SPAR - BRAMPTON (SSS)

9445 AIRPORT RD

Critical Items List

SRMS

CIL Ref#: 3111

Revision: 0

FMEA Rev: D

BRAMPTON ONTARIO LESAUS

System: SRMS

Subsystem: ELECTRICAL SUB-SYSTEM

Assembly Desc: Servo Power Amplifier

Part Number(s): 51140F1177-3

51140F1177-5

hem:

Function: Filter Board Assembly

Fitters 28V to SPA. Fitters secondary voltages to position encoder, commutator and techometer SCU. Provides backup relay to switch motor to backup drive.

Failure Mode: One or more relay contacts stuck in Normally Open position.

HW Func. Screen Failures

Criticality:

Mission Phase: Orbit

Cause(s): Filter Board Assembly

Relay contacts stuck in normally open position.

Fallure effect on unit/end items

> One or more motor phase tines failed to backup mode. BDA output is connected in parallel with MDA. Backup relay 8/TE will be annunciated on all six joints. MDA inhibit override is lost. TCO BITE may detect at high motor demands and cause MCIU autobrakes.

Worst Case: Loss of Joint Dynamic Braking. System unprotected from subsequent brake failed OFF.

dundant Paths: Manual Brakes.

Backup Drive.

Retention Rationale

Design:

Releys are hermetically sealed types, conforming to MIL-R-39016 as dictated by the design application. In addition, all relays are screened to NASA ST-R-0001 requirements. Contact current and voltage strasses are reduced in accordance with the dereting requirements of SPAR-RMS-PA.003. In the packaging dealign, emphasis has been placed upon retry mounting to ensure good heat transfer and emmunity from vibration.

The SPA board is fabricated using Surface Mount Technology (SMT). This is a PWB assembly technology in which the components are soldered to the solder pads on the surface of the PWB. The significant advantage of this technology is to enable the parts on the board to be more densely packed, to reduce to overall volume and weight of the assembly.

The assembly process is highly automated. The pasts are mounted on the boards using a computer controlled "pick and place" machine. The subsequent soldering operation is performed using a belt furnace, in which the time and temperature thermal profile that the PWB assembly is exposed to is tightly controlled and optimized to ensure proper part soldering attachment. The assembly is manufactured under documented procedures and quality controls. These controls are exercised throughout the assembly, inspection, and testing of the unit. This inspection includes workmanship, component mounting, soldering, and conformal scatting to ensure that if is in accordance with the NHB 5300 atlandands.

The SMT line used for the SPA PWB assembly has undergone a full qualification program, and assembles produced on this line are used in other space programs.

The circuit board design has been reviewed to ensure adequate conductor width and separation and to confirm appropriate dimensions of solder pads and of component hold provisions. Parts mounting methods are controlled in accordance with MSFC-STD-154A, MSFC-STD-138 and SASD 2579751. These documents require approved mounting methods, stress ruler and component security.

Test:

QUALIFICATION TESTS - The SPA is subjected to the following qualification testing: VIBRATION: Each exis of the QM is subjected to Flight Acceptance Vibration Test (FAVT), Qualification Acceptance Vibration Test (QAVT), and Qualification Vibration Tests (QVT) in accordance with the SPA Vibration Test Procedure (826566). The lavel and duration for FAVT as as per Figure 6 and Table 2 of 828588; the level and duration for QAVT is an per Figure 7 and Table 2 of 826588; the level and duration for QVT is as per Figure 8 and Table of 826586. At the end of the three successive random vibration test in each axis, both directions (+/-) of each of the axis is subjected to a shook pulse test as per Figure 9 of 826586.

THERMAL/VACUUM QM TVAC Test is in accordance with Figure 5 of the SPA TVAC Test Procedure (826586), with full

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Functional/Parametric Test performed at levals of +60 degrees C and -35 degrees C, and non-operating at -54 degrees C. The Qualificati vacuum levels during TVAC is 1X10**-6 torr or less. The total test duration is 7 1/2 cycles. The QM SPA is subjected to a minimum of 100 hours of life testing and 1000 power On-Off cycles.

EMC: The QM is subjected to EMC Testing (tests CE01/CE03, CE07, CS01, CS02, CS06, RE02, RS02, and RS03) in accordance with the SPA EMC test Procedure (826477) based on MIL-STD-481 A.

UNIT FLIGHT ACCEPTANCE TESTS - The FM SPA is subjected to the following acceptance testing: VIBRATION: FM Acceptance Vibration Test (AVT) in accordance with the SPA Vibration Test Procedure (626586), with level and duration as per Figure 6 and Table 2 of 828585.

THERMAL/VACUUM: FM TVAC Test is in accordance with Figure 8 of the SPA TVAC Test Procedure (826588), with levels of +49 degrees 0 and -25 degrees C for a duration of 1 1/2 cycles. The vacuum levels during Acceptance TVAC Test is 1X10**-5 torr or less.

JOINT SRU TESTS - The SPA is tested as part of the joints (ambient and vibration tests only). The ambient ATP for the Shoulder Joint, Elbow Joint, and Wrist Joint are as per ATP, 2001, ATP, 2003, and ATP, 2005 respectively. The vibration lest for the Shoulder Joint, and Elbow or Wrist Joint are as per ATP.2002, ATP.2004 and ATP.2006 respectively. Through wire function, continuity and electional isolation tests are performed per TP,283.

