

FMEA NO. 2.1.1  
 CRITICALITY 2/2

SHUTTLE CCTV  
 CRITICAL ITEMS LIST

UNIT TVC/MLA  
 DWG NO. 2294819-506.508/  
2294820-502  
 SHEET 1 OF 9

FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE	FAILURE EFFECT ON END ITEM	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE
<p>No output signal to the VSU. Neither video or synchronization information is present.</p> <p><u>TVC</u>                      A1, 2294800-504 Sync Generator Clock Divider Chain.</p> <p>A2, 2294801-501 Camera Training Logic. A4, 2294804-503 Sync Formatter Video Output Drive.</p> <p>A6, 2294805-501 Power ON/OFF Switching Input Voltage Pre-regulator. Output Voltage Regulator                      A7, 2294806-503 DC-DC Converter Primary Oscillator Drive. Secondary Rectifiers/Filters.</p> <p>A13, 2295527-1 Master Oscillator.</p>	<p>Loss of camera output depicting scene information within FOV of lens assembly.</p> <p><u>Worst Case:</u>                      Loss of mission critical video.</p>	<p><u>DESIGN FEATURES</u></p> <p>The TVC/Lens Assembly is comprised of 16 electrical subassemblies; 13 subassemblies are RCA Astro designed and fabricated using standard printed-circuit board type of construction. The remaining three assemblies, high voltage power supply, oscillator, and stepper motors, are vendor supplied components which have been specified and purchased according to RCA Specification Control Drawings (SCDs) prepared by engineering and reliability assurance. Specifications per the SCD are prepared to establish the design, performance, test, qualification, and acceptance requirements for a procured piece of equipment.</p> <p>Parts, materials, processes, and design guidelines for the Shuttle CCTV program are specified in accordance with RCA 2295503. This document defines the program requirements for selection and control of FFE parts. To the maximum extent, and consistent with availability, all parts have been selected from military specifications at the JAN level, as a minimum. In addition to the overall selection criteria, a subset of general purpose preferred parts has been defined by this document and the RCA Government Systems Division Standard Parts List. In the case of the CMOS and TTL family of microcircuits, devices are screened and tested to the MCL-STO-083C equivalent and procured under the designations of HI-REL/3N0 and SNC 54LS from RCA-SSD and Texas Instruments Corp, respectively. Parts not included in the above documents have been used in the design only after a nonstandard item approval form (NSIAF) has been prepared, submitted to Reliability Assurance Engineering (RAE) and approved for use in the specific application(s) defined in the NSIAF by NASA-JSC.</p> <p>Worst-Case Circuit Analyses have been performed and documented for all circuit designs to demonstrate that sufficient operating margins exist for all operating conditions. The analysis was worst case-in that the value for each of the variable parameters was set to limits that will drive the output to a maximum (or minimum).</p> <p>A component application review and analysis was conducted to verify that the applied stress on each piece part by the temperature extremes identified with environmental qualification testing does not exceed the stress derating values identified in RCA 2295503.</p> <p>In addition, an objective examination of the design was performed through a PDR and CDR to verify that the TVC/Lens assembly met specification and contractual requirements.</p>

