

CIL  
EMU CRITICAL ITEMS LIST

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Date: 11/09/94

12/24/94 SUPERSEDES 12/24/91

ANALYST:

NAME P/N QTY	CRIT	FAILURE MODE & CAUSES	FAILURE EFFECT	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE
CHECK VALVE/VENT FLOW SENSOR, ITEM 121 ----- SV771836-29 (1)	2/1R	121FN05: External leakage, gas.  CAUSE: Seal failure.	EMU ITEM: Suit gas leakage to ambient.  GFE INTERFACE: Excessive consumption of the primary oxygen supply. The SDP is automatically activated during EVA if the suit pressure drops to 3.33 psid.  MISSION: Terminate EVA. Loss of one EMU.  CREW/VEHICLE: None for single failure. Possible loss of crewmen with loss of SDP.	A. Design - The design of the elastomeric face and radial O-ring seals utilizes materials and dimensions which ensure sealing is achieved through elastomer compression between parallel surfaces and restrained from extrusion. The connector is a standard hemetically sealed device in which the electrical connector terminals are sealed by glass encapsulation.  B. Test - Component Acceptance test - The item is proof pressure tested at 0.25-8.75 psig for 5 minutes minimum. Following proof pressure the item is externally leakage tested 5.5 - 5.7 psig O2 for 5 minutes minimum. There shall be no bubbles in a 5 minute period.  CEI PDA Test - The vent loop is proof pressure tested at 0.25 - 8.65 psig for 5 minutes minimum. Sequentially total system leakage is verified per ventilation loop leakage testing. The vent loop is pressured at ports T2, T3, and T11 to 18.9 - 19.1 psia with O2, leakage shall not exceed 4.66 acc/min O2.  Certification Test - The item completed 3,655 flow and 1,983 check cycles which fulfilled the 15 year requirement during 3/85. No engineering changes have been incorporated since this time.  C. Inspection - All details, gases and test facilities are cleaned and inspected to 193150 ERSDA to preclude contamination clogging. Details, including the O-ring, O-ring grooves, and sealing surfaces, are 100% inspected per drawing dimensions and surface finish characteristics. Details are manufactured from material with certified physical and chemical properties.  D. Failure History - N-EMU-121-0902 (5-3-84) - External leakage due to a slight indentation crossing the seal parting line added external leakage test to IPT.


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
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NAME P/R QTY	CRIT	FAILURE MODE & CAUSES	FAILURE EFFECT	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE
	2/1R	121FN05:		<p>H-EMU-100--801 (5/16/90) - A breakthrough hole was discovered in the aluminum valve module housing from the vent loop to ambient at the drainport "W" housing wall. Investigation revealed an existing thin wall housing bore was overstressed during drainport "W" removal/installation. The thin wall condition (.011 inch) was caused by a drawing error corrected by EC 42806-771 (7/19/85). Existing bores will be illuminated and inspected before each flight during preflight drainport removal and draining.</p> <p>E. Ground Turnaround - Tested per FEMU-R-001, Gas Structural and Leakage.</p> <p>F. Operational Use - Crew Response - Trouble shoot problem, if no success, consider EMU 3 if available. EMU no go for EVA. EVA: When CVS data confirms an accelerated primary O2 use rate, terminate EVA. If CVS data confirms loss of suit pressure regulation coupled with an accelerated primary O2 use rate, abort EVA. Training - Standard EMU training covers this failure mode. Operational Considerations - Flight rules define go/no go criteria related to EMU suit pressure regulation. Flight rules require termination of EVA upon activation of SOP. EVA checklist and FDP procedures verify hardware integrity and systems operational status prior to EVA. Real time data system allows ground monitoring of EMU systems.</p>

# ITEM 122 CO<sub>2</sub> TRANSDUCER


P/N SV767798 OR P/N SV809145





# IR CO<sub>2</sub> TRANSDUCER

P/N SV809286  
**ITEM 122**



EMU - 782

