PROJECT: SRMS (-5 MCIU INSTALLED)
ASS'Y NOMENCLATURE: MCIU

SYSTEM: ELECTRICAL SUBSYSTEM
ASS'Y P/N: 51155F160-5   SHEET: 1

FMEA REF.	FMEA REV.	NAME, QTY, & DRAWING REF. DESIGNATION	FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE	FAILURE EFFECT ON END ITEM	HDWR / FUNC. 2/1R CRITICALITY	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE SCREENS: A-PASS, B-PASS, C-PASS
2075	0	COMPUTER I/F QTY. 1 SCHEMATIC 812753	MODE: LOSS OF INTERFACE SYNCH-RONIZATION CAUSE(S): 1) LOSS OF FRAME SYNC SIGNAL 2) LOSS OF 2 MHZ CLOCK	MCIU FAILURE WARNING. FRAME SYNC FAILURE DETECTOR WILL DETECT. LOSS OF COMMUNICATONS WITH ABE, GPC, AND DBC. GPC WILL STOP COMMUNICATIONS AFTER TWO CYCLES. AUTO BRAKES. ARM COMES TO REST. LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER SUPPORTED MODES. LOSS OF LIMPING DURING END EFFECTOR CAPTURE. LOSS OF EE AUTO DRIVE MODE. EE AUTO SEQUENCE IN PROGRESS MAY FAIL ON. WORST CASE ---------- UNEXPECTED MOTION. SIX JOINT RUNAWAY AUTOBRAKES. REDUNDANT PATHS REMAINING ------------- 1) AUTOBRAKES (FOR SAFING THE SYTEM) 2) DIRECT DRIVE AND EE MANUAL MODES. (FOR CONTINUING OPERATIONS)		**DESIGN FEATURES** ---------------- THE 16MHZ CLOCK IS GENERATED BY A HYBRID CRYSTAL OSCILLATOR. THIS DEVICE UTILIZES ESTABLISHED RELIABILITY EEE PARTS. THE DEVICE UTILIZES ESTABLISHED RELIABILITY EEE PARTS. THE DEVICE IS CONTROLLED BY SPAR PROCUREMENT SPEC. WHICH INCLUDES THE REQUIREMENT FOR PRE-CAP VISUAL INSPECTION. EEE PARTS HAVE BEEN SELECTED AND CONTROLLED IN ACCORDANCE WITH SPAR-RMS-PA.003. THIS DOCUMENT DEFINES THE PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS FOR MONITORING AND CONTROLLING EEE PARTS. THE REQUIREMENTS INCLUDE PART SELECTION TO AT LEAST "ESTABLISHED RELIABILITY" LEVELS, AND ADEQUATE DERATING OF PART STRESS LEVELS. PROCEDURES AND ACTIVITIES ARE SPECIFIED TO ENSURE AT LEAST EQUIVALENT QUALITY FOR NONSTANDARD AND IRREGULAR PARTS. RELIABILITY ANALYSIS HAS CONFIRMED NO PARTS WITH GENERICALLY HIGH FAILURE RATES. AEROSPACE DESIGN STANDARDS FOR DETAILING ELECTRONIC PARTS PACKAGING, MOUNTING AND STRUCTURAL/MECHANICAL/INTEGRITY OF ASSEMBLIES ARE APPLIED. SUCH DESIGN HAS BEEN REVIEWED AND FOUND SATISFACTORY THROUGH THE DESIGN AUDIT PROCESS, INCLUDING THE USE OF RELIABILITY, MAINTAINABILITY AND SAFETY CHECKLISTS. MATERIAL SELECTION AND USAGE CONFORMS TO SPAR-SG.368 WHICH IS EQUIVALENT TO THE NASA MATERIALS USAGE REQUIREMENTS. WORST CASE ANALYSIS HAS BEEN CONDUCTED TO ENSURE THAT PERFORMANCE CAN BE MET UNDER WORST CASE TEMPERATURE AND AGING EFFECTS. EEE PARTS STRESS ANALYSIS HAS BEEN COMPLETED AND CONFIRMS THAT THE PARTS MEET THE DERATING REQUIREMENTS. PRINTED CIRCUIT BOARD DESIGNS HAVE BEEN REVIEWED TO ENSURE ADEQUATE CIRCUIT PATH WIDTH AND SEPARATION AND TO CONFIRM APPROPRIATE DIMENSIONS OF CIRCUIT SOLDER PADS AND OF COMPONENT HOLE PROVISIONS. PARTS MOUNTING METHODS ARE CONTROLLED IN ACCORDANCE WITH MSFC-STD-136 WHICH DEFINES APPROVED-MOUNTING METHODS, STRESS RELIEF, AND COMPONENT SECURITY. WHERE APPLICABLE, DESIGN DRAWINGS AND DOCUMENTATION GIVE CLEAR IDENTIFICATION OF HANDLING PRECAUTIONS FOR ESD SENSITIVE PARTS. BOARD ASSEMBLY DRAWINGS INCLUDE THE REQUIREMENTS FOR SOLDERING STANDARDS IN ACCORDANCE WITH NHB 5300.4(3) AND JSC 08800. TTL LOGIC DEVICES HAVE GOOD NOISE IMMUNITY. MANUFACTURING TECHNOLOGY, AND RELIABILITY HISTORY, ARE WELL ESTABLISHED AND DOCUMENTED. LIFE EXPECTANCY IS INCREASED BY ENSURING THAT ALL ALLOWABLE STRESS LEVELS ARE DERATED IN ACCORDANCE WITH SPAR-RMS-PA.003. THE MIA IS AN ORBITER COMMON-USE ITEM, PROCURED TO ROCKWELL INTERNATIONAL SPECIFICATION MC 615-0000, AND IS CUSTOMER-SUPPLIED FOR SRMS USE. THE DESIGN DETAILS OF THE MIA ARE PROPRIATORY TO THE SINGER COMPANY AND EEE PARTS USED IN ITS BUILD ARE NOT SUBJECT TO CONTROL OR MONITORING BY THE SPAR EEE PARTS PROGRAM.