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FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE	FAILURE EFFECT ON END ITEM	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE	
<p>No output signal to the VSU. Neither video or synchronization information is present.</p> <p>TVC A1, 2294880-504 Sync Generator Clock Divider Chain.</p> <p>A2, 2294881-501 Camera Training Logic. A4, 2294884-503 Sync Formatter Video Output Drive.</p> <p>A6, 2294885-501 Power ON/OFF Switching Input Voltage Pre-regulator. Output Voltage Regulator</p> <p>A7, 2294886-503 DC-DC Converter Primary Oscillator Drive. Secondary Rectifiers/Filters.</p> <p>A13, 2295527-1 Master Oscillator.</p>	<p>Loss of camera output depicting scene information within FOV of lens assembly.</p> <p><u>Worst Case:</u> Loss of mission critical video.</p>	<p><b>DESIGN FEATURES (Continued)</b></p> <p><b>BARE BOARD DESIGN (A1, A6, A7)</b></p> <p>The design for the associated boards A1, A6, and A7 are constructed from laminated copper-clad epoxy glass sheets (NFMA G-10) Grade FR-4), PER MIL-P-55617A. Circuit connections are made through plated traces which run from point to point on the board surfaces. Every trace terminates at an annular ring. The annular ring surrounds the hole in which a component lead or terminal is located. This ring provides a footing for the solder, ensuring good mechanical and electrical performance. Its size and shape are governed by MIL-P-55640 as are trace widths, spacing and routing. These requirements are reiterated specifically in drawing notes to further assure compliance. Variations between the artwork master and the final product (due to irregularities of the etching process) are also controlled by drawing notes. This prevents making defective boards from good artwork. Holes which house no lead or terminal, but serve only to electrically interconnect the different board layers, contain stitch bars for mechanical support and increased reliability.</p> <p>The thru holes are drilled from a drill tape thus eliminating the possibility of human error and allowing tight control over hole and annular ring concentricity, an important reliability criterion. After drilling and etching, all copper cladding is tin-lead plated per MIL-STD-1495. This provides for easy and reliable soldering at the time of board assembly, even after periods of prolonged storage.</p> <p><b>BOARD ASSEMBLY DESIGN (A1, A6, A7)</b></p> <p>All components are installed in a manner which assures maximum reliability. Component leads are pre-tinned, allowing total wetting of solder joints. All leads are formed to provide stress relief and the bodies of large components are staked. Special mounting and handling instructions are included in each drawing required after final assembly. The board is coated with urethane which protects against humidity and contamination.</p>	

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FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE	FAILURE EFFECT ON END ITEM	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE
<p>to output signal to the VSU. Neither video or synchronization information is present.</p> <p>VC</p> <p>1. 2294800-504 Sync Generator Clock Divider Chain.</p> <p>2. 2294801-501 Camera Training Logic. A4, 2294804-503 Sync Formatter Video Output Drive.</p> <p>6. 2294805-501 Power ON/OFF Switching Input Voltage Pre-regulator. Dupul Voltage Regulator</p> <p>7. 2294806-503 DC-DC Converter Primary Oscillator Drive. Secondary Rectifiers/Filter.</p> <p>13. 2295527-1 Master Oscillator.</p>	<p>Loss of camera output depicting scene information within FOV of lens assembly.</p> <p><u>Worst Case:</u> Loss of Mission critical video.</p>	<p><u>DESIGN FEATURES</u> (Continued)</p> <p><b>BARE BOARD CONSTRUCTION (A2)</b></p> <p>The boards are of "welded wire" construction. At the bare board level this does not distinguish it from a normal PC board except that holes which will take weld pins generally are not connected to PC traces. Only those pins which bring power and ground potentials to the ICs are on PCs. An annular ring surrounds the hole in the board where each power and ground pin is located. These pins are then soldered to the trace like any other component lead. Aside from this feature, all design &amp; construction techniques used in PC board layout apply.</p> <p><b>BOARD ASSEMBLY (A2)</b></p> <p>The drilled and etched boards are populated with several hundred solderable or weldable pins. Power and ground pins, as well as connector pins, are soldered in place. Discreet components (resistors, diodes, capacitors) are attached to bifurcated terminals, where they are soldered. Flatpack ICs are welded, lead-by-lead, to the tops of the weld pins. After welding, extra lead material is trimmed away. Circuit connections are made using #30 AWG nickel weld wire. The wire is welded to the pin surfaces on the board backside. All wire welds are done using a machine which is tape driven, thus eliminating the possibility of miswiring due to operator error. All wiring &amp; circuit performance is tested prior to box-level installation. After successful testing, components are staked as required by drawing notes and the assembly is coated with urethane.</p> <p>The boards are inserted in the box on card-edge guides, in the same manner as the other PC boards.</p> <p><b>BOARD PLACEMENT</b></p> <p>The A7-A low voltage power supply board is bolted in place at 6 points around its perimeter. Four of these mounting screws also pass through and tie down the smaller A7-B board. These two boards are mounted face-to-face, separated by the standoffs. Electrical interconnections are achieved by jumper wires between the two boards. The A7-A houses a 34-pin connector which brings in power and signals from outside the module.</p> <p>The A7 module includes these two boards as well as power transistor Q4. The module housing is bent aluminum sheet, comprised of two halves screwed together. The boards and Q4 are secured to the lower half, and wired together. Then the upper half is put in place. By mounting Q4 directly to the aluminum housing, good thermal performance is assured.</p> <p>The A1, A2, and A6 boards are secured in the electronics assembly by gold-plated beryllium copper card guides. Connections are made to the mother board with blind-mated connectors. Disengagement during launch is prevented by a cover</p>

