SPAR - BRAMPTON (\$\$\$)

445 AIRPORT RD

### Critical Items List

SRM5

CIL Ref#: 3031

Revision: 0

FMEA Rev: 1

RAMPTON ONTARIO L6S4J3

System: SRMS

Subsystem: ELECTRICAL SUB-SYSTEM

Assembly Desc: Servo Powe: Amplifier

Part Number(s): 51140F1177-3

51140F1177-5

Item:

Function: Motor Drive Amplifier Assembly

Provides motor voltage based on damand from technometer electronics.

Commutates the motor drive voltage. Provides hardware current limiting, brake drive, direct drive functions and enables backup drive. Provides BITE circuits and

BITE verification for MDA.

Failure Mode: Loss of or Erroneous Output from Buck Regulator.

HW Func. Screen Failures

Criticality:

2 1R

Mission Phase; Orbit

Causa(s): Motor Drive Amplifier Assembly

Buck regulator fails overvoltage.

Bluck regulator fails shorted to ground.

COMM BITE rag to current sensor FPGA fails active.

Degraded MDA voltage transient response.

Loss of backsines return path.

Loss of buck regulator voltage to commutation bridge.

Loss of buck regulator voltage.

Loss of or erruneous analog demand voltage to buck regulator in all modes.

Loss of or erronadus information to current sensor FPGA.

Loss of or erroneous MDA demand data to buck regulator in computer supported

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Failure effect on

unit/end item;

Loss of or erroneous voltage applied to motor. MDA demand voltage BITE will detact that voltage at output of buok regulator is inconsistent with demand at input. MCIU autobrakes, Loss of computer supported mode, in direct drive joint brake may be applied.

Worst Case: Unexpected motion. Joint runaway. Autobrakes.

Redundant Paths: Autobrakes (to Safe the System).

Direct Drive (If Available),

Backup Drive.

tention Rationale

Design:

The design utilizes proven circuit techniques and is implemented using CMOS logic devices. CMOS devices operate at low power and hence do not experience significant operating stresses. The technology is mature, and device reliability history is well documented. All stresses are additionally reduced by denating the appropriate parameters in accordance with SPAR-RMS-PA.003. Special handling precautions are used at all stages of manufacture to preclude damage/stress due to electrostatic discharge.

Comparators and operational amplifiers are standard linear integrated circuits with mature manufacturing technology. Application constraints are in accordance with SPAR-RMS-PA,003.

The D to A converter is screened to the requirements of SPAR-RMS-PA.003.

pared: 29Jul97 by Hiltz, Michael

RMS/ELEC - 713

Supersedes: N/A

# SPAR - BRAMPTON (SSS)

9446 AIRPORT RD

## Critical Items List

SRI

CIL Ref#: 3031

Revision: 0

FMEA Rev: 1

BRAMPTON ONTARIO LESAJ3

Discrete semiconductor devices are specified to at least the TX level of MIL-S-19500. Samples of all procured lots/date codes are subject to destructive physical analysis (DPA) to verify the integrity of the manufacturing processes. Particle Impact Noise Detection (PIND) screening performed on microcircuits, translator and diodes that are mounted in a package with an internal cavity construction. The purpose of the less particles in the package, usually resulting from the assembly process. Device stress levels are detailed in accordance with

Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGA's) and the Error Detection and Correction (EDAC) are semi-custom microcircuits in which the basic design functional elements are designed by the manufacturer. The interconnection of these elements is then customized by Spar to provide the functionality of the completed microcircuit. The design utilizes proven circuit techniques and is implamented using CMOS technology. This technology operates at low power and hance the device does not experience significant operating stresses. The technology is mature, and the SPAR-RMS-PA.003 and verified by design review.

This approach has a significant edvantage in that it reduces the quantity of discrete parts required in the assembly and also the complexity the PWB and results in significant weight and volume savings. This type of semi-custom part has been successfully used in other space applications.

The parts are qualified to the requirements of the applicable specification. They are 100% screened and burned in to the requirements of the Spar requirements document.

Resistors and capacitors used in the design are selected from established reliability (ER) types. Life expectancy is increased by ansuring that all allowable stress levels are detailed in experience with SPAR-RMS-PA.003. All ceramic and electrolytic suspections are routinely subjected to radiographic inspection in accordance with the requirements of MSFC-STD-356.

Transformers and inductors are designed specifically for the application. These are torsid-wound and utilize a femile core material. Choice of wire size and of insulation materials ensure that the derating requirements of SPAR-RMS-PA.003 are met.

