SPAR - BRAMPTON (SSS) 9445 AIRPORT RD

# **Critical Items List**

SRMS

BRAMPTON ONTARIO L6S4J3

CIL Ref#: 2681

Revision: 0

FMEA Rev: 0

System: SRMS

Subsystem: ELECTRICAL SUB-SYSTEM

Assembly Desc: Servo Power Amplifier

Part Number(s): 51140F1177-3

51140F1177-5

Item:

Function: Digital Interface Assembly

Receives and loads command data to CPU. Generates position encoder clock and sync signals, processes position encoder data and external flags and assembles

return data for transmission to MCIU.

Failure Mode: Erroneous RDW1 data.

H/W Func. Screen Failures

Criticality:

2 1R

Mission Phase: Orbit

Cause(s): Digital Interface Assembly

Erroneous tachometer data and flags (Fwd/Bkd and current limit).

Erroneous tachometer data low byte. Loss of or erroneous current limit flag. Loss of or erroneous Fwd/Backdrive flag.

Failure effect on unit/end item:

> Tachometer data, Current limit flag, fwd/backdrive flag and/or one or two end effector flags are stuck at 0, 1 or corrupt. Echoed command data for the failed joint will be set to all 1's causing ABE communication BITE. All other return data for falled joint and other joints remains valid.

Worst Case: Loss of mission. Loss of computer supported modes.

Redundant Paths: Direct Drive and End Effector Manual mode.

Backup Drive and End Effector Backup release.

## Retention Rationale

### Design:

Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGA's) and the Error Detection and Correction (EDAC) are semi-custom microcircuits in which the basic design functional elements are designed by the manufacturer. The interconnection of these elements is then customized by Spar to provide the functionality of the completed microcircuit. The design utilizes proven circuit techniques and is implemented using CMOS technology. This technology operates at low power and hence the device does not experience significant operating stresses. The technology is mature, and the basic device reliability is well documented. All stresses are additionally reduced by derating the appropriate parameters in accordance with SPAR-RMS-PA.003 and verified by design review.

This approach has a significant advantage in that it reduces the quantity of discrete parts required in the assembly and also the complexity of

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The SPA board is fabricated using Surface Mount Technology (SMT). This is a PWB assembly technology in which the components a soldered to the solder pads on the surface of the PWB. The significant advantage of this technology is to enable the parts on the board to be more densely packed, to reduce to overall volume and weight of the assembly.

The assembly process is highly automated. The parts are mounted on the boards using a computer controlled "pick and place" machine. The subsequent soldering operation is performed using a bett furnace, in which the time and temperature thermal profile that the PWB assembly is exposed to is tightly controlled and optimized to ensure proper part soldering attachment. The assembly is manufactured under documented procedures and quality controls. These controls are exercised throughout the assembly, inspection and testing of the unit. This inspection includes workmanship, component mounting, soldering, and conformal coating to ensure that it is in accordance with the NHB 5300 standards.

The SMT line used for the SPA PWB assembly has undergone a full qualification program, and assemblies produced on this line are used in other space programs.

The circuit board design has been reviewed to ensure adequate conductor width and separation and to confirm appropriate dimensions of solder pads and of component hold provisions. Parts mounting methods are controlled in accordance with MSFC-STD-154A, MSFC-STD-136 and SASD 2573751. These documents require approved mounting methods, stress relief and component security.

#### Test:

QUALIFICATION TESTS - The SPA is subjected to the following qualification testing:

VIBRATION: Each axis of the QM is subjected to Flight Acceptance Vibration Test (FAVT), Qualification Acceptance Vibration Test (QAVT), and Qualification Vibration Tests (QVT) in accordance with the SPA Vibration Test Procedure (826586). The level and duration for FAVT is as per Figure 6 and Table 2 of 826586; the level and duration for QAVT is as per Figure 8 and Table of 826586. At the end of the three successive random vibration test in each axis, both directions (+/-) of each of the axis is subjected to a shock pulse test as per Figure 9 of 826586.

THERMAL/VACUUM: QM TVAC Test is in accordance with Figure 5 of the SPA TVAC Test Procedure (826588), with full Functional/Parametric Test performed at levels of +60 degrees C and -36 degrees C, and non-operating at -54 degrees C. The Qualification vacuum levels during TVAC is 1X10<sup>--</sup>-6 torr or less. The total test duration is 7 1/2 cycles. The QM SPA is subjected to a minimum of 1000 hours of life testing and 1000 power On-Off cycles.

