

CRITICAL ITEMS LIST

PROJECT: SRMS

ASS'Y NOMENCLATURE: SERVO POWER AMPLIFIER

SYSTEM: ELECTRICAL SUBSYSTEM

ASS'Y P/N: 5114091177

SHEET: 1

PWEA REF.	PWEA REV.	NAME, QTY, & DRAWING REF. DESIGNATION	FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE	FAILURE EFFECT ON END ITEM	MDWR / FUNC. 2/1R CRITICALITY RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE SCREENS: A-PASS, B-PASS, C-PASS
2620	1	PHASE LOCK LOOP QTY-6 SCHEMATIC 2563723	<p>MODE: LOSS OF OR INCORRECT TACHOMETER FEED BACK TO SERVO LOOP AND MCIU.</p> <p>CAUSE(S): (1) FAILURE OF PULSE SHAPER. (2) FILTER FAILS OPEN. (3) VCO-PLL FAILURE OF 2*6 DIVIDER</p>	<p>COUNTER PRODUCING RATE DATA IS ERRONEOUSLY OR NOT UPDATED. MAY RESULT IN A MAXIMUM NEGATIVE (CCU) COMMAND. MOTOR WILL BE DRIVEN AT MAXIMUM RATE CCV. RATE DATA TO THE MCIU/GPC WILL BE ERRONEOUS. AUTO BRAKES INITIATED. LOSS OF LIMPING DURING EMO EFFECTOR CAPTURE.</p> <p>WORST CASE ----- UNEXPECTED MOTION, JOINT RUNAWAY, AUTOBRAKES.</p> <p>REDUNDANT PATHS REMAINING ----- AUTOBRAKES</p>	<p>DESIGN FEATURES -----</p> <p>COMPARATORS AND OPERATIONAL AMPLIFIERS ARE STANDARD LINEAR INTEGRATED CIRCUITS WITH MATURE MANUFACTURING TECHNOLOGY. APPLICATION CONSTRAINTS ARE IN ACCORDANCE WITH SPAR-RMS-PA.003.</p> <p>ALL RESISTORS AND CAPACITORS USED IN THE DESIGN ARE SELECTED FROM ESTABLISHED RELIABILITY (ER) TYPES. LIFE EXPECTANCY IS INCREASED BY ENSURING THAT ALL ALLOWABLE STRESS LEVELS ARE DERATED IN ACCORDANCE WITH SPAR-RMS-PA.003. ALL CERAMIC AND ELECTROLYTIC CAPACITORS ARE ROUTINELY SUBJECTED TO RADIOGRAPHIC INSPECTION.</p> <p>THE DESIGN UTILIZES PROVEN CIRCUIT TECHNIQUES AND IS IMPLEMENTED USING CMOS LOGIC DEVICES.</p> <p>CMOS DEVICES OPERATE AT LOW POWER AND HENCE DO NOT EXPERIENCE SIGNIFICANT OPERATING STRESSES. THE TECHNOLOGY IS MATURE, AND DEVICE RELIABILITY HISTORY IS WELL DOCUMENTED. ALL STRESSES ARE ADDITIONALLY REDUCED BY DERATING THE APPROPRIATE PARAMETERS IN ACCORDANCE WITH SPAR-RMS-PA.003. SPECIAL HANDLING PRECAUTIONS ARE USED AT ALL STAGES OF MANUFACTURE TO PRECLUDE DAMAGE/STRESS DUE TO ELECTROSTATIC DISCHARGE.</p> <p>VCO AND PLL COMPONENTS ARE SCREENED TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF SPAR-RMS-PA.003.</p>

RMS/ELEC - 327

PREPARED BY: MFMG

SUPERCEDING DATE: 11 SEP 86

APPROVED BY:

DATE: 24 JUL 91

CPL REV: 1

CRITICAL ITEM LIST

PROJECT: SMS
 ASSY NUMBER/CATEGORY: SERVO POWER AMPLIFIER

SYSTEM: ELECTRICAL SUBSYSTEM
 ASSY P/N: 5114071177

SHEET: 2

FMEA REF.	FMEA REV.	NAME QTY & DRAWING REF. DESIGNATION	FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE	FAILURE EFFECT ON END ITEM	HOWR / FUNC. 2/1R CRITICALITY	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE SCREENS: A-PASS, B-PASS, C-PASS
2620	1	PHASE LOCK LOOP Q11-6 SCHEMATIC 2563723	<p>MODE: LOSS OF OR INCORRECT TACHOMETER FEED BACK TO SERVO LOOP AND MCIU.</p> <p>CAUSE(S): (1) FAILURE OF PULSE SHAPER. (2) FILTER FAILS OPEN. (3) VCO-PLL FAILURE OF 2**6 DIVIDER</p>	<p>COUNTER PRODUCING RATE DATA IS ERRONEOUSLY OR NOT UPDATED. MAY RESULT IN A MAXIMUM NEGATIVE (CCW) COMMAND. MOTOR WILL BE DRIVEN AT MAXIMUM RATE CCW. RATE DATA TO THE MCIU/GPC WILL BE ERRONEOUS. AUTO BRAKES INITIATED. LOSS OF LIMPING DURING END EFFECTOR CAPTURE.</p> <p>WORST CASE UNEXPECTED MOTION, JOINT RUNAWAY, AUTOBRAKES.</p> <p>REDUNDANT PATHS REMAINING ----- AUTOBRAKES</p>	<p>ACCEPTANCE TESTS ----- THE SPA IS SUBJECTED TO THE FOLLOWING ENVIRONMENTAL TESTING AS AN SRU.</p> <p>O VIBRATION: LEVEL AND DURATION - REFERENCE TABLE 4 O THERMAL: PLUS 70 DEGREES C TO -25 DEGREES C DURATION - 1 1/2 CYCLES</p> <p>THE SPA IS THEN TESTED AS PART OF THE JOINTS ACCEPTANCE TESTS (VIBRATION AND THERMAL VACUUM TEST).</p> <p>THE SPA'S/JOINTS UNDERGO RMS SYSTEM TESTS (TP510 RMS STRONGBACK AND TP552 FLAT FLOOR TESTS) WHICH VERIFIES THE ABSENCE OF THE FAILURE MODE.</p> <p>QUALIFICATION TESTS ----- THE SPA IS SUBJECTED TO THE FOLLOWING SRU QUALIFICATION TEST ENVIRONMENTS. THE SPA WAS ALSO TESTED AS PART OF THE JOINT QUALIFICATION TESTS.</p> <p>O VIBRATION: LEVEL AND DURATION - REFERENCE TABLE 4 O SHOCK: 200/11 MS/3 AXES (6 DIRECTIONS) O THERMAL VAC: +81 DEGREES C TO -36 DEGREES C (6 CYCLES) 1x10**6 TORR O HUMIDITY: TESTED WITH THE SHOULDER JOINT O EMC: MIL-STD-461 AS MODIFIED BY SL-E-0002 (TEST CE01, CE03, CS01, CS02, CS06, RE01, RE02 (N/B), RS01)</p> <p>FLIGHT CHECKOUT ----- PDRS OPS CHECKLIST (ALL VEHICLES) JSC 16987</p>	