The SPA board is fabricated using Surface Mount Technology (SMT). This is a PWB assembly technology in which the components are soldered to the solder pads on the surface of the PWB. The significant advantage of this technology is to enable the parts on the board to be more densely pecked, to reduce to overall volume and weight of the assembly.

The assembly process is highly automated. The parts are mounted on the boards using a computer controlled "pick and place" machine. The subsequent soldering operation is performed using a belt furnace, in which the time and temperature thermal profile that the PWB assembly as exposed to is tightly controlled end optimized to ensure proper part soldering attachment. The essembly is manufactured under documented procedures and quality controls. These controls are exercised throughout the assembly, inspection and testing of the unit. This inspection includes workmanship, component mounting, soldering, and conformal costing to ensure that it is in accordance with the NNB 5300 standard.

The SMT line used for the SPA PWB assembly has undergone a full qualification program, and assemblies produced on this line are used other space programs.

The circuit board design has been reviewed to ensure adequate conductor width and separation and to confirm appropriate dimensions of salder pads and of component hold provisions. Parts mounting methods are controlled in accordance with MSFC-STD-154A, MSFC-STD-138 and SASD 2573751. These documents require approved mounting methods, stress relief and component security.

#### Test:

QUALIFICATION TESTS - The SPA is subjected to the following qualification hasting:

VIBRATION. Each exis of the QM is subjected to Flight Acceptance Vibration Test (FAVT), Qualification Acceptance Vibration Test (QAVT), and Qualification Vibration Tests (QVT) in accordance with the SPA Vibration Test Procedure (826586). The level and duration for FAVT is an per Figure 6 and Table 2 of 826586; the level and duration for QAVT is as per Figure 8 and Table 2 of 826586. At the end of the three successive random vibration test in each axis, both directions (+/-) of each of the 8xis is subjected to a shock pulse test as per Figure 9 of 826586.

THERMALVACUUM: QM TVAC Test is in accordance with Figure 5 of the SPA TVAC Test Procedure (\$26568), with full Functional/Parametric Test performed at levels of +60 degrees C and -35 degrees C, and non-operating at -54 degrees C. The Qualification vacuum levels during TVAC is 1X10\*\*-6 torr or less. The total test duration is 7 1/2 cycles. The QM SPA is subjected to a minimum of 1000 hours of life testing and 1000 power Qn-Off cycles.

EMC\* The QM is subjected to EMC Testing (tests CE01/CE03, CE07, CS01, CS02, CS06, RE02, RS02, and RS03) in accordance with the SPA EMC test Procedure (825477) based on MIL-STD-481A.

UNIT FLIGHT ACCEPTANCE TESTS - The FM SPA is subjected to the following acceptance testing:

VIBRATION: FM Acceptance Vibration Test (AVT) in accordance with the SPA Vibration Test Procedure (826585), with level and duration as par Figure 6 and Table 2 of 826589.

THERMAL/VACUUM: FM TVAC Test in in accordance with Figure 5 of the SPA TVAC Test Procedure (828588), with levels of +49 degrees C and -25 degrees C for a duration of 1 1/2 cycles. The vacuum levels during Acceptance TVAC Test is 1X10\*\*-5 torr or less.

JOINT SRU TESTS - The SPA is tested as part of the joints (ambient and vibration tests only). The ambient ATP for the Shoulder Joint, Eibow Joint, and Wrist Joint are as per ATP.2001, ATP.2003, and ATP.2005 respectively. The subration test for the Shoulder Joint, and Elbow or Wrist Joint are as per ATP.2002, ATP.2004 and ATP.2006 respectively. Through wire function, continuity and electingal isolation tests are performed per TP.283.

### Critical Items List

SRMS

BRAMPTON ONTARIO L6843

CIL Ref#: 3031

Revision: 0

FMEA Revolt

MECHANICAL ARM REASSEMBLY - The SPA's/Joints undergo a machanical arm integration stage where electrical checks are performed per TP.2007.

MECHANICAL ARM TESTING - The outgoing split-arm is configured on the Strongback and the Manipulator Arm Checkout is performed per ATP, 1932.

FLIGHT CHECKOUT: PDRS OPS Checkout (all vehicles) JSC 16987.

### Inspection:

Units are manufactured under documented quality controls. These controls are exercised throughout design procurement, planning, receiving, processing, fabrication, assembly, leating and shipping of the units. Mandatory inspection points are employed at various stages of fabrication, assembly, and test. Government source inspection is invoked at various control levels.

EEE parts inspection is performed as required by SPAR-RMS-PA,003. Each EEE part is qualified at the part level to the requirements of the applicable specification. All EEE parts are 100% screened and burned-in, as a minimum, as required by SPAR-RMS-PA.003, by the supplier. DPA is performed as required by PA.003 on a randomly selected 5% of parts, maximum 5 pieces, minimum 3 pieces for each lot number/date code of parts received. All cavity devices are subjected to 100% PIND. Wire is procured to specification MiL-W-22759 or MIL-W-81381 and Inspected and tested to NASA JSCM5080 Standard Number 95A.

