ARE APPLIED. SUCH DESIGN HAS BEEN REVIEWED AND FOUND SATISFACTORY THROUGH THE DESIGN AUDIT PROCESS, INCLUDING THE SECTION AND THE MASS MAYERS TO HEAVE THE PARTS THE PARTS SHEET HOW ANALYSIS

ASS'T NUMERICATIONS: DAT PAREL ASS'T FAR. 21140237							
FHEA FMFA REV.	NAME, QTY, B DRAWING REF. DESIGNATION	FATLURE MODE AND CAUSE	FAILURE EFFECT ON END LIEM	HOWR / FUNC. 1/1 CRITICALITY	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE SCREENS: N/A		
1090 5	DISCRETE IMPUT/OUTPUT CIRCUIT OTY-3 ED 87300	MODE: DATA ERRATIC FROM DRC TO MCIU.  CAUSE(S): (1) RC FILTER FAITURE.  (2) LOSS OF ADDRESS SIGNAL.  (3) LOSS OF AND/OR SELECT GATE OUTPUT.  (4) LOSS OF OUTPUT DRIVE TRANSISTOR.	UNEXPECTED MOTION. 6 JOINT RUMAMAY. UNCOMPANDED END EFFECTOR RELEASE. UNAMMUNCIATED. CREW ACTION REG. REDUNDANT PATHS REMAINING N/A	STANDARDS IN A INTERCONNECTION MODULE PRINTER FILM-WIRING. AND HAS KAPTON MANUFACTURED I ELECTRONICS PACONNECTORS ARE INTEGRATED TO GUALIFICATION DELIVERED ASSISTENGTH.  LINTERCONNECTION OF ALL CONTROL OF ALL CONTROL PARTS WIRING HARMES SUBJECTED TO INSULATION RETAINS THE TEST PROGETHE FULLY ASSOF THE D&C PA		SOCKET  SOCKET  TED TO ALL G WHICH ITY.  TRIC  E PANEL D  TESTING	
REPARED BY:	MFWG	SUPERCEDING DA	TE: 06 OCT 87	APPROVED BY:	DATE: 24 JUL 91	CIL REV:	