MECHANICAL ARM REASSEMBLY - The SPA's/Joints undergo a mechanical arm integration stage where electrical checks are performed per TP.2007.

MECHANICAL ARM TESTING - The outgoing spiil-arm is configured on the Strongback and the Manipulator Arm Checkout is performed per ATP, 1932.

FLIGHT CHECKOUT: PDRS OPS Checkout (all vehicles) JSC 18987.

inspection:

Units are manufactured under documented quality controls. These controls are exercised throughout design procurement, planning, receiving, processing, fabrication, assembly, testing and shipping of the units. Mandatory inspection points are employed at vanous stages of fabrication, assembly, and test. Government source inspection is invoked at various control levels.

EEE parts inspection is performed as required by SPAR-RMS-PA.003. Each EEE part is qualified at the part level to the requirements of the applicable specification. All EEE parts are 100% screened and burned-in, as a minimum, as required by SPAR-RMS-PA.003, by the supplier, DPA is performed as required by PA.003 on a randomly selected 5% of parts, maximum 5 pieces, minimum 3 pieces for each lot number/da code of parts received. All cavity devices are subjected to 100% PIND. Wire is produced to specification MIL-W-22759 or MIL-W-81381 and inspected and tested to NASA JSCM8080 Standard Number 85A.

Receiving inspection verifies that all parts received are as identified in the procurement decuments, that no physical damage has occurred to parts during shipment, that the receiving documents provide adequate traceability information and screening data clearly identifies acceptable parts.

Parts are inspected throughout manufacture and assembly as appropriate to the manufacturing stage completed. These inspections include: Printed circuit board inspection for track separation, damage and adequacy of plated through holes, component mounting inspection for correct soldering, were looping, strapping, etc. Operators and inspectors are trained and certified to NASA NHB \$300.4(3A-1) Standard. Conformal coating inspection for adequate processing is performed using uttraviolal light techniques. P.C. Board installation inspection includes checks for correct board installation, alignment of boards, proper connector contact making, wire routing, strapping of wires etc. Post P.C. Soard installation inspection includes classifiness and workmanship (Spar/government rep. mandatory inspection point).

Unit Pre-Acceptance Test inspection, which includes an audit of lower tier inspection completion, as built configuration verification to as design etc (mandatory inspection point). A unit Test Readiness Review (TRR) which includes verification of test personnel, test documents, test equipment calibration/validation status and hardware configuration is convened by QA in conjunction with Engineering, Reliability, Configuration Control, Supplier as applicable, and the government representative, prior to the start of any formal testing (Acceptance or Qualification). Unit level Acceptance Testing (ATP) includes ambient performance, thermal and vibration testing (Spar/government rep. mandatory inspection point).

Integration of unit to Joint SRU - Inspections include grounding checks, connectors for bent or pushback contacts, visual, cleanliness, interconnect wiring and power up test to the appropriate Joint Inspection Test Procedure (PTP). Joint level Pre-Acceptance Test Inspection. includes an audit of lower tier inspection completion, as built configuration verification to as design etc. Joint level Acceptance Testing (ATP) includes ambient and vibration testing (Sper/government rep, mandatory inspection point).

Mechanical Arm Ressaumbly - the Integration of mechanical arm subassemblies to form the assembled arm. Inspections are performed at each phase of integration which includes electrical checks, through wiring checks, wiring routing, interface connectors for bent or pushback contacts etc. Mechanical Arm Testing - Strongback and flat floor ambient performance test (Sparigovernment rep. mandatory inspection point).

OMRSD Offline: Power-up arm. Verify no Backup Relay BITE errors.

OMRSD Online None. Installation:

OMRSD Online Power-up arm. Verify no Backup Relay BITE errors.

Turnaround:

185ep96 by Fung. 8d repared:

Supersedes: N/A

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FMEA Rev: (

SF

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Screen Failure: A: Pass

8: Pass

C: Pass

Crew Training: The crew will be trained to turn RMS power to off if brakes fall to stop arm.

Crew Action: None For subsequent failure crew must turn RMS power switch to off to apply brakes.

Operational Effect: None. Subsequent failure in autobraking may cause joint runaway.

Missisten. Operate under vernier rates within approximately 10 ft of structure. The operator must be able to detect that the arm is responding properly Constraints: commands via window and/or CCTV views during all arm operations. Auto trajectories must be designed to come no closer than approxima

5 ft from structure.

Functional Group	Name	Position	Telephone	Date Signed	Status
Engineer	Hitz, Michael / SPAR-BRAMPTON	Systema Engineer	4634	OSMar98	Signes
Reliability	Molgaard, Lena / SPAR-BRAMPTON	Reliability Engineer	4580	OSMar98	Signed
Program Management Offic	Rice, Craig / SPAR-BRAMPTON	Technical Program Manager	4882	06Mer98	Signed
Subsystem Manager	Glann, George / JSC-ER	RMS Subsystem Manager	(261) 483-1516	30Mar98	Signed
Technical Manager	Allegn, Ron / JSC-MV8	RMS Project Engineer JSC	(713) 483-4072	09Apr98	Signed
Y+ M. Ever Acres	CARR DAVID / JSC-NC 6	EMS SHOP ENGINEER	(24)403-3997	30 4/297	12 × 12

YETY+ MISSION ASSURANCE COAN, DAVID SEC-NC 6