FMEA NO. <u>2.1.1</u> CRITICALITY <u>2/2</u>		SHUTTLE CCTV CRITICAL ITEMS LIST	UNIT <u>IYC/MLA</u> DWG NO. <u>2294819-506.508/</u> <u>2294820-502</u> SHEET <u>4</u> OF <u>9</u>
FATLURE MODE AND CAUSE	FATLURE EFFECT OR END ITEM	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE	
No output signal to the VSU. Neither video or synchronization information is present.  <u>IYC</u> A1, 2294880-504 Sync Generator Clock Divider Chain.  A2, 2294881-501 Camera Training Logic. A4, 2294884-503 Sync Former Video Output Drive.  A6, 2294865-501 Power ON/OFF Switching Input Voltage Pre-regulator. Output Voltage Regulator A7, 2294886-503 DC-DC Converter Primary Oscillator Drive. Secondary Rectifiers/Filters. A11, 2295527-1 Master Oscillator.	Loss of camera output depicting scene information within FOV of lens assembly.  <u>Worst Case:</u> Loss of mission critical video.	The A13 assembly is a temperature compensated voltage controlled crystal oscillator (TCVCO) that is purchased to a specification controlled drawing that establishes the requirements for performance, design, test, and qualification of the unit. The product assurance provisions of the document contain the identical requirements for electronic parts and materials as the Shuttle CCTV program and must receive the approval of RCA and NASA-JSC. Mechanical and electrical integrity of the assembly is confirmed by both analysis (design reviews) and test (qualification and acceptance).  <u>QUALIFICATION TEST</u>  For Qualification Test Flow, see Table 2 located at the front of this book.	

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FAILURE MODE AND  
CAUSE

4c output signal to the VSU. Neither video or synchronization information is present.

IVC

U1, 2294880-504 Sync Generator Clock Divider Chain.

U2, 2294881-501 Camera Training Logic. A4, 2294884-503 Sync Formatter Video Output Drive.

U6, 2294885-501 Power ON/OFF switching Input Voltage Pre-regulator. Output Voltage Regulator U7, 2294886 503 DC-DC Converter Primary Oscillator Drive. Secondary Rectifiers/Filters.

U13, 2295521-1 Master Oscillator.

FAILURE EFFECT  
ON END ITEM

Loss of camera output depicting scene information within FOV of lens assembly.

Worst Case:

Loss of mission critical video.

RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE

ACCEPTANCE TEST

The CCTV systems' TVC/MLA is subjected directly, without vibration isolators which might be used in their normal installation, to the following testing:

- Vibration:
 

20-80Hz:	3 dB/Oct-rise from 0.01 G <sup>2</sup> /Hz
80-350 Hz:	0.04 G <sup>2</sup> /Hz
350-750 Hz:	-3 dB/10 Oct-slope
Test Duration:	1 Minute per Axis
Test Level:	6.1 Grms
- Thermal Vacuum: In a pressure of  $1 \times 10^{-5}$  Torr, the temperature shall be as follows:
 

125° F:	Time to stabilize equipment plus 1 hour
25° F:	Time to stabilize equipment plus 1 hour
125° F:	Time to stabilize equipment plus 1 hour

The IVC/MLA may not have been subjected to the vacuum condition.

For Acceptance Test Flow, see Table 1 located at the front of this book.

OPERATIONAL TESTS

In order to verify that CCTV components are operational, a test must verify the health of all the command related components from the PHS (A7A1) panel switch, through the RCU, through the sync lines to the Camera/PTU, to the Camera/PTU command decoder. The test must also verify the camera's ability to produce video, the VSU's ability to route video, and the monitor's ability to display video. A similar test would be performed to verify the MDM command path.

Pre-Launch on Orbiter Test/In-Flight Test

1. Power CCTV System.
2. Via the PHS panel, select a monitor as destination and the camera under test as source.
3. Send "Camera Power On" command from PHS panel.
4. Select "External Sync" on monitor.
5. Observe video displayed on monitor. Note that if video on monitor is synchronized (i.e., stable raster) then this indicates that the camera is receiving composite sync from the RCU and that the camera is producing synchronized video.
6. Send Pan, Tilt, focus, Zoom, DIR, AND Gamma commands and visually (either via the monitor or direct observation) verify operation.
7. Select downlink as destination and camera under test as source.
8. Observe video routed to downlink.
9. Send "Camera Power Off" command via PHS panel.
10. Repeat Steps 3 through 9 except issue commands via the MDM command path.