PREPARED BY: MFWG   SUPERCEDING DATE: NONE

DATE: 11 JUL 91   CIL REV: 0

CRITICAL ITEMS LIST

FMEA REF.	FMEA REV.	NAME, QTY, & DRAWING REF. DESIGNATION	FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE	FAILURE EFFECT ON END ITEM	HDWR / FUNC. 2/1R CRITICALITY	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE SCREENS: A-PASS, B-PASS, C-PASS
2075	0	COMPUTER I/F QTY. 1 SCHEMATIC 812753	MODE: LOSS OF INTERFACE SYNCH-RONIZATION CAUSE(S): 1) LOSS OF FRAME SYNC SIGNAL 2) LOSS OF 2 MHZ CLOCK	MCIU FAILURE WARNING. FRAME SYNC FAILURE DETECTOR WILL DETECT. LOSS OF COMMUNICATONS WITH ABE, GPC, AND D&C. GPC WILL STOP COMMUNICATIONS AFTER TWO CYCLES. AUTO BRAKES. ARM COMES TO REST. LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER SUPPORTED MODES. LOSS OF LIMPING DURING END EFFECTOR CAPTURE. LOSS OF EE AUTO DRIVE MODE. EE AUTO SEQUENCE IN PROGRESS MAY FAIL ON. WORST CASE ---------- UNEXPECTED MOTION. SIX JOINT RUNAWAY AUTOBRAKES. REDUNDANT PATHS REMAINING --------------- 1) AUTOBRAKES (FOR SAFING THE SYTEM) 2) DIRECT DRIVE AND EE MANUAL MODES. (FOR CONTINUING OPERATIONS)		THE MIA IS LOCATED ON THE COMPUTER INTERFACE PRINTED CIRCUIT BOARD ASSEMBLY. 12 VDC POWER IS SUPPLIED TO THE MIA THROUGH A VOLTAGE REGULATOR WHICH OPERATES FROM A 16 VDC SUPPLY, GENERATED BY THE MCPC. THE REGULATOR CIRCUIT IS ALSO LOCATED ON THE COMPUTER INTERFACE PCB, AND BASICALLY COMPRISES AN LM109HG TYPE REGULATOR AND A 1N829 ZENER REFERENCE DIODE. THESE EEE PARTS ARE CONTROLLED BY THE SPAR EEE PARTS PROGRAM. THE DESIGN UTILIZES PROVEN CIRCUIT TECHNIQUES AND IS IMPLEMENTED USING CMOS LOGIC DEVICES. CMOS DEVICES OPERATE AT LOW POWER AND HENCE DO NOT EXPERIENCE SIGNIFICANT OPERATING STRESSES. THE TECHNOLOGY IS MATURE, AND DEVICE RELIABILITY HISTORY IS WELL DOCUMENTED. ALL STRESSES ARE ADDITIONALLY REDUCED BY DERATING THE APPROPRIATE PARAMETERS IN ACCORDANCE WITH SPAR-RMS-PA.003. SPECIAL HANDLING PRECAUTIONS ARE USED AT ALL STAGES OF MANUFACTURE TO PRECLUDE DAMAGE/STRESS DUE TO ELECTRO-STATIC DISCHARGE.

