SPAR - BRAMPTON (SSS)

9445 AIRPORT RD

Critical Items List

SRMS

CIL Ref#: 3105

Revision: 0

FMEA Rev: 0

BRAMPTON ONTARIO L684J3

System: SRMS

Subsystem: ELECTRICAL SUB-SYSTEM

Assembly Desc: Servo Power Amplifier

Part Number(s): 51140F1177-3

51140F1177-5

Item:

Function: Motor Drive Amplifier Assembly

Provides motor voltage based on demand from tachometer electronics.

Commutates the motor drive voltage. Provides hardware current limiting, brake drive, direct drive functions and enables backup drive. Provides BITE circuits and BITE verification for MDA.

Fallure Mode: Loss of brake cail suppression diode.

H/W Func. Screen Fallures

Criticatity: 3 1R AB

Mission Phase: Orbit

Cause(s): Motor Drive Amplifier Assembly

Loss of brake coll suppression diode.

Failure effect on unit/end item:

No effect. Brake coil.

No effect. Brake coil suppression is still available in the brake assembly.

Worst Case: No effect until aubsequent failure.

dundant Paths: Brake suppression diode in Meter Module.

Jettison.

etention Rationale

Design:

Discrete semiconductor devices are specified to at least the TX level of MIL-S-19500. Samples of all procured lots/date codes are subjected to destructive physical analysis (OPA) to verify the integrity of the manufacturing processes. Particle impact Noise Detection (PIND) screening is performed on microcircuits, transistor and diodes that are mounted in a package with an internal cavity construction. The purpose of the test is to detect losse particles in the package, usually resulting from the assembly process. Device stress levels are detailed in accordance with SPAR-RMS-PA.003 and verified by design review.

The SPA board is fabricated using Surface Mount Technology (SMT). This is a PWB sesembly technology in which the components are soldered to the solder packs on the surface of the PWB. The significant advantage of this technology is to enable the parts on the board to be more densely packed, to reduce to overall volume and weight of the assembly.

The assembly process is highly automated. The parts are mounted on the bounds using a computer controlled "pick and place" machine. The subsequent soldering operation is performed using a ball furnace, in which the time and temperature thermal profile that the PVVB assembly is exposed to is tightly controlled and optimized to ensure proper part soldering attachment. The assembly is manufactured under documented procedures and quality controls. These controls are exercised throughout the assembly, inspection, and testing of the unit. This inspection includes workmanship, component mounting, soldering, and conformal coating to ensure that it is in accordance with the NHB 5300 standards.

The SMT line used for the SPA PWB assembly has undergone a full qualification program, and assembles produced on this line are used in other space programs.

The circuit board design has been reviewed to ensure adequate conductor width and separation and to confirm appropriate dimensions of solder pads and of component hold provisions. Parts mounting methods are controlled in accordance with MSPC-STO-154A, MSPC-STO-138 and SASO 2573751. These documents require approved mounting methods, stress relief and component security.

Test:

QUALIFICATION TESTS - The SPA is subjected to the following qualification testing:
VIBRATION: Each axis of the QM is subjected to Flight Acceptance Vibration Test (FAVT), Qualification Acceptance Vibration Test (QAVT), and Qualification Vibration Tests (QVT) in accordance with the SPA Vibration Test Procedure (826586). The level and duration for FAVT is as per Figure 6 and Table 2 of 826586; the level and duration for QAVT is as per Figure 7 and Table 2 of 826586; the level and duration for QAVT is

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as per Figure 8 and Table of 826586. At the end of the three successive random vibration test in each axis, both directions (+/-) of each of axis is subjected to a shock pulse test as per Figure 9 of 826586.

THERMAL/VACUUM: QM TVAC Test is in accordance with Figure 6 of the SPA TVAC Test Procedure (826586), with full Functional/Parametric Test performed at levels of +60 degrees C and -36 degrees C, and non-operating at -54 degrees C. The Qualification vacuum levels during TVAC is 1X10**-6 torr or less. The total test duration is 7 1/2 cycles. The QM SPA is subjected to a minimum of 1000 hours of life testing and 1000 power On-Off cycles.

EMC: The QM is subjected to EMC Teeting (lests CE01/CE03, CE07, CS01, CS02, CS06, RE02, RS02, and RS03) in eccordance with the SPA EMC test Procedure (828477) based on MIL-STD-461A.

UNIT FLIGHT ACCEPTANCE TESTS - The FM SPA is subjected to the following acceptance testing:

VIBRATION: FM Acceptance Vibration Test (AVT) in accordance with the SPA Vibration Test Procedure (826586), with level and duration as per Figure 6 and Table 2 of 826586.

THERMAUVACUUM: FM TVAC Test is in accordance with Figure 6 of the SPA TVAC Test Procedure (526588), with levels of +48 degrees and -25 degrees C for a duration of 1 1/2 cycles. The vacuum levels during Acceptance TVAC Test is 1X10**-5 tort or less.

