

C10
 CRITICAL ITEMS LIST
 (SEE) C10/R

NAME P/N QTY	CRIP	FAILURE MODE & CAUSES	FAILURE EFFECT	REASONING FOR ACCEPTANCE
RESERVE MATER. ITEM 140 02760991- 05 101	2/R	REWORKED; EXTERNAL WATER LEAKAGE. CAUSE: SEAL FAILURE.	END ITEM; WATER DAMAGE TO AIRCRAFT. CRY INTERFACE; DEFECTION OF THE O-RING WATER RESISTANCE. MISSION; LOSS OF USE OF THE ITEM. CREW/VEHICLE; NONE.	B. DESIGN - THE PERIMETER OF THE BLADDER OPENING HAS A PREDEFINED MESHING LAYER "O-RING" BONDED IN PLACE WHICH PERFORMS THE SEALING FUNCTION. THE SEALING CONCEPT IS THE SAME AS THAT OF A STANDARD FACE TYPE O-SEAL, CONSISTING OF AN ELASTOMERIC RING COMPRESSED AND RETAINED BETWEEN SMOOTH FLAT SURFACES. RADIAL SEALS (SEALING AND FACE SEALS DESIGN) ARE "DESIGNED" UNDER ALL TOLERANCE CONDITIONS AND ALSO LISTED. THE CAVITIES, BORES AND O-SEAL AREAS OF THE BLENDED ARE THE ONLY COATED WITH AN IMPROVED CORROSION INHIBITING COATING.
PC362-E "				B. TEST - COMPONENT ACCEPTANCE TEST - PER AT-E-030-2. AN EXTENSIVE LEAKAGE TEST IS PERFORMED BY PRESSURING THE ITEM GAS SIDE AND AIR SIDE WITH 15.0 - 15.6 PSIG NITROGEN. THE LEAKAGE AS MEASURED WITH A VOLUMETRIC MICROMETER FOR 10 MINUTES SHALL BE 0.5 SCC/MIN OR MAX.
HWB				FOR TEST - WITH THE ITEM INSTALLED IN THE PIDS THE AIR SIDE OF THE ITEM IS PRESSURIZED WITH 05.7 - 15.0 PSIG AIR. THE LEAKAGE SHALL BE 1 SCC/MIN MAX OR MEASURED WITH A VOLUMETRIC MICROMETER FOR 10 MINUTE PERIOD.
				CERTIFICATION TEST - THE ITEM'S SEALS WERE SUCCESSFULLY EXPOSED TO 30,000 FULL/DRAIN CYCLES AND 2,700 HOURS OF PRESSURIZED AIR DURING 1/84 VS A REQUIREMENT OF 1000 AND 1700 RESPECTIVELY.
				C. INSPECTION - THE SEALING SURFACES BETWEEN THE BLADDER TOWERS AND THE WATER TANK, THE VARIOUS BORES AND MESHING POINTS, AND THE TANK PRESSURE SURFACES ARE 100% INSPECTED TO MEET DIMENSIONAL AND SURFACE FINISH REQUIREMENTS. THE "O" RINGS ARE 100% INSPECTED FOR SURFACE CHARACTERISTICS PER SYMBOLED; CLASSES III. THE "O" SEALS BONDED TO THE ORBERS ARE 100% INSPECTED TO MEET DIMENSIONAL AND SURFACE FINISH REQUIREMENTS.

SEE
EMU-1054 FROM LIST
FIG. 101/10

NAME P.O. CITY	DATE	FATIGUE MODE & CAUSES	FATIGUE EFFECT	RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACCEPTANCE
WETMORE NATE R TAMK. 10101 D-01 20140602- 26 011	8/2	IDENTIFIED: EXTERNAL OILIER SEALS.		<p>D. FATIGUE HISTORY - J-EMU-000-001 (A-B-65) A LEAKY JOINT IN THE INBOARD WHEEL THE O-SEAL IS ADDED TO THE SLABBY SURFACE CAUSED EXTERNAL WATER SEALAGE. A NEW SLABBY PRINTING FINISH HAS BEEN INCORPORATED.</p> <p>E. GROUND DEMONSTRATION - TESTING IS PERFORMED PER EMU-1054, RESERVE TO PRIMARY MAINT TANK DAMAGE.</p> <p>F. OPERATIONAL USE - EMU RESPONSE. EVA: EMU-1054 DATA COMPARE LOGS OF PRIMARY FEEDBACK AND CHECKING IS INADEQUATE, FURTHER EVA. CONSIDER SECURITY DATA RECHANGE TO COVER THE OPERATION. TRAINING - STANDARD EMI TRAINING COVERS THIS FATIGUE MODE OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS - PILOT MUST BE AWARE OF EVIDENCE RELATED TO EMI THERMAL CONTROL. EVA CHECKLIST PROCEDURES VERIFY HARDWARE INTEGRITY AND SYSTEM OPERATIONAL STATUS PRIOR TO EVA. REAL TIME DATA SYSTEM ALONG GROUND MONITORING OF EMI SYSTEMS.</p>
FEIGER-D "				
JWB				

101/10