PREPARED BY: MFWG   SUPERCEDING DATE: NONE   DATE: 11 JUL 91   CIL REV: 0

RMS/ELEC - 112

FMEA REF.	FMEA REV.	NAME, QTY, & DRAWING REF. DESIGNATION	FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE	FAILURE EFFECT ON END ITEM	HDWR / FUNC. 2/1R CRITICALITY	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE SCREENS: A-PASS, B-PASS, C-PASS
2075	0	COMPUTER I/F QTY. 1 SCHEMATIC 812753	MODE: LOSS OF INTERFACE SYNCH- RONIZATION CAUSE(S): 1) LOSS OF FRAME SYNC SIGNAL 2) LOSS OF 2 MHZ CLOCK	MCIU FAILURE WARNING. FRAME SYNC FAILURE DETECTOR WILL DETECT. LOSS OF COMMUNICATONS WITH ABE, GPC, AND D&C. GPC WILL STOP COMMUNICATIONS AFTER TWO CYCLES. AUTO BRAKES. ARM COMES TO REST. LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER SUPPORTED MODES. LOSS OF LIMPING DURING END EFFECTOR CAPTURE. LOSS OF EE AUTO DRIVE MODE. EE AUTO SEQUENCE IN PROGRESS MAY FAIL ON. WORST CASE ---------- UNEXPECTED MOTION. SIX JOINT RUNAWAY AUTOBRAKES. REDUNDANT PATHS REMAINING --------------- 1) AUTOBRAKES (FOR SAFING THE SYTEM) 2) DIRECT DRIVE AND EE MANUAL MODES. (FOR CONTINUING OPERATIONS)		ACCEPTANCE TESTS ---------------- THE MCIU IS SUBJECTED TO THE FOLLOWING ACCEPTANCE ENVIRONMENTAL TESTING AS AN LRU. O VIBRATION: LEVEL AND DURATION - REFERENCE TABLE 3.2 O THERMAL: +40 DEGREES C TO -16 DEGREES C (2 CYCLES) QUALIFICATION TESTS ------------------- THE MCIU IS SUBJECTED TO THE FOLLOWING LRU QUALIFICATION ENVIRONMENTS: O VIBRATION: LEVEL AND DURATION - REFERENCE TABLE 3.2 O SHOCK: BY SIMILARITY TO -3 MCIU O THERMAL: +51 DEGREES C TO -27 DEGREES C (10 CYCLES) O HUMIDITY: BY SIMILARITY TO -3 MCIU O EMC: MIL-STD-461 AS MODIFIED BY SL-E-0002 (TESTS CE01, CE03, CS01, CS02, CS06, RE02 (N/B), RS01, RS02 O LIFE: 630 OPERATING HOURS 1000 POWER ON/OFF CYCLES FLIGHT CHECKOUT --------------- PDRS OPS CHECKLIST (ALL VEHICLES) JSC 16987

PREPARED BY: MFWG   SUPERCEDING DATE: NONE

DATE: 11 JUL 91   CIL REV: 0

PROJECT: SRMS (-5 MCIU INSTALLED)   SYSTEM: ELECTRICAL SUBSYSTEM
ASS'Y NOMENCLATURE: MCIU   ASS'Y P/N: 51155F160-5   SHEET: __4__