RMS/ELEC - 328

CRITICAL ITEMS LIST

PROJECT: SRMS
 ASS'Y NAME/DESCRIPTION: STROBE POWER AMPLIFIER

SYSTEM: OPTICAL SUBSYSTEM
 ASS'Y P/N: 5112071177

SHEET: 3

IMEA REF.	IMEA REV.	NAME, QTY & DRAWING REF. DESIGNATION	FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE	FAILURE EFFECT ON END ITEM	HOWR / FUNC. 2/1R CRITICALITY	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE SCREENS: A-PASS, B-PASS, C-PASS
2620	1	PHASE LOCK LOOP QTY 6 SCHEMATIC 2563723	<p>MODE: LOSS OF OR INCORRECT TACHOMETER FEED BACK TO SERVO LOOP AND MCIU.</p> <p>CAUSE(S): (1) FAILURE OF PULSE SHAPER. (2) FILTER FAILS OPEN. (3) VCO-PLL FAILURE OF 2**6 DIVIDER</p>	<p>COUNTER PRODUCING RATE DATA IS ERRONEOUSLY OR NOT UPDATED. MAY RESULT IN A MAXIMUM NEGATIVE (CCW) COMMAND. MOTOR WILL BE DRIVEN AT MAXIMUM RATE CCW. RATE DATA TO THE MCIU/GPC WILL BE ERRONEOUS. AUTO BRAKES INITIATED. LOSS OF LIMPING DURING END EFFECTOR CAPTURE.</p> <p>WORST CASE ----- UNEXPECTED MOTION. JOINT RUNAWAY. AUTOBRAKES.</p> <p>REDUNDANT PATHS REMAINING ----- AUTOBRAKES</p>	<p>QA/INSPECTIONS -----</p> <p>UNITS ARE MANUFACTURED UNDER DOCUMENTED QUALITY CONTROLS. THESE CONTROLS ARE EXERCISED THROUGHOUT DESIGN PROCUREMENT, PLANNING, RECEIVING, PROCESSING, FABRICATION, ASSEMBLY, TESTING AND SHIPPING OF THE UNITS. MANDATORY INSPECTION POINTS ARE EMPLOYED AT VARIOUS STAGES OF FABRICATION ASSEMBLY AND TEST. GOVERNMENT SOURCE INSPECTION IS INVOKED AT VARIOUS CONTROL LEVELS.</p> <p>EEE PARTS INSPECTION IS PERFORMED AS REQUIRED BY SPAR-RMS-PA.003. EACH EEE PART IS QUALIFIED AT THE PART LEVEL TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE APPLICABLE SPECIFICATION. ALL EEE PARTS ARE 100% SCREENED AND BURNED IN, AS A MINIMUM AS REQUIRED BY SPAR-RMS-PA.003, BY THE SUPPLIER. ADDITIONALLY, EEE PARTS ARE 100% RE-SCREENED IN ACCORDANCE WITH REQUIREMENTS, BY AN INDEPENDENT SPAR APPROVED TESTING FACILITY. DPA IS PERFORMED AS REQUIRED BY PA.003 ON A RANDOMLY SELECTED 5% OF PARTS, MAXIMUM 5 PIECES MINIMUM 3 PIECES FOR EACH LOT NUMBER/DATE CODE OF PARTS RECEIVED.</p> <p>WIRE IS PROCURED TO SPECIFICATION MIL-W-22759 OR MIL-W-81381 AND INSPECTED AND TESTED TO NASA JSCN8000 STANDARD NUMBER 95A.</p> <p>RECEIVING INSPECTION VERIFIES THAT ALL PARTS RECEIVED ARE AS IDENTIFIED IN THE PROCUREMENT DOCUMENTS THAT NO PHYSICAL DAMAGE HAS OCCURRED TO PARTS DURING SHIPMENT THAT THE RECEIVING DOCUMENTS PROVIDE ADEQUATE TRACEABILITY INFORMATION AND SCREENING DATA CLEARLY IDENTIFIES ACCEPTABLE PARTS.</p> <p>PARTS ARE INSPECTED THROUGHOUT MANUFACTURE AND ASSEMBLY AS APPROPRIATE TO THE MANUFACTURING STAGE COMPLETED. THESE INSPECTIONS INCLUDE,</p> <p>PRINTED CIRCUIT BOARD INSPECTION FOR TRACK SEPARATION, DAMAGE AND ADEQUACY OF PLATED THROUGH HOLES,</p> <p>COMPONENT MOUNTING INSPECTION FOR CORRECT SOLDERING, WIRE LOOPING, STRAPPING, ETC. OPERATORS AND INSPECTORS ARE TRAINED AND CERTIFIED TO NASA NHB 5300.4(3A) STANDARD, AS MODIFIED BY JSC 0800A.</p> <p>CONFORMAL COATING INSPECTION FOR ADEQUATE PROCESSING IS PERFORMED USING ULTRAVIOLET LIGHT TECHNIQUES.</p> <p>POST P.C. BD. INSTALLATION INSPECTION, CLEANLINESS AND WORKMANSHIP (SPAR/GOVERNMENT REP. MANDATORY INSPECTION POINT)</p> <p>P.C. BD. INSTALLATION INSPECTION, CHECK FOR CORRECT BOARD INSTALLATION, ALIGNMENT OF BOARDS, PROPER CONNECTOR CONTACT MATING, WIRE ROUTING, STRAPPING OF WIRES ETC.,</p> <p>PRE-CLOSURE INSPECTION, WORKMANSHIP AND CLEANLINESS (SPAR/GOVERNMENT REP. - MANDATORY INSPECTION POINT)</p> <p>PRE-ACCEPTANCE TEST INSPECTION, WHICH INCLUDES AN AUDIT OF LOWER TIER INSPECTION COMPLETION, AS BUILT CONFIGURATION VERIFICATION TO AS DESIGN ETC., (MANDATORY INSPECTION POINT).</p>	