JOINT SRU TESTS - The SPA is tested as part of the joints (ambient and vibration tests only). The ambient ATP for the Shoulder Joint. Elbow Joint, and Wrist Joint are as per ATP,2001, ATP,2003, and ATP,2005 respectively. The vibration test for the Shoulder Joint, and Elbow or Wrist Joint are as per ATP,2002, ATP,2004 and ATP,2006 respectively. Through wire function, continuity and electical isolation tests are performed per TP,283.

MECHANICAL ARM REASSEMBLY - The SPA's/Joints undergo a mechanical arm integration stage where electrical checks are partiarms per TP.2007.

MECHANICAL ARM TESTING - The outgoing split-erm is configured on the Strongback and the Manipulator Arm Checkout is performed per ATP.1932.

FLIGHT CHECKOUT: PDRS OPS Checkout (all vehicles) JSC 16987.

Inspection;

Units are manufactured under documented quality controls. These controls are exercised throughout design procurement, planning, receiving, processing, fabrication, assembly, testing and shipping of the units. Mandatory inspection points are employed at vanous stages of fabrication, assembly, and test. Government source inspection is invoked at various control levels.

EEE parts inspection is performed as required by SPAR-RMS-PA.003. Each EEE part is qualified at the part level to the requirements of applicable specification. All EEE parts are 100% screened and burned-in, as a minimum, as required by SPAR-RMS-PA.003, by the supplier. OPA is performed as required by PA.003 on a randomly selected 5% of parts, maximum 5 pieces, minimum 3 pieces for each lot number/date code of parts received. All cavity devices are subjected to 100% PIND. Wire is procured to specification MIL-W-22759 or MIL-W-81361 and inspected and tested to NASA JSCM8060 Standard Number 95A.

Recalving inspection verifies that all parts received are as identified in the procurement documents, that no physical damage has occurred to parts during shipment, that the receiving documents provide adequate traceability information and screening data clearly identifies acceptable parts.

Parts are inspected throughout manufacture and assembly as appropriate to the manufacturing stage completed. These inspections include:

Printed circuit board inspection for track separation, damage and adequacy of plated through holes, component mounting inspection for correct soldering, wire looping, strapping, etc. Operators and inspectors are trained and certified to NASA NHB 5300.4(3A-1) Standard.

Conformal coating inspection for adequate processing is performed using ultraviolet light techniques. P.C. Board installation inspection include checks for correct board installation, alignment of boards, proper connector contact mating, wire multing, strapping of wires etc. Post P.C. Board installation includes cleanliness and workmanship (Spar/government rep. mandatory inspection point).

Unit Pre-Acceptance Test inspection, which includes an audit of lower the inspection completion, as built configuration verification to as design etc (mandatory inspection point). A unit Test Readings Review (TRR) which includes varification of test personnel, test documents, test equipment calibration/validation status and handware configuration is convened by QA in conjunction with Engineering, Reliability, Configuration Control, Supplier as applicable, and the government representative, prior to the start of any formal testing (Acceptance or Qualification). Unit level Acceptance Testing (ATP) includes ambient performance, thermal and vibration testing (Spar/government rep. mandatory inspection point).

Integration of unit to Joint SRU - Inspections include grounding checks, connectors for bent or pushback contacts, visual, cleanliness, interconnect wiring and power up test to the appropriate Joint Inspection Test Procedure (ITP). Joint level Pre-Acceptance Test Inspection, includes an audit of lower tier inspection completion, as built configuration verification to as design etc. Joint level Acceptance Testing (ATP) includes ambient and vibration testing (Spanlgovernment rep. mandatory inspection point).

Mechanical Arm Reassembly - the integration of mechanical arm subsessembles to form the essembled arm. Inspections are performed at each phase of integration which includes electrical chacks, through wiring checks, wiring routing, interface connectors for bent or pushback contacts etc. Mechanical Arm Testing - Strongback and flat floor ambient performance test (Spar/government rep. mandatory inspection point).

OMRSD Offline: None

OMRSD Online None

Installation:

OMRSD Online None Turnaround:

Prepared:

Supersedes: N/A

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FMEA Rev: D

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Screen Faiture: A: Open circuit cannot be diffected because redundant hardware items are parallel connected and are not individually instrumented.

B: Open circuit cannot be detected because redundant hardware items are parallel connected and are not individually instrumented.

C: Pase

Craw Training: The crew will be trained to always observe whether the arm is responding properly to commands. If it isn't, apply brakes.

Crew Action: None.

Operational Effect: None. Subsequent failure of redundant shurit may cause undesired arm trajectory.

Mission None, Constraints:

metional Group	Name	Pasition	Telephone	Date Signed	Status
gineer	Hiltz, Michael / SPAR-BRAMPTON	Systems Engineer	4634	06Mar98	Signed
Hisbility	Molgaard, Lene / SPAR-BRAMPTON	Reliability Engineer	4590	06Ma/98	Signed
ogram Management Offic	Rice, Craig / SPAR-BRAMPTON	Technical Program Manager	4892	06Mar98	Signed
bsystem Manager	Glenn, George / JSC-ER	RMS Subsystem Manager	(281) 483-1516	30Mar98	Signed
chnical Menager	Allison, Ron / JSC-MV6	RMS Project Engineer JSC	(713) 483-4072	09Apr98	Signed