FMEA REF.	FMEA REV.	NAME, QTY, & DRAWING REF. DESIGNATION	FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE	FAILURE EFFECT ON END ITEM	HDWR / FUNC. 2/1R CRITICALITY	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE SCREENS: A-PASS, B-PASS, C-PASS
2075	0	COMPUTER 1/F QTY. 1 SCHEMATIC 812753	MODE: LOSS OF INTERFACE SYNCH- RONIZATION CAUSE(S): 1) LOSS OF FRAME SYNC SIGNAL 2) LOSS OF 2 MHZ CLOCK	MCIU FAILURE WARNING. FRAME SYNC FAILURE DETECTOR WILL DETECT. LOSS OF COMMUNICATONS WITH AOE, GPC, AND D&C. GPC WILL STOP COMMUNICATIONS AFTER TWO CYCLES. AUTO BRAKES. ARM COMES TO REST. LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER SUPPORTED MODES. LOSS OF LIMPING DURING END EFFECTOR CAPTURE. LOSS OF EE AUTO DRIVE MODE. EE AUTO SEQUENCE IN PROGRESS MAY FAIL ON. WORST CASE --------- UNEXPECTED MOTION. SIX JOINT RUNAWAY AUTOBRAKES. REDUNDANT PATHS REMAINING --------------- 1) AUTOBRAKES (FOR SAFING THE SYTEM) 2) DIRECT DRIVE AND EE MANUAL MODES. (FOR CONTINUING OPERATIONS)	QA/INSPECTIONS -------------- DOCUMENTED QUALITY CONTROLS ARE EXERCISED THROUGHOUT DESIGN PROCUREMENT, PLANNING, RECEIVING, PROCESSING FABRICATION, ASSEMBLY, TESTING AND SHIPPING OF THE MCIU. GOVERNMENT SOURCE INSPECTION IS INVOKED AT VARIOUS LEVELS OF COMPONENT ASSEMBLY AND TEST OPERATIONS. MANDATORY INSPECTION POINTS ARE EMPLOYED AT VARIOUS LEVELS OF ASSEMBLY AND TEST. EEE PARTS INSPECTION IS PERFORMED AS REQUIRED BY SPAR-RMS-PA.003. EACH EEE PART IS QUALIFIED AT THE PART LEVEL TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE APPLICABLE SPECIFICATION. ALL EEE PARTS ARE 100% SCREENED AND BURNED IN, AS A MINIMUM, AS REQUIRED BY SPAR-RMS-PA.003, BY THE SUPPLIER. ADDITIONALLY, EEE PARTS ARE 100% RE-SCREENED IN ACCORDANCE WITH REQUIREMENTS, BY AN INDEPENDENT SPAR APPROVED TESTING FACILITY. DPA IS PERFORMED AS REQUIRED BY PA.003 ON A RANDOMLY SELECTED 5% OF PARTS, MAXIMUM 5 PIECES, MINIMUM 3 PIECES FOR EACH LOT NUMBER/DATE CODE OF PARTS RECEIVED. WIRE IS PROCURED, INSPECTED, AND TESTED TO SPAR-RMS-PA.003. RECEIVING INSPECTION VERIFIES THAT ALL PARTS RECEIVED ARE AS IDENTIFIED IN THE PROCUREMENT DOCUMENTS, THAT NO PHYSICAL DAMAGE HAS OCCURRED TO PARTS DURING SHIPMENT, THAT THE RECEIVING DOCUMENTS PROVIDE ADEQUATE TRACEABILITY INFORMATION AND SCREENING DATA CLEARLY IDENTIFIES ACCEPTABLE PARTS. PARTS ARE INSPECTED THROUGHOUT MANUFACTURE AND ASSEMBLY AS APPROPRIATE TO THE MANUFACTURING STAGE COMPLETED. THESE INSPECTIONS INCLUDE, PRINTED CIRCUIT BOARD INSPECTION FOR TRACK SEPARATION, DAMAGE AND ADEQUACY OF PLATED THROUGH HOLES, COMPONENT MOUNTING INSPECTION FOR CORRECT SOLDERING, WIRE LOOPING, STRAPPING, ETC. OPERATORS AND INSPECTORS ARE TRAINED AND CERTIFIED TO NASA NHB 5300.4(3A-1) STANDARD. CONFORMAL COATING INSPECTION FOR ADEQUATE PROCESSING IS PERFORMED USING ULTRAVIOLET LIGHT TECHNIQUES. POST P.C. BD. INSTALLATION INSPECTION, CLEANLINESS AND WORKMANSHIP (SPAR/GOVERNMENT REP. MANDATORY INSPECTION POINT) P.C. BD. INSTALLATION INSPECTION, CHECK FOR CORRECT BOARD INSTALLATION, ALIGNMENT OF BOARDS, PROPER CONNECTOR CONTACT MATING, WIRE ROUTING, STRAPPING OF WIRES ETC., PRE-CLOSURE INSPECTION, WORKMANSHIP AND CLEANLINESS (SPAR/GOVERNMENT REP. - MANDATORY INSPECTION POINT) PRE-ACCEPTANCE TEST INSPECTION, WHICH INCLUDES AN AUDIT OF LOWER TIER INSPECTION COMPLETION, AS BUILT CONFIGURATION VERIFICATION TO AS DESIGN ETC., (MANDATORY INSPECTION POINT). A TEST READINESS REVIEW (TRR) WHICH INCLUDES VERIFICATION OF TEST PERSONNEL, TEST DOCUMENTS, TEST EQUIPMENT CALIBRATION/ VALIDATION STATUS AND HARDWARE CONFIGURATION IS CONVENED BY