PROJECT: SRMS ASS'Y NOMENCLATURE: DEC PANEL

SYSTEM: D&C SUBSYSTEM ASS'Y P/N: 51140E391

" SHEET: \_\_\_3

FMEA Ref.	FHEA REV.	DRAVENG REF.	AND	ON	l 1/1	
			FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE  MODE: DATA ERRATIC FROM DAC TO MCIU.  CAUSE(\$): (1) RC FILTER FAILURE.  (2) LOSS OF ADDRESS SIGHAL. (3) LOSS OF AMD/OR SELECT GATE OUTPUT. (4) LOSS OF	FAILURE EFFECT ON END ITEM  UNEXPECTED MOTION. 6 JOINT RUMAWAY. UNCOMMANDED END EFFECTOR RELEASE. UNANWUNCIATED. CREW ACTION REQ. REDUNDANT PATHS REMAINING	CRITICALITY  QA/IMSPECTIONS  EEE PARTS IMSPECT SPAR-RMS-PA.003. TO THE REQUIREME PARTS ARE 100X S REQUIREME BY SPAR EEE PARTS ARE 10 REQUIREMENTS. BY FACILITY. DPA 1S SELECTED 5X OF EACH LOT NUMBER/WIRE IS PROCURED AND IMSPECTED AN RECEIVING IMSPECTION IN THE DAMAGE HAS OCCUPED DAMAGE HAS OCCUPED AND DAMAGE HAS OCCUPED TO THE PARTS OF THE PA	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE  SCREENS: N/A  CTION IS PERFORMED AS REQUIRED BY EACH EEE PART IS QUALIFIED AT THE PART LEVEL ENTS OF THE APPLICABLE SPECIFICATION. ALL EEE SCREENED AND BURNED IN, AS A MINIMUM, AS R-RMS-PA.003, BY THE SUPPLIER. ADDITIONALLY, OOX RE-SCREENED IN ACCORDANCE MITH Y AN INDEPENDENT SPAR APPROVED TESTING S PERFORMED AS REQUIRED BY PA.003 OM A RANDOMLY PARTS, MAXIMUM S PIECES, MINIMUM 3 PIECES FOR //DATE CODE OF PARTS RECEIVED. D TO SPECIFICATION MIL-W-22759 OR MIL-W-81381 ND TESTED TO MASA JSCMBOBO STANDARD NUMBER 95A.  CTION VERIFIES THAT ALL PARTS RECEIVED ARE AS HE PROCUREMENT DOCUMENTS, THAT MO PHYSICAL RRED TO PARTS DURING SHIPMENT, THAT THE
			(4) LUSS IVE OUIPUIT DRIVE TRANSISTOR.		RECEIVING DOCUME AND SCREENING DATE PARTS ARE IMPERIMENTATE TO THE TOTAL TOTAL TOTAL TOTAL THE PRINTED CIRCUIT AND ADEQUACY OF COMPONENT MOUNT LOOPING, STRAPP AND CERTIFIED TO BY JSC OBBOOA.  CONFORMAL COATH PERFORMED USING POST P.C. BD. 16	ENTS PROVIDE ADEQUATE TRACEABILITY INFORMATION ATA CLEARLY IDENTIFIES ACCEPTABLE PARTS.  CTED THROUGHOUT MANUFACTURE AND ASSEMBLY AS THE MANUFACTURING STAGE COMPLETED. THESE LUDE,  BOARD INSPECTION FOR TRACK SEPARATION, DAMAGE PLATED THROUGH HOLES, ING INSPECTION FOR CORRECT SOLDERING, WIRE ING ETC. OPERATORS AND INSPECTORS ARE TRAINED O MASA NHB 5300.4(3A) STANDARD, AS MODIFIED  MG INSPECTION FOR ADEQUATE PROCESSING IS OUTRAVIOLET LIGHT TECHNIQUES.
			. ,		P.C. BD. INSTALL IMSTALLATION, A MATING, WIRE RO  PRE-TEST INSPECTOF LOWER TIER I VERIFICATION TO MANDATORY INSPECTOR A TEST READINES TEST PERSONNEL, VALIDATION STATE QUALITY ASSURAN	CAR/GOVERNMENT REP. MANDATORY INSPECTION POINT)  LATION INSPECTION, CHECK FOR CORRECT BOARD  LIGNMENT OF BOARDS, PROPER COMMECTOR CONTACT  JUTING, STRAPPING OF WIRES ETC.,  CTION OF D&C PANEL ASSY INCLUDES AN AUDIT INSPECTION COMPLETION, AS BUILD CONFIGURATION  O AS DESIGN ETC. (SPAR/GOVERNMENT REP  COTION POINT)  SS REVIEW (TRR) WHICH INCLUDES VERIFICATION OF  TEST DOCUMENTS, TEST EQUIPMENT CALIBRATION/ FUS AND HARDWARE CONFIGURATION IS CONVENED BY  KCE IN CONJUNCTION WITH ENGINEERING,  DIFFIGURATION CONTROL, SUPPLIER AS APPLICABLE,  ENT REPRESENTATIVE, PRIOR TO THE START OF ANY
PARED 8		MFUG	SUPERCEDING DAT	F: 06 OCT 87	FORMAL TESTING	(ACCEPTANCE OR QUALIFICATION).  TING (ATP) INCLUDES AMBIENT PERFORMANCE,