RMS/ELEC - 329

PREPARED BY:

MFWG

SUPERSEDING DATE: 11 SEP 86

APPROVED BY:

DATE: 24 JUL 91

CIT REV: 1

CRITICAL ITEM LIST

PROJECT: SRMS
 ASSY MANUFACTURE: SERVO POWER AMPLIFIER

SYSTEM: ELECTRICAL SUBSYSTEM
 ASSY P/N: 5114071177

SHEET: 4

IMEA REF.	IMEA REV.	NAME, QTY & DRAWING DET. DESIGNATION	FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE	FAILURE EFFECT OR END ITEM	HOW / FUNC. 2/1R CRITICALITY	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE SCREENS: A-PASS, B-PASS, C-PASS
7670	1	PHASE LOCK LOOP QTY & SCHEMATIC 2563723	<p>MODE: LOSS OF OR INCORRECT TACHMETER FEED BACK TO SERVO LOOP AND MCIU.</p> <p>CAUSE(S): (1) FAILURE OF PULSE SHAPER. (2) FILTER FAILS OPEN. (3) VCO-PLL FAILURE OF 2**6 DIVIDER</p>	<p>COMPUTER PRODUCING RATE DATA IS ERRONEOUSLY OR NOT UPDATED, MAY RESULT IN A MAXIMUM NEGATIVE (CCU) COMMAND. MOTOR WILL BE DRIVEN AT MAXIMUM RATE CCU. RATE DATA TO THE MCIU/GPC WILL BE ERRONEOUS. AUTO BRAKES INITIATED. LOSS OF LIMPING DURING END EFFECTOR CAPTURE.</p> <p>WORST CASE ----- UNEXPECTED MOTION. JOINT RIMAVAT. AUTOBRAKES.</p> <p>REDUNDANT PATHS REMAINING ----- AUTOBRAKES</p>	2/1R	<p>A TEST READINESS REVIEW (TRR) WHICH INCLUDES VERIFICATION OF TEST PERSONNEL, TEST DOCUMENTS, TEST EQUIPMENT CALIBRATION/ VALIDATION STATUS AND HARDWARE CONFIGURATION IS CONVENED BY QUALITY ASSURANCE IN CONJUNCTION WITH ENGINEERING, RELIABILITY, CONFIGURATION CONTROL, SUPPLIER AS APPLICABLE, AND THE GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVE, PRIOR TO THE START OF ANY FORMAL TESTING (ACCEPTANCE OR QUALIFICATION).</p> <p>ACCEPTANCE TESTING (ATP) INCLUDES AMBIENT PERFORMANCE, THERMAL AND VIBRATION TESTING, (SPAR/GOVERNMENT REP. - MANDATORY INSPECTION POINT).</p> <p>INTEGRATION OF UNIT TO JOINT SRU - INSPECTIONS INCLUDE GROUNDING CHECKS, CONNECTORS FOR BENT OR PUSHBACK CONTACTS, VISUAL, CLEANLINESS, INTERCONNECT WIRING AND POWER UP TEST TO THE APPROPRIATE JOINT INSPECTION TEST PROCEDURE (ITP) ETC.</p> <p>JOINT LEVEL PRE-ACCEPTANCE TEST INSPECTION, INCLUDES AN AUDIT OF LOWER TIER INSPECTION COMPLETION, AS BUILT CONFIGURATION VERIFICATION TO AS DESIGN ETC.</p> <p>JOINT LEVEL ACCEPTANCE TESTING (ATP) INCLUDES AMBIENT, VIBRATION AND THERMAL-VAC TESTING. (SPAR/GOVERNMENT REP. - MANDATORY INSPECTION POINT).</p> <p>SRMS SYSTEMS INTEGRATION, THE INTEGRATION OF MECHANICAL ARM SUBASSEMBLIES AND THE FLIGHT CABIN EQUIPMENT TO FORM THE SRMS. INSPECTIONS ARE PERFORMED AT EACH PHASE OF INTEGRATION WHICH INCLUDES GROUNDING CHECKS, THRU WIRING CHECKS, WIRING ROUTING, INTERFACE CONNECTORS FOR BENT OR PUSH BACK CONTACTS ETC.</p> <p>SRMS SYSTEMS TESTING - STRONGBACK AND FLAT FLOOR AMBIENT PERFORMANCE TEST. (SPAR/GOVERNMENT REP. - MANDATORY INSPECTION POINT)</p>