EMC: The QM is subjected to EMC Testing (tests CE01/CE03, CE07, CS01, CS02, CS06, RE02, RS02, and RS03) in accordance with the SPA EMC test Procedure (826477) based on MIL-STD-461A.

UNIT FLIGHT ACCEPTANCE TESTS - The FM SPA is subjected to the following acceptance testing:

VIBRATION: FM Acceptance Vibration Test (AVT) in accordance with the SPA Vibration Test Procedure (826586), with level and duration as per Figure 6 and Table 2 of 826586.

THERMAL/VACUUM: FM TVAC Test is in accordance with Figure 6 of the SPA TVAC Test Procedure (826588), with levels of +49 degree and -25 degrees C for a duration of 1 1/2 cycles. The vacuum levels during Acceptance TVAC Test is 1X10\*\*-5 torr or less.

JOINT SRU TESTS - The SPA is tested as part of the joints (ambient and vibration tests only). The ambient ATP for the Shoulder Joint, Elbow Joint, and Wrist Joint are as per ATP.2001, ATP.2003, and ATP.2005 respectively. The vibration test for the Shoulder Joint, and Elbow or Wrist Joint are as per ATP.2004 and ATP.2006 respectively. Through wire function, continuity and electircal isolation tests are performed per TP.283.

MECHANICAL ARM REASSEMBLY - The SPA's/Joints undergo a mechanical arm integration stage where electrical checks are performed per TP.2007.

MECHANICAL ARM TESTING - The outgoing split-arm is configured on the Strongback and the Manipulator Arm Checkout is performed per ATP.1932.

FLIGHT CHECKOUT: PDRS OPS Checkout (all vehicles) JSC 16987.

### Inspection:

Units are manufactured under documented quality controls. These controls are exercised throughout design procurement, planning, receiving, processing, fabrication, assembly, testing and shipping of the units. Mandatory inspection points are employed at various stages of

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
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Integration of unit to Joint SRU - Inspections include grounding checks, connectors for bent or pushback contacts, visual, cleanliness, interconnect wiring and power up test to the appropriate Joint Inspection Test Procedure (ITP). Joint level Pre-Acceptance Test Inspection, includes an audit of lower tier inspection completion, as built configuration verification to as design etc. Joint level Acceptance Testing (ATP) includes ambient and vibration testing (Spar/government rep. mandatory inspection point).

Mechanical Arm Reassembly - the integration of mechanical arm subassemblies to form the assembled arm. Inspections are performed at each phase of integration which includes electrical checks, through wiring checks, wiring routing, interface connectors for bent or pushback contacts etc. Mechanical Arm Testing - Strongback and flat floor ambient performance test (Spar/government rep. mandatory inspection point).

OMRSD Offline: Power-up arm. Verify no ABE communication failures. Operate End Effector and check flags.

OMRSD Online None.

Installation:

OMR\$D Online Power-up arm. Verify no ABE communication failures. Operate End Effector and check flags. Turnaround:

Screen Failure: A: Pass

B: Pass

C: Pass

Crew Training: The crew will be trained to always observe whether the arm is responding properly to commands. If it isn't, apply brakes.

Crew Action: Select Direct Drive. Use EE Manual Mode. Single/Direct Drive switch should be pulsed to maintain proper rates.

Operational Effect: Computer supported modes of operation are lost, Direct Drive and Backup are available. Auto End Effector mode is lost,

Mission None.

Constraints:

Functional Group	Name	Position	Telephone	Date Signed	Status
Engineer	Hiltz, Michael / SPAR-BRAMPTON	Systems Engineer	4634	06Mar98	-
Reliability	Molgaard, Lena / SPAR-BRAMPTON	Reliability Engineer	4590		Signed
Program Management Offic	Rice, Craig / SPAR-BRAMPTON	Technical Program Manager	4892	06Mar98	Signed
Subsystem Manager	Glenn, George / JSC-ER	RMS Subsystem Manager	<del>-</del>	06Mar98	Signed
Technical Manager	Allison, Ron / JSC-MV6	RMS Project Engineer JSC	(281) 483-1516	30Mar98	Signed
	7 1110-211, 110117 200-11170	RMS Project Engineer JSC	(713) 483–4072	09Apr98	Signed

SAFETTY MISSION ASSAURANCE COAN, DAVID / SSC-NCG RMS SAMA ENGINEER

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