Receiving Inspection verifies that all parts received are as identified in the procurement documents, that no physical damage has occurred to parts during shipment, that the receiving documents provide adequate traceability information and screening data clearly identifies acceptable

Parts are inspected throughout manufacture and easembly as appropriate to the manufacturing stage completed. These inspections include: Printed circuit board inspection for track separation, damage and edequacy of plated through holes, component mounting inspection for correct soldaring, wire looping, strapping, etc. Operators and inspectors are trained and certified to NASA NHB 5300.4(3A-1) Standard. Conformal coating inspection for adequate processing is performed using ultraviolet light techniques. P.C. Board installation inspection includes checks for correct board installation, alignment of boards, proper connector contact mating, wire routing, strapping of wires atc. Post P.C. Board installation inspection includes cleanliness and workmanship (Spar/government rep. mandatory inspection point).

Unit Pre-Acceptance Test inspection, which includes an audit of lower tier inspection completion, as built configuration verification to as design etc (mandatory inspection point). A unit Test Readiness Review (TRR) which includes verification of test personnel, test documents. test equipment calibration/validation status and hardware configuration is convened by QA in conjunction with Engineering, Reliability, Configuration Control, Supplier as applicable, and the government representative, prior to the start of any formal testing (Acceptance or Qualification). Unit level Acceptance Testing (ATP) includes ambient performance, thermal and vibration testing (Sper/government rep. mandatory inspection point).

Integration of unit to Joint SRU - Inspections include grounding checks, connectors for bent or pushback contacts, visual, cleanliness, Interconnect wiring and power up test to the appropriate Joint Inspection Test Procedure (ITP). Joint level Pre-Acceptance Test Inspection, includes an audit of lower tier inspection completion, as built configuration verification to as design etc. Joint level Acceptance Testing (ATP) includes ambient and vibration testing (Spar/government rep. mandatory inspection point).

Mechanical Arm Reassembly - the integration of mechanical arm subassemblies to form the assembled arm. Inspections are performed at each phase of integration which includes electrical chacks, through wiring checks, wiring routing, interface connectors for bent or pushback contacts etc. Mechanical Arm Testing - Strongback and flat floor ambient performance test (Sper/government rep. mandatory inspection point).

OMRSD Offline: Power-up arm. Verify no MDA BITE errors. Verify availability of Computer Supported modes. Select Direct Drive and verify Brake not applied. when joint motion commanded.

OMRSD Online None. Installation:

OMRSD Online Power-up arm. Verify no MDA BITE errors. Verify availability of Computer Supported modes. Select Direct Orive and verify Brake not applied Turnaround: when joint motion commanded.

Screen Failure: A: Pass

B: Pass

C: Pass

Crew Training: The crew will be trained to always observe whether the arm is responding properly to commande. If it Isn't, apply brakes.

Craw Action: Select Direct Drive if available. If D/D not available select Back-up Drive. Single/Direct Drive switch should be buised to maintain proper rates.

operational Effect: Cannot use Computer Supported modes. Direct Drive may not be available. Autobrakes. Back-up is available. Arm will not stop automatically if failure of the autobrake system has previously occurred. Brakes can be applied manually,

Mission. Operate under vernier rates within approximately 10 ft of structure. The operator must be able to detect that the arm is responding properly to Constraints: commands via window and/or CCTV views during all arm operations. Auto trajectories must be designed to come no closer than approximately

5 ft from structure.

provals:

pared:

SPAR - BRAMPTON (SSS)

9445 AIRPORT RD

Critical Items List

SRN

CIL Rof#: 3031

Revision: 0

PMEA Rev: 1

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Functional Group Name		Position			
	·	- POSIDOR -	Talephone	Date Signed	Slatus
ingineer	Hiltz, Michael	Systems Engineer	4534	15Det97	Signe
deliability	Molgaard, Lena	Reliability Engineer	4590	16Oct97	Signer
rogram Management Offic	Taplin, Ron	Technical Manager	4768	15Oct97	Signer
Subsystem Manager	Glenn, George	RMS Subsystem Manager	(281) 483-1516	24Mar98	•
echnical Manager	Peck, John	Technical Manager (JSC)	713-483-1264	21Mar98	Signed Signed

SAMETYA MISSIN ACCURANCE COAN, DAVID

RMS STAR ENGINEER

(201) 453-3099 20 ME 97 Lands