PREPARED BY: ___MFWG___   SUPERCEDING DATE: __NONE__   RMS/ELEC - 114   DATE: __11 JUL 91__   CIL REV: __0__

PROJECT: SRMS (-5 MCIU INSTALLED)
ASS'Y NOMENCLATURE: MCIU
SYSTEM: ELECTRICAL SUBSYSTEM
ASS'Y P/N: 51155F160-5
SHEET: 5

FMEA REF.	FMEA REV.	NAME, QTY, & DRAWING REF. DESIGNATION	FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE	FAILURE EFFECT ON END ITEM	HDWR / FUNC. 2/1R CRITICALITY	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE SCREENS: A-PASS, B-PASS, C-PASS
2075	0	COMPUTER I/F QTY. 1 SCHEMATIC 812753	MODE: LOSS OF INTERFACE SYNCH- RONIZATION CAUSE(S): 1) LOSS OF FRAME SYNC SIGNAL 2) LOSS OF 2 MHZ CLOCK	MCIU FAILURE WARNING. FRAME SYNC FAILURE DETECTOR WILL DETECT. LOSS OF COMMUNICATONS WITH ABE, GPC, AND D&C. GPC WILL STOP COMMUNICATIONS AFTER TWO CYCLES. AUTO BRAKES, ARM COMES TO REST. LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER SUPPORTED MODES. LOSS OF LIMPING DURING END EFFECTOR CAPTURE. LOSS OF EE AUTO DRIVE MODE. EE AUTO SEQUENCE IN PROGRESS MAY FAIL ON. WORST CASE ---------- UNEXPECTED MOTION. SIX JOINT RUNAWAY AUTOBRAKES. REDUNDANT PATHS REMAINING --------------- 1) AUTOBRAKES (FOR SAFING THE SYTEM) 2) DIRECT DRIVE AND EE MANUAL MODES. (FOR CONTINUING OPERATIONS)		QUALITY ASSURANCE IN CONJUNCTION WITH ENGINEERING, RELIABILITY, CONFIGURATION CONTROL, SUPPLIER AS APPLICABLE, AND THE GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVE, PRIOR TO THE START OF ANY FORMAL TESTING (ACCEPTANCE OR QUALIFICATION). ACCEPTANCE TESTING (ATP) INCLUDES AMBIENT, VIBRATION, AND THERMAL TESTING (SPAR/GOVERNMENT REP. - MANDITORY INSPECTION POINT).