RMS/ELEC - 330

PREPARED BY:

NFWQ

SUPERSEDING DATE: 11 SEP 86

APPROVED BY:

DATE: 24 JUL 91

CIL REV: 1

CRITICAL ITEM LIST

PROJECT: SRMS
ASS'Y NO: _____

FAILURE: SERVO POWER AMPLIFIER

SYSTEM: ELECTRICAL SUBSYSTEM
ASS'Y P/N: 51120F1177

SHEET: _____

IHEA REF.	IHEA REV.	NAME, QTY & DRAWING REF. DESIGNATION	FAILURE MODE AND FAULTS	FAILURE EFFECT ON END ITEM	HOWR / FUNC. 2/1R CRITICALITY RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE SCREENS: A-PASS, B-PASS, C-PASS
2620	1	PHASE LOCK LOOP Q1Y-6 SCHEMATIC 2563723	<p>NOTE: LOSS OF OR INCORRECT TACHOMETER FEED BACK TO SERVO LOOP AND MCIU.</p> <p>CAUSE(S): (1) FAILURE OF PULSE SHAPER. (2) FILTER FAILS OPEN. (3) VCO-PLL FAILURE OF 2ND DIVIDER</p>	<p>COUNTER PRODUCING RATE DATA IS ERRONEOUSLY OR NOT UPDATED. MAY RESULT IN A MAXIMUM NEGATIVE (CCU) COMMAND. MOTOR WILL BE DRIVEN AT MAXIMUM RATE CCU. RATE DATA TO THE MCIU/GPC WILL BE ERRONEOUS. AUTO BRAKES INITIATED. LOSS OF LIMPING DURING END EFFECTOR CAPTURE.</p> <p>WORST CASE ----- UNEXPECTED MOTION. JOINT RUNAWAY. AUTOBRAKES.</p> <p>REDUNDANT PATHS REMAINING ----- AUTOBRAKES</p>	<p>FAILURE HISTORY -----</p> <p>THE FOLLOWING FAILURE ANALYSIS REPORT(S) ARE RELEVANT:</p> <p>FAR 3320: S/N 313 OCT 82</p> <p>DESCRIPTION FILTER OUTPUT VOLTAGES ONE - HALF EXPECTED VALUES. FOUND FAILED U9 (HA2700), SUSPECTED ELETRIO-STATIC DISCHARGE.</p> <p>CORRECTIVE ACTION ----- REPLACED FAILED COMPONENT.</p>

