REVISED 10-14-86

FMFA NO		SHUTTLE CCIV CRITICAL ITEMS LEST	UNIT <u>Videa Switching Unit (</u> DWG NO. 2294023-502, 504  SHEET OF			
FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE	FATI HRE EFFECT ON CND STEN	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE				
No video from a single video source to any output. Cause: (1) Amplifier or output buffer os Input Amplifier A1, 2294892-502 ur A5, 2294892-504	No video from particular camera available for display or downlink. No camera status data to RCU. Ho data display on TVN via failed input path. Horst case: Loss of required camera video signal.	The VSU is a microprocessor-based video switching unit using an ACA 180? microprocessor, CHOS RAM, and TIL PROM. Computer 1/0, decoding logic, digit and switch control circuitry are implemented in CHOS CO4000 series logic to power dissipation. The design incorporates OHOS FET devices (SD231s) purcha an RCA spec control drawing (SCD) as the basic video switch element. Video split-screen capability incorporates glass delay line modules procured from Microsonics (originally Corning) to an RCA SCD. The video amplifier design				
		Parts were required to be JAN reliability level parts of selection falls into three categories:	of their equivalent. Part			
		<ul> <li>()} JAN or better parts from the Military QPL,</li> <li>(2) Parts demonstrated to NASA to be equivalent to (e.g., CO4NON/3W series parts), or</li> <li>(3) Parts procured to an RCA spec control drawing screening to effect JAN equivalency.</li> </ul>				
		BARE BOARD DESIGN (A4)				
		The design of the associated A4 board is constructed fropper-clad epoxy glass sheets (NEMA 6-10) Grade FR-4) connections are made through printed traces which run board surfaces. Every trace terminates at an annular surrounds the hole in which a component lead or termina provides a footing for the solder, ensuring good mechan performance. Its size and shape are governed by NIL-P spacing and routing. These requirements are reiterated notes to further assure compliance. Variations between final product (due to irregularities of the etching product and include the serve of the etching product of the etching etc	, PER MIL-P-SS617A. Circuit from point to point on the ring. The annular ring of is located. This ring nical and electrical -SS640 as are trace widths, I specifically in drawing in the artwork master and the neess) are also controlled by from good artwork. Holes which Ily interconnect the different			
		The thru hales are drilled from a drill tape thus eliminum error and allowing tight control over hole and an important reliability criterion. After drilling and eliminelead plated per MIL-STD-1495. This provides for eather time of hoard assembly, even after periods of problem.	noular ring concentricity, an acting, All copper cladding is asy and reliable soldering at			

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TMEA NO		SHUTTLE COIV CRITICAL ITEMS LIST	DWG NO. 2294823-502. 504  SHEET2 OF7		
FAILURE HODE AND FAILURE EFFECT					
Cause: (I) Amplifier or output buffer on Input Amplifier A4, 2294892-502 or A5, 2294892-504	ON END TIEM  No video from particular camera available for display or downlink.  No camera status data to RCU.  No data display on TVM via failed input path.  Werst case: Loss of required camera video signal.	PESIGN FEATURES  BHARD ASSEMBLY DESIGN (A4)  All components are installed in a manner which as Component leads are pre-tinned, allowing total we are formed to provide stress relief and the budie Special mounting and bandling instructions are in after final assembly. The board is coated with a humidity and contamination.  PC boards.  BOAND PLACEMENT  The A4 board is secured in the electronics assembly in the provides. Connectivity belong the beard benefits and the board with blind—mated connectors. Disengagement during which spans the board's free edge.	isures maximum reliability, etting of solder joints. All leads es of large components are staked. ucluded in each drawing required urethane which protects against oly by ctions are made to the mother board		
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		REVI5:D FG-14-
FMEA NO. 1.2.18 CRITECALITY 222		SHUTTLE CCTV
	FAILURE EFFECT ON END TIEM  No video from particular camera available for display or downlink.  No camera status data to RCU.  No data display on TVM via failed input path.  Norst case: Loss of required camera video signal.	SHUTTLE CCTV DWG NO. 2294823-502, 504 CRITICAL TIEMS LIST
		Pre-Launch on Orbiter Test/In-flight lest  1. Power CCTV System. 2. Via the PHS panel, select a monitor as destination and the camera under test as source. 3. Send "Camera Power On" command from PHS panel. 4. Select "External Sync" on monitor. 5. Observe video displayed on munitor. Note that if video on monitor is synchronized (i.e., stable raster) then this indicates that the camera is receiving composite sync from the RCO and that the camera is producing synchronized video. 6. Send Pan, lift, focus, Zoom, DLK, AND Gamma commands and visually (either via the monitor or direct observation) verify operation. 7. Select downlink as destination and camera under test as source. 8. Observe video routed to downlink. 9. Send "Camera Power Off" command via PHS panel. 10. Repeat Steps 3 through 9 except issue commands via the MDM command path. This proves that the CCTV equipment is operational.