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<b>FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE</b> No output signal to the VSU. Neither video or synchronization information is present.  <b>TVC</b> A1, 2294B80-504 Sync Generator Clock Divider Chain.  A2, 2294B81-501 Camera Training Logic. A4, 2294B84-503 Sync Former Video Output Drive.  A6, 2294B85-501 Power ON/OFF Switching Input Voltage Pre-regulator. Output Voltage Regulator A7, 2294B86-503 DC-DC Converter Primary Oscillator Drive. Secondary Rectifiers/filters.  A13, 2295527-1 Master Oscillator.	<b>FAILURE EFFECT ON END ITEM</b> Loss of camera output depicting scene information within FOV of lens assembly.  <b>Worst Case:</b> Loss of mission critical video.	<b>RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE</b>  <u>QA/INSPECTION</u>  <b>Procurement Control</b> - The TVC/MLA EEE Parts and hardware items are procured from approved vendors and suppliers, which meet the requirements set forth in the CCTV contract and Quality Plan Work Statement (WS-2593176). Resident DCAS personnel review all procurement documents to establish the need for GSI on selected parts (PAI 517).  <b>Incoming Inspection and Storage</b> - Incoming Quality inspections are made on all received materials and parts. Results are recorded by lot and retained in file by drawing and control numbers for future reference and traceability. All EEE parts are subjected to incoming acceptance tests as called for in PAI 315 - Incoming Inspection Test Instructions. Incoming flight parts are further processed in accordance with ACA 18466B4 - Preconditioning and Acceptance Requirements for Electronic Parts, with the exception that DPA and PIND testing is not performed. Mechanical items are inspected per PAI 316 - Incoming Inspection Instructions for mechanical items, PAI 305 - Incoming Quality Control Inspection Instruction, and PAI 612 - Procedure for Processing Incoming or Purchased Parts Designated for Flight Use. Accepted items are delivered to Material Controlled Stores and retained under specified conditions until fabrication is required. Non-conforming materials are held for Material Review Board (MRB) disposition. (PAI-307, PAI IQC-531.)  <b>Board Assembly &amp; Test</b> - Prior to the start of TVC board assembly, all items are verified to be correct by stock room personnel, as the items are accumulated to form a kit. The items are verified again by the operator who assembles the kit by checking against the as-built-parts-list (ABPL). DCAS Mandatory Inspection Points are designated for all printed circuit, wire wrap and welded wire boards, plus harness connectors for soldering wiring, crimping, solder splices and quality workmanship prior to coating of the component side of boards and sleeving of harnesses.  <p style="text-align: center;"><b>TVC Boards</b></p> Specific TVC board assembly and test instructions are provided in drawing notes, and applicable documents are called out in the Fabrication Procedure and Record (FPR-2294B19) and parts list PL2294B19. These include shuttle TVC assembly notes 2593660, Process Standard RTV-566 2280861, Process Standard - Bonding Velcro Tape 2280889, Specification Soldering 2280749, Specification Name Plate Application 1960167, Specification - Crimping 2280800, Specification - Bonding and Staking 2280878, Specification - Urethane coating 2280877, Specification - Locking compound 2026116, Specification Epoxy Adhesive 2010985, Specification - Marking 2280876, Specification - Workmanship 8030035, Specification Bonding and Staking 2280875.

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SHUTTLE CCTV  
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UNIT TVC/MIA  
 DWG NO. 2294819-506.508/  
2294820-502  
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FAILURE MODE AND  
 CAUSE

FAILURE EFFECT  
 ON END ITEM

RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE

No output signal to the VSU. Neither video or synchronization information is present.

Loss of camera output depicting scene information within FOV of lens assembly.

QA/INSPECTION (Continued)

IVC Assembly and Test

IVC  
 A1, 2294880-504 Sync Generator Clock Divider Chain.

Worst Case:  
 Loss of mission critical video.