RMS/ELEC - 331

PREPARED BY: MMG

SUPERSEDING DATE: 11 SEP 90

APPROVED BY: _____

DATE: 24 JUL 91

CIL REV: 1

CRITICAL ITEMS LIST

PROJECT: SRMS
 ASS'Y Nomenclature: SERVO POWER AMPLIFIER

SYSTEM: ELECTRICAL SUBSYSTEM
 ASS'Y P/N: 511201177
 SHEET: 6

TIMEA REF.	TIMEA REV.	NAME, QTY, & DRAWING REF. DESIGNATION	FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE	FAILURE EFFECT ON END ITEM	HOWR / FUNC. 2/1A CRITICALITY	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE SCREENS: A-PASS, B-PASS, C-PASS
2620	1	PHASE LOCK LOOP Q11-6 SCHEMATIC 2563723	<p>MODE: LOSS OF OR INCORRECT TACHOMETER FEED BACK TO SERVO LOOP AND MCIU.</p> <p>CAUSE(S): (1) FAILURE OF PULSE SHAPER. (2) FILTER FAILS OPEN. (3) VCO-PLL FAILURE OF 2**6 DIVIDER</p>	<p>COUNTER PRODUCING RATE DATA IS ERRONEOUSLY OR NOT UPDATED. MAY RESULT IN A MAXIMUM NEGATIVE (CCW) COMMAND. MOTOR WILL BE DRIVEN AT MAXIMUM RATE CCW. RATE DATA TO THE MCIU/GPC WILL BE ERRONEOUS. AUTO BRAKES INITIATED. LOSS OF LIMPING DURING END EFFECTOR CAPTURE.</p> <p>WORST CASE UNEXPECTED MOTION. JOINT RUNAWAY. AUTOBRAKES.</p> <p>REDUNDANT PATHS REMAINING AUTOBRAKES</p>	<p>OPERATIONAL EFFECTS ----- JOINT RUNAWAY. AUTOBRAKES. CANNOT USE COMPUTER SUPPORTED MODES. DIRECT DRIVE AND BACKUP AVAILABLE. ARM WILL NOT STOP AUTOMATICALLY IF AN UNDETECTED FAILURE OF THE AUTO BRAKES SYSTEM HAS PREVIOUSLY OCCURRED. BRAKES CAN BE APPLIED MANUALLY.</p> <p>CREW ACTION ----- APPLY BRAKES. USE DIRECT DRIVE.</p> <p>CREW TRAINING ----- THE CREW WILL BE TRAINED TO ALWAYS OBSERVE WHETHER THE ARM IS RESPONDING PROPERLY TO COMMANDS. IF IT ISN'T, APPLY BRAKES.</p> <p>MISSION CONSTRAINT ----- OPERATE UNDER VERMIER RATES WITHIN 10 FT OF STRUCTURE. THE OPERATOR MUST BE ABLE TO DETECT THAT THE ARM/PAYLOAD IS RESPONDING PROPERLY TO COMMANDS VIA WINDOW AND/OR CCTV VIEWS DURING ALL ARM OPERATIONS.</p> <p>OMRSD OFFLINE ----- VERIFY ABSENCE OF TACHOMETER BITE ON ABE DATA.</p> <p>OMRSD ONLINE INSTALLATION ----- NONE</p> <p>OMRSD ONLINE TURNAROUND ----- VERIFY ABSENCE OF TACHOMETER BITE ON ABE DATA.</p>	

RMS/ELEC - 332

PREPARED BY: _____

MIMG

SUPERCEDING DATE: 11 SEP 86

APPROVED BY: _____

DATE: 24 JUL 91

CIL REV: 1