FREA NO1.2.18		SHUTTLE CCIV CRETICAL FIEMS LIST	UNIT <u>Video Switching Unit (VSI</u> DWG NO. <u>2294823-502.504</u> SHEET <u>4</u> OF <u>7</u>			
FAILURE MODE AND	FAILURE EFFECT	RATIGNALE FOR ACCEPTANCE				
	Procurement Control — The VSD Parts and hardware items vendors and suppliers, which meet the requirements set Quality Plan Work Statement (NS-2593176). Resident DC procurement documents to establish the need for GSJ on Incoming Inspection and Starage — Incoming Quality ins received malerials and parts. Results are recorded by drawing and control numbers for future reference and t subjected to incoming acceptance tests as called for i Test Instructions. Incoming flight parts are further RCA 1846684 — Preconditioning and Acceptance Requirements exception the DPA and PIND testing is not performed inspected per PAI 316 — Incoming Inspection Instructions Processing Incoming or Purchased Parts Designated for are delivered to Material Controlled Stores and retain until fabrication is required. Non-conforming material Board (MRB) disposition. (PAI-307, PAI IQC-5311.	are procured from approved forth in the CCTV contract and AS personnel review all selected parts (PAC 517).  pections are made on all lot and retained in file by raceability. All EEE parts are a PAC 315 - Incoming Inspection processed in accordance with onts for Electronic Parts, with d. Mechanical items are as for mechanical items, PAC, and PAI 612 - Procedure for Flight Use. Accepted items ed under specified conditions ls are held for Material Meview d assembly, all items are items are accumulated to form to assembles the kit by Mandatory Inspection Points welded wire boards, plus der splices and quality boards and sleeving of harnesses. provided in drawing notes, and Procedure and Record wire connection List 2295906, conding Velcro Jape 2280889, at a Application 1960167, ling and Staking 2280078, in a locking compound 2026116, Marking 2280876.				
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			REVISEU 10-14-6				
FMEA NO. 1.2.18		SHUTTLE CCTV	UNIT Video Switching Unit (VS) UNG NO. 2294023-502, 504				
		CRITICAL ITEMS LIST	SHEELI <u>5</u> QF <u>7</u>				
FAILURE MODE AND  CAUSE	FAILUME EFFECT ON END TYEM	RATIONALE FOR ACCEP	TANCE				
No video from a single video source to any output.  (duse: (1) Amplifier or output buffer on Input Amplifier A4, 2294892-502 or A5, 2294892-504	No video from particular camera available for display or dumnlink. No camera status data to RCU. No data display on TVN via failed input path.  Verst case: Loss of required camera video signal.	QA/INSPECTION (Continued)  YSU Assembly and Jest  An open box test is performed per IP-II-2294832, IP-AI-2294823, including vibration and thermal vacimitnessed, traceability numbers are recorded and citouse. RCA quality and DCAS inspections are performed FPR operations in accordance with PAI-26 DCAS personnel witness VSU button-up and critical monitor acceptance tests and review test data/resulafter all repair, rework and retest.  Preparation for Shipment - The VSU is packaged acceptanced for packaging and handling guidelines. A assembly drawing, parts list, ABPL, test data, etc documentation folder assigned specifically to each retained for reference. An EIDP is prepared for exceptional packing and marking, and review the EIDP for completence and marking, and review the EIDP for completence.	uum. Torques are specified and alibrated tools are check prior ormed at the completion of 4, PAI-205, PAI-206, and PAI-217. torquing. RCA and OCAS personnel lts. These personnel also inspect ording to 2280746. Process II related documentation including is gathered and held in a assembly. This folder is ach VSU in accordance with the nnel witness crating, packaging,				
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FMFA NO],2_18		SHUTTLE CCTV CRITICAL LIENS LIST		UNIT Video Switching Unit 1980. DWG NO. <u>2294823-502, 504,</u>				
CRITICALITY 2/2			CREITON TIENS ETSI		SHEET	6	OF	
CALLURE MODE AND	FAILURE EFFECT ON END 1)EM		BAT LONAL	E FOR ACCEPTANCE	1 · <del>-</del> ·		<b>_</b>	
No video from a single video source to any output.  Cause: (1) Amplifier or output bufler on Input Amplifier A4, 2294892-502 or A5, 2294892-504	No video from particular camera available for display or doublink. No camera status data to PCU. No data display on IVH via failed input path. Horst case: Loss of required camera video signal.	HONE.						

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FMEA NO1.2,18		SHUTTLE CCTV CRITICAL ITEHS LIST	UNIT <u>Video Smitching Unit (VSU</u> ) OWG NO. <u>2294823-582</u> , <u>504</u> SHEET <u>7</u> OF <u>7</u>				
FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE No video from a single video source to any output.  Cause: (1) Amplifier or output bufler on Input Amplifier A4, 2294892-502 or A5, 2294892-504  FAILURE EFFECT ONE END ITEM No video from particular camera available for display or downlink. No camera status data to RCU. No data display on TVM via failed input path.  Morst case: Loss of required camera video signal.		RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE  OPERATIONAL EFFECTS  Loss of video. Possible loss of major mission objectives due to loss of RMS cameras or other required cameras.  CREM ACLIONS  If possible, continue RMS operations using alternative visual cues.  CREM_TRAINING  Crew should be trained to use possible alternatives to CCTV.  MISSION CONSTRAINT  Where possible, procedures should be designed so they can be accomplished without CCTV.					
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