PROJECT: SRMS
- ASS'Y NOMENCLATURE: DEC PANEL

SYSTEM: DEC SUBSYSTEM ASS'Y P/N: 51140E391

THEA REV. DRAWING REF. DRAWING REF. DRAWING REF. DRAWING REF. DRAWING REF. DATA REASON TO RECEDING REFECT BY THE RESON BRC 10 RCIU. REVERTING REPORT REASON TO RESON BRC 10 RCIU. REVERTING REPORT REASON TO RESON BRC 10 RCIU. RESON BRC				. 40	2.1 NAMENCENTATIONS: has			
EE MODE MANUAL  (4) LOSS OF OUTPUT DRIVE TRANSISTOR.  (A) LOSS OF OUTPUT DRIVE TRANSISTOR.  CAUSE (1) ONE DAC TO MCIU DID FOR ONE WORD.  CAUSE (2) THE DATA FOR ONE MORD.  CAUSE (2) THE DATA FOR ONE DAC TO MCIU WORD WILL BE ALL ZEROS.  POSSIBLE LOSS OF EE AUTO COMMANDS AND LOSS OF EE AUTO COMMANDS AND OUTPUT.  CAUSE (3) SAME AS ABOVE.  CAUSE (4) ONE DBC TO MCIU DIT FAILS LOW FOR TWO MORDS.  IF BIT FAILS COMMAND AND LOSS OF MANUAL WORDS.  IF BIT FAILS COMMAND AS EE MAY BE COMMAND FOR MAY BE SON AS EE MODE SAILCH SET TO AUTO.	REF.	REV.	DRAVING REF. DESIGNATION  DISCRETE INPUT/OUTPUT CIRCUIT 01Y-3	FAILURE MODE AND EAUSE  MODE: DATA ERRATIC FROM DEC TO MCIU. CAUSE(S): (1) RC FILTER FAILURE. (2) LOSS OF ADDRESS SIGNAL. (3) LOSS OF AND/OR	FAILURE EFFECT ON END ITEM  DATA ERRATIC FROM D&C TO MCIU. EFFECTS VARY OEPENDING UPON WHICH WORD/BIT FAILS. IF IN EE AUTO MODE, POSSIBLE PREMATURE RELEASE. COULD DROP IN OR OUT OF RATE HOLD. MAY NOT BE ABLE TO STOP AUTO SEG. WITM STOP SWITCH.	HDWR / FUNC. 1/1 CRITICALITY  THERMAL AND VI MANDATORY INSI INTEGRATION OF PERFORMED AT 1 GROUNDING CHE INSPECTION FOR SUB-SYSTEM PE PERFORMANCE TI SRMS SYSTEMS SUBASSEMBLIES INSPECTIONS A INCLUDES GROU	IBRATION TESTING, (SPAR/GOVERNMENT REP PECTION POINT).  F D&C PANEL, RHC, THC AND MCIU, IMSPECTIONS A FACH STAGE OF INTEGRATION, WHICH INCLUDES CKS, INTER CONNECT CABLE VERIFICATION, CONNECT REAL OF PUSHBACK CONTACTS ETC.  RFORMANCE TESTING (ATP), INCLUDES AN AMBIENT EST. (MANDATORY INSPECTION POINT).  INTEGRATION, THE INTEGRATION OF MECHANICAL A AND THE FLIGHT CABIN EQUIPMENT TO FORM THE HOUSE OF THE WIRTHG CHECKS, WIRTHG ROU RECTORS FOR BENT OR PUSH BACK CONTACTS ETC.	CTOR RM SRMS.
SAME AS ABOVE.  CAUSE (4) ONE DEC TO MCIU BIT FAILS LOW FOR TWO WORDS. IF BIT FAILS HIGH, ONE BIT ON ALL WORDS INCORRECT. EE COMMAND MAY FAIL ON. EE MAY BE COMMANDED AS SOON AS EE MODE SWITCH SET TO AUTO.				OUTPUT. (4) LOSS OF OUTPUT DRIVE	EE MODE MANUAL. HAY NOT BE ABLE TO CANCEL MCIU SAFING. GPC MAY DROP INTO IDLE.  CAUSE (1) ONE DAC TO MCIU BIT FAILS LOW FOR ONE WORD.  CAUSE (2) THE DATA FOR ONE DAC TO MCIU WORD MILL BE ALL ZEROS. POSSIBLE LOSS OF EE AUTO COMMANDS AND LOSS OF LIMPING	PERFORMANCE T	TESTING - STRONGBACK AND FLAT FLOOR AMBIENT EST. (SPAR/GOVERNMENT REP MANDATORY INSPE	CTION
					CAUSE (3) SAME AS ABOVE.  CAUSE (4) ONE D&C TO MCIU BIT FAILS LOW FOR TWO WORDS. IF BIT FAILS HIGH, ONE BIT ON ALL WORDS INCORRECT. EE COMMAND MAY FAIL ON. EE MAY BE COMMANDED AS SOON AS EE MODE SWITCH SET TO AUTO.			CIL RE\

PREPARED BY:

MFMG

PROJECT: SAMS
ASS'Y NOMENCLATURE: DEC PANEL SYSTEM: D&C SUBSYSTEM ASS'Y P/N: 51140E391 " SHEFT: \_\_6 HAME, Q1Y, & DRAWING REF. DESIGNATION HOWR / FUNC. 1/1 CRITICALITY FAILURE EFFECT FAILURE MODE FMEA REF. **FMEA** RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE ON END ITEM REV. AHD CAUSE SCREENS: H/A DISCRETE IMPUT/OUTPUT MODE: DATA ERRATIC FROM DEC TO MCIU. 1090 5 FAILURE HISTORY UNEXPECTED CIRCUIT 01Y-3 ED 87300 MOTION, 6 JOINT RUNAWAY. UNCOMMANDED END EFFECTOR THERE HAVE BEEN NO FAILURES ASSOCIATED WITH THIS FAILURE HODE ON THE SRHS PROGRAM. CAUSE(S):, (1) RC FILTER FAILURE. RELEASE. UNANNUNCIATED. CREW ACTION REQ. (2) LOSS OF ADDRESS SIGNAL. REDUNDANT PATHS REMAINING (3) LOSS OF AND/OR SELECT GATE OUTPUT. N/A (4) LOSS OF OUTPUT DRIVE TRANSISTOR.

APPROVED BY:

DATE: 24 JUL 91

CIL REV: 5

SUPERCEDING DATE: 06 OCT 87

PROJECT: 50 ASS'Y NOMENCLATURE: DEC PANEL SYSTEM: D&C SUBSYSTEM ASS'Y P/N: 51140E391

SHFE1:

FHEA REF.	FMEA REV.	HAME, QTY, & DRAWING REF. DESIGNATION	FAILURE HODE AND CAUSE	FAILURE EFFECT ON END ITEM	HDWR / FUNC. RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE 1/1 CRITICALITY SCREENS: N/A
1090	5	DISCRETE IMPUT/OUTPUT CIRCUIT QIV-3 ED 87300	MODE: DATA ERRATIC FROM DEC TO MCIU.  CAUSE(S): (1) RC FILTER FAILURE. (2) LOSS OF ADDRESS SIGNAL. (3) LOSS OF AND/OR SELECT GATE OUTPUT. (4) LOSS OF OUTPUT DRIVE TRANSISTOR.	DATA ERRATIC FROM D&C TO MCIU. EFFECTS VARY DEPENDING UPON WHICH WORD/BIT FALLS. IF IN EE AUTO MODE, POSSIBLE PREMATURE RELEASE. COULD DROP IN OR OUT OF RATE HOLD. MAY NOT BE ABLE TO STOP AUTO SEQ. WITH STOP SWITCH. MAY NOT LIMP IN EE MODE MAHUAL. MAY NOT BE ABLE TO CANCEL MCIU SAFING. GPC MAY DROP INTO IDLE.  CAUSE (1) ONE D&C TO MCIU BIT FALLS LOW FOR OME WORD.  CAUSE (2) THE DATA FOR ONE D&C TO MCIU WORD WILL BE ALL ZEROS. POSSIBLE LOSS OF EE AUTO COMMANDS AND LOSS OF LIMPING DURING CAPTURE.  CAUSE (3) SAME AS ABOVE.  CAUSE (4) ONE D&C TO MCIU BIT FAILS LOW FOR TWO MORDS. IF BIT FAILS HIGH, ONE BIT ON ALL WORDS INCORRECT. EE COMMAND AS EE MODE SWITCH SET TO AUTO.  WORST CASE	OPERATIONAL EFFECTS  ARM MAY STOP USING THE STOP SWITCH DURING AN AUTO SEG. THE SEQUENCE MAY STILL FOLLOW ITS PREPROGRAMMED PATH UNTIL THE DESIRED ENDPOINT IS REACHED. STOP SWITCH IS DESIGNED TO INTERRUPT AUTO SEQUENCE. FOR UNEXPECTED MOTION, BRAKES SHOULD BE USED TO STOP ARM.  OR ARM WILL NOT LIMP DURING CAP/RIG SEQUENCE. ARM JOINTS WILL NOT CONFORM TO PATLOAD DURING A CAPTURE SEQUENCE. IF THERE IS ANY MISALIGHMENT WITH THE GRAPPLE FIXTURE, THE PAYLOAD WILL CHANGE ITS ATITUDE DURING A FREE FLITING CAPTURE, OR THE ARM WILL BE PRELOADED IF THE PAYLOAD IS BERTHED. IT MAY TAKE LONGER TO COMPLETE A CAPTURE SEQUENCE.  OR THE ARM COULD BEGIN TO OPERATE WITH (OR CANNOT CANCEL) RATE HOLD AT ANY TIME WHILE COMMANDING IN A MANUAL AUGMENTED MODE. THE OPERATOR WILL DETECT AND INHERENTLY COMPENSATE.  CREW ACTION  APPLY BRAKES INSTEAD OF THE PROCEED/STOP SWITCH TO STOP THE ARM.  OR NOME FOR FREE FLYING CAPTURES. ENTER TEST MODE TO LIMP ARM AFTER COMPLETION OF A BERTHED PAYLOAD CAPTURE.  OR APPLY BRAKES TO STOP ARM AND CANCEL THE RATE HOLD FUNCTION.  CREW TRAINING  THE CREW WILL BE TRAINED TO ALWAYS OBSERVE WHETHER THE ARM IS RESPONDING PROPERLY TO COMMANDS. IF IT ISN'T, APPLY BRAKES. CREW SHOULD BE TRAINED TO ALWAYS OBSERVE WHETHER THE ARM IS RESPONDING PROPERLY TO COMMANDS. IF IT ISN'T, APPLY BRAKES. CREW SHOULD BE TRAINED TO ALWAYS OBSERVE WHETHER THE ARM IS RESPONDING PROPERLY TO COMMANDS. IF IT ISN'T, APPLY BRAKES. CREW SHOULD BE TRAINED TO SHITCH) IF UNUSUAL ARM TO A MINIMUM.  MISSION CONSTRAINT  CREW SHOULD NOT ENTER ANY AUTO MODE UNLESS THEY KNOM EXACTLY WHAT TRAJECTORY THE ARM FULL TAKE AND ESTREE THAT THER ARE NO DISTALLES IN THE PATH OF THE SEQUENCE. THE BRAKES SHOULD BE USED TO STOP ARM (NOT STOP SWITCH) IF UNUSUAL ARM BEHAVIOUR.  WHEN CAPTURING A FREE FLYER, THE E WIST BE TARE ENOUGH MAY FROM STRUCTURE TO PROHIBIT CONTACT RECARDLESS OF PAYLOAD ROTATIONS.  OPERATOR WIST BE ABLE TO DETECT THAT THE ARM IS RESPONDING PROPERLY TO COMMANDS VIA WINDOW AND/OR CCTV VIEWS DURING ALL ARM OPERATIONS.

PREPARED BY:

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MFMG

PROJECT: SRMS ASS'Y NOMENCEATURE: DEC PANEL SYSTEM: DEC SUBSYSTEM ASS'Y P/N: 51140E391 SHEET -NAME, QTY, & DRAWING REF. HDWR / FUNC. 1/1 CRITICALITY FATLURE HODE FAILURE EFFECT FMEA REF. FMEA RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE REV. AND ON CAUSE END ITEM DESIGNATION SCREENS: N/A MODE: DATA ERRATIC FROM D&C 1090 5 DISCRETE ...... SWITCHES INPUT/OUTPUT UNEXPECTED CIRCUIT MOTION. 6 JOINT 017-3 ED 87300 TO MCIU. RUNAWAY. OMRSD ONLINE INSTALLATION UNCOMMANDED END EFFECTOR CAUSE(S):, (1) RC FILTER RELEASE. UNANNUNCTATED. HONE FAILURE. CREW ACTION REQ. OMRSD ONLINE TURNAROUND (2) LOSS OF ADDRESS SIGNAL. REDUNDANT PATHS REHAINING EXERCISE ALL DEC PANEL SWITCHES AND DISPLAYS VERIFY CORRECT RESPONSE (3) LOSS OF AND/OR SELECT GATE OUTPUT. H/A (4) LOSS OF OUTPUT DRIVE TRANSISTOR.

RMS/D&C - 222

APPROVED BY:

DATE: 24 JUL 91

CIL REV: 5

SUPERCEDING DATE: 06 OCT 87