An open box test is performed per TP-IT-2294819, and an Acceptance Test per TP-AT-2294819, including vibration and thermal vacuum. Torques are specified and witnessed, traceability numbers are recorded and calibrated tools are checked prior to use. RCA Quality and DCAS inspections are performed at the completion of specified FPR operations in accordance with PAI-204, PAI-205, PAI 206 and PAI 217. DCAS personnel witness TVC button-up and critical torquing.

A2, 2294881-501 Camera Training Logic. A4, 2294884-503 Sync Formatter Video Output Drive.

IVC/MIA Assembly and Test - After a TVC and an MIA have been tested individually, they are mated and a final acceptance test is performed per TP-AT-2294819, including vibration and thermal vacuum environments. RCA and DCAS personnel monitor these tests and review the acceptance test data/results. These personnel also inspect for conformance after all repair, rework and retest.

A6, 2294885-501 Power ON/OFF Switching Input Voltage Pre-regulator. Output Voltage Regulator A7, 2294886-503 DC-DC Converter Primary Oscillator Drive. Secondary Rectifiers/Filters.

Preparation for Shipment - The TVC and MIA are separated prior to shipment after fabrication and testing is complete. Each is packaged according to CCTV Letter 801) and 2280746, Process standard for Packaging and Handling guidelines. All related documentation including assembly drawings, Parts List, ABPL, Test Data, etc., is gathered and held in a documentation folder assigned specifically to each assembly. This folder is retained for reference. An EIDP is prepared for each assembly in accordance with the requirements of HS-2593176. RCA QC and DCAS personnel witness crating, packaging, packing, and marking, and review the EIDP for completeness and accuracy.

A13, 2295527-1 Master Oscillator.

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FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE	FAILURE EFFECT ON END ITEM	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE	
<p>No output signal to the VSU. Neither video or synchronization information is present.</p> <p><u>IVC</u>                      A1, 2294880-504 Sync Generator Clock Divider Chain.</p> <p>A2, 2294881-501 Camera Training Logic. A4, 2294884-503 Sync Formatter Video Output Drive.</p> <p>A6, 2294885-501 Power ON/OFF Switching Input Voltage Pre-regulator. Output Voltage Regulator                      A7, 2294886-503 DC-DC Converter Primary Oscillator Drive. Secondary Rectifiers/Filters.</p> <p>A13, 2295527-1 Master Oscillator.</p>	<p>Loss of camera output depicting scene information within FOV of lens assembly.</p> <p><u>Worst Case:</u>                      loss of mission critical video.</p>	<p><u>FAILURE HISTORY</u></p> <p>TDR - W2644 - Log #0462, TVC S/N F003-502                      IDR - W2640 - Log #0463, TVC S/N F003-502</p> <p><u>Description:</u> Integration Testing Failure                      Box Level                      Thermal-Vac Hot Environment</p> <p>No video from IVC. +28 volt current at 1.5 Amp limit. (30 minutes into thermal vac hot test cycle -105°F)</p> <p><u>Cause:</u> Short in A7 low voltage power supply. (High voltage winding of transformer)</p> <p><u>Corrective Action:</u> Removed and replaced transformer (sent to vendor for analysis). Short due to a pin-hole in magnet wire insulation. Future transformers to be purchased per revised spec control drawing ECM CCTV 649(B3026).</p> <p>TDR - W2740 - Log #0486 - TVC S/N 008-502</p> <p><u>Description:</u> Pre-Launch Test failure                      Box Level                      Ambient Environment</p> <p>REF: VJCS-2-01-0097 unit returned from KSC. Power was applied to wrong pins. (+28V).</p> <p><u>Cause:</u> Incorrect wiring of shuttle craft harness, put +28V to J1-10 and RTN to J1-9.</p> <p><u>Corrective Action:</u> Wiring of shuttle harness to be repaired by responsible organization. Failure analysis performed and corrective action taken on TVC S/N 008. A6 board-failure analysis indicated the following parts are to be changed. Q1, Q3, Q12, CR3, CR6, and R51 were replaced.</p> <p>TDR - W8024 - Log #0530 - TVC S/N 007-502</p> <p><u>Description:</u> Acceptance Test Failure                      Box Level                      Thermal Vac - Hot Environment.</p> <p>TVC drawing excessive current, &gt;1.5A. Failure occurred at +125°F.</p> <p><u>Cause:</u> Capacitor C10 on the A6 board was found to be shorted. A large quantity of solder flowed inside from sleeve thru header.</p> <p><u>Corrective Action:</u> Capacitor C10 removed &amp; replaced, (random part failure).</p>	