PREPARED BY: MFWG
SUPERCEDING DATE: NONE
DATE: 11 JUL 91   CIL REV: 0

PROJECT: SRMS (-5 MCIU INSTALLED)
ASS'Y NOMENCLATURE: MCIU

SYSTEM: ELECTRICAL SUBSYSTEM
ASS'Y P/N: 51155F160-5   SHEET: __6_

FMEA REF.	FMEA REV.	NAME, QTY, & DRAWING REF. DESIGNATION	FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE	FAILURE EFFECT ON END ITEM	HDWR / FUNC. 2/1R CRITICALITY	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE SCREENS: A-PASS, B-PASS, C-PASS
2075	0	COMPUTER I/F QTY. 1 SCHEMATIC 812753	MODE: LOSS OF INTERFACE SYNCH- RONIZATION CAUSE(S): 1) LOSS OF FRAME SYNC SIGNAL 2) LOSS OF 2 MHZ CLOCK	MCIU FAILURE WARNING. FRAME SYNC FAILURE DETECTOR WILL DETECT. LOSS OF COMMUNICATONS WITH ABE, GPC, AND D&C. GPC WILL STOP COMMUNICATIONS AFTER TWO CYCLES. AUTO BRAKES. ARM COMES TO REST. LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER SUPPORTED MODES. LOSS OF LIMPING DURING END EFFECTOR CAPTURE. LOSS OF EE AUTO DRIVE MODE. EE AUTO SEQUENCE IN PROGRESS MAY FAIL ON. WORST CASE ---------- UNEXPECTED MOTION. SIX JOINT RUNAWAY AUTOBRAKES. REDUNDANT PATHS REMAINING ---------------- 1) AUTOBRAKES (FOR SAFING THE SYTEM) 2) DIRECT DRIVE AND EE MANUAL MODES. (FOR CONTINUING OPERATIONS)		FAILURE HISTORY --------------- THERE HAVE BEEN NO FAILURES ASSOCIATED WITH THIS FAILURE MODE ON THE SRMS PROGRAM.

PREPARED BY: __MFWG__   SUPERCEDING DATE: __NONE__

DATE: __11 JUL 91__   CIL REV: __0__

RMS/ELEC - 116

CRITICAL ITEMS LIST

FMEA REF.	FMEA REV.	NAME, QTY, & DRAWING REF. DESIGNATION	FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE	FAILURE EFFECT ON END ITEM	HDWR / FUNC. 2/1R CRITICALITY	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE SCREENS: A-PASS, B-PASS, C-PASS
2075	0	COMPUTER I/F QTY. 1 SCHEMATIC 812753	MODE: LOSS OF INTERFACE SYNCH-RONIZATION CAUSE(S): 1) LOSS OF FRAME SYNC SIGNAL 2) LOSS OF 2 MHZ CLOCK	MCIU FAILURE WARNING. FRAME SYNC FAILURE DETECTOR WILL DETECT. LOSS OF COMMUNICATONS WITH ABE, GPC, AND D&C. GPC WILL STOP COMMUNICATIONS AFTER TWO CYCLES. AUTO BRAKES. ARM COMES TO REST. LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER SUPPORTED MODES. LOSS OF LIMPING DURING END EFFECTOR CAPTURE. LOSS OF EE AUTO DRIVE MODE. EE AUTO SEQUENCE IN PROGRESS MAY FAIL ON. WORST CASE ---------- UNEXPECTED MOTION. SIX JOINT RUNAWAY AUTOBRAKES. REDUNDANT PATHS REMAINING -------------- 1) AUTOBRAKES (FOR SAFING THE SYTEM) 2) DIRECT DRIVE AND EE MANUAL MODES. (FOR CONTINUING OPERATIONS)		OPERATIONAL EFFECT ------------------ LOSS OF DATA. AUTOBRAKES. LOSS OF COMPUTER SUPPORTED MODES. LOSS OF LIMPING. LOSS OF EE AUTO MODES. D&C DATA WILL BE INVALID. DIRECT DRIVE AND BACKUP AVAILABLE. EE MODE MANUAL AVAILABLE WITHOUT TALKBACKS. CREW ACTION ----------- SELECT DIRECT DRIVE. USE EE MODE MANUAL. SINGLE/DIRECT DRIVE SWITCH SHOULD BE PULSED TO MAINTAIN PROPER RATES. CREW TRAINING ------------- CREW IS TRAINED: TO ALWAYS OBSERVE WHETHER THE ARM IS RESPONDING PROPERLY TO COMMANDS. IF IT ISN'T, APPLY BRAKES. TO RECOGNIZE AND RESPOND TO ALL OFF-NOMINAL OPERATIONS OF THE END EFFECTOR. MISSION CONSTRAINT ------------------ OPERATE UNDER VERNIER RATES WITHIN 10 FT OF STRUCTURE. THE OPERATOR MUST BE ABLE TO DETECT THAT THE ARM/PAYLOAD IS RESPONDING PROPERLY TO COMMANDS VIA WINDOW AND/OR CCTV VIEWS DURING ALL ARM OPERATIONS. SCREEN FAILURES --------------- N/A OMRSD OFFLINE -------------- VERIFY FRAME SYNC CHARACTERISTICS AT OUTPUT OF MCIU OMRSD ONLINE INSTALLATION ------------------------- NONE OMRSD ONLINE TURNAROUND ----------------------- EXERCISE THE ABE/MCIU DATA BUS. VERIFY ABSENCE OF MCIU FAILURE WARNING.