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SHUTTLE CCIV  
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FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE	FAILURE EFFECT ON END ITEM	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE
<p>No output signal to the VSO. Neither video or synchronization information is present.</p> <p><u>TVC</u>                      A1, 2294880-504 Sync Generator Clock Divider Chain.</p> <p>A2, 2294881-501 Camera Training Logic. A4, 2294884-503 Sync Formatter Video Output Drive.</p> <p>A6, 2294885-501 Power ON/OFF Switching Input Voltage Pre-regulator. Output Voltage Regulator                      A7, 2294886-503 DC-DC Converter Primary Oscillator Drive. Secondary Rectifiers/filters.</p> <p>A11, 2295527-1 Master Oscillator.</p>	<p>Loss of camera output depicting scene information within FOV of lens assembly.</p> <p><u>Worst Case:</u>                      Loss of mission critical video.</p>	<p><u>FAILURE HISTORY</u></p> <p>TDR - N6823 - Log #558 - TVC S/N 032-502                      Y1771 - Log #568 - TVC S/N 009-502                      Y1771 - Log #568 - TVC S/N 002-502                      Y1771 - Log #568 - TVC S/N 009-502                      Y1770 - Log #567 - TVC S/N 014-502                      Y1770 - Log #567 - TVC S/N 010-502                      Y1770 - Log #568 - TVC S/N 017-502                      W1729 - Log #578 - TVC S/N 020-502</p> <p><u>Description:</u> Flight Failure, Spacecraft Level                      RMS TV Camera circuit breaker popped open during flight mission STS-3.</p> <p><u>Cause:</u> Camera low voltage supply has erratic synchronization mode at low temperature.</p> <p><u>Corrective Action:</u> All flight cameras were returned under CCA35 for rework and retest to ECN C-1881. ECN (C-1881) to the low voltage power supplies eliminates the erratic synchronization problem. TVC group part no. has been changed from 2294819-502 to 504 to denote cameras that contain low voltage power supply modification.</p> <p>TDR - Y1773 - Log #0570 - TVC S/N 008-502</p> <p><u>Description:</u> Flight Failure                      Spacecraft Level (STS-3)</p> <p>TVC not synchronized for approximately 38 minutes. This problem occurred at cold temperature. Synchronization was regained at 2°C.</p> <p><u>Cause:</u> Loss of phase lock due to thermal asymmetry of the 3.58 MHz Phase detector.</p> <p><u>Corrective Action:</u> CCA 39 has been issued directing PCA to incorporate the heater and sync modifications (ECN CCT 838) to all flight camera's. TVC 008 was modified accordingly. TVC group number has been updated from group 502 to 506.</p> <p>TDR - Y1779 - Log #576 - TVC S/N 014-502</p> <p><u>Description:</u> Flight Failure (STS-3)                      Spacecraft Level</p> <p>TDR was opened to follow relay K1 - contacts 5 and 8 failure on ass'y 2294885-501 S/N F018.</p>

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UNET - TVC/MLA  
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FAILURE MODE AND  
 CAUSE

No output signal to the VSU. Neither video or synchronization information is present.

TVC  
 A1, 2294880-504 Sync Generator Clock Divider Chain.

A2, 2294881-501 Camera Training Logic. A4, 2294884-503 Sync Formatter Video Output Drive.

A6, 2294885-501 Power ON/OFF Switching Input Voltage Pre-regulator. Output Voltage Regulator  
 A7, 2294886-503 DC-DC Converter Primary Oscillator Drive. Secondary Rectifiers/Filters.

A13, 2295527-1 Master Oscillator.

FAILURE EFFECT  
 ON END ITEM

Loss of camera output depicting scene information within FOV of lens assembly.

Worst Case:  
 Loss of mission critical video.

RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE

FAILURE HISTORY

Cause: TVC low voltage power supply has erratic synchronization at low temperature. Relay failure result of excessively high current through contacts 5 and 8 during reset command.

Corrective Action: Removed and replaced K1 on the A6 board. Low voltage power supply was reworked to ECM-C1881. Refer to TDR N6823 for complete history of erratic synchronization problem.

TDR - W1360 - Log #083B - TVC S/N 026-506

Description: Flight Failure, Spacecraft Level  
 SIS-8

During the flight operations, one time when crew turned camera on they had no control of ALC and Gamma functions. Problem resolved itself by recycling power.

Cause: After numerous operations, the reported condition was duplicated on test set. After initial turn on, camera would not except ALC, and Gamma commands. It was found that the output of U33 Pin 6 CMD F.F. reset on A2 board was set in a high state. This should normally have been reset low by either "POR" or bit count 88 pulses, after initial power turn-on. Suspect devices A2 - U26, U66, U67, and U68.

Corrective Action: Removed and replaced the following parts on the A2 Board U26, U66, U67, and U68. Lab analysis did not indicated any defect with removed parts. Problem has not recurred after new parts were installed.

IDR - A3939 - Log #0954 - TVC S/N 031-506

Description: Flight Failure, Spacecraft Level  
 SIS-14

Problem report PV6-D84037  
 No video output

Cause: Defective Relay K-1 on the A6 Board.

Corrective Action: Cause due to a foreign conductive particle temporarily lodged between relay leads and board P.C. traces. Relay K-1 sent to product assurance lab for analysis, report #A3909. Numerous discrepancies were found, none of which were critical.

FMEA NO. <u>2.1.1</u> CRITICALITY <u>2/2</u>	SHUTTLE CCTV CRITICAL ITEMS LIST	UNIT <u>TVC/MIA</u> DWG NO. <u>2294819-506, 508/</u> <u>2294820-502</u> SHEET <u>BC</u> OF <u>9</u>
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FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE	FAILURE EFFECT ON END ITEM	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE
<p>No output signal to the VSO. Neither video or synchronization information is present.</p> <p><u>IVC</u>            A1, 2294880-504 Sync Generator Clock Divider Chain.</p> <p>A2, 2294881-501 Camera Training Logic. A4, 2294804-503 Sync Formatter Video Output Drive.</p> <p>A6, 2294885-501 Power ON/OFF Switching Input Voltage Pre-regulator. Output Voltage Regulator</p> <p>A7, 2294886-503 DC-DC Converter Primary Oscillator Drive. Secondary Rectifiers/Filters.</p> <p>A13, 2295027-1 Master Oscillator.</p>	<p>Loss of camera output depicting scene information within FOV of lens assembly.</p> <p><u>Worst Case:</u>            Loss of mission critical video.</p>	<p><u>FAILURE HISTORY</u></p> <p>TDR - B-3521 - Log #1165 - TVC S/N 038-508</p> <p><u>Description:</u> Acceptance Test Failure            Box Level            Thermal Vac - Hot Environment            Excessive supply current, lost all DLR/camera lights and output video information.</p> <p><u>Cause:</u> Shorted capacitor C14 on A6 board.</p> <p><u>Corrective Action:</u> C14 removed and replaced with new capacitor. Product assurance lab could not find a cause for shorted cap. (Report # B5321A)            Considered random failure.</p>

FHEA NO. 2.3.1

CRITICALITY 2/2

SHUTTLE CCTV  
CRITICAL ITEMS LIST

UNIT TVC/MLA  
DWG NO. 2294879-506, 508/  
2294870-507  
SHEET 9 OF 9

FAILURE MODE AND  
CAUSE

No output signal to the VSU. Neither video or synchronization information is present.

IYC

A1, 2294880-504 Sync Generator Clock Divider Chain.

A2, 2294881-501 Camera Training Logic. A4, 2294884-503 Sync Formulator Video Output Drive.

A6, 2294885-501 Power ON/OFF Switching Input Voltage Pre-regulator. Output Voltage Regulator  
A7, 2294886-503 DC-DC Converter Primary Oscillator Drive. Secondary Rectifiers/Filters.

A13, 2295527-1 Master Oscillator.

FAILURE EFFECT  
ON END ITEM

Loss of camera output depicting scene information within FOV of lens assembly.

Worst Case:

Loss of mission critical video.

RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE

OPERATIONAL EFFECTS

Loss of video. Possible loss of major mission objectives due to loss of RMS cameras or other required cameras.

CREW ACTIONS

If possible, continue RMS operations using alternative visual cues.

CREW TRAINING

Crew should be trained to use possible alternatives to CCTV.

MISSION CONSTRAINT

Where possible, procedures should be designed so they can be accomplished without CCTV.