SPAR - BRAMPTON (SSS)

9445 AIRPORT RO

Critical Items List

SRMS

CIL Ref#: 3121

Revision: 0

FMEA Rev: 1

BRAMPTON ONTARIO L654J3

System: SRMS

Subsystem: ELECTRICAL SUB-SYSTEM

Assembly Desc: Servo Power Amplifier

Part Number(s): 51140F1177-3

51140F1177-5

item:

Function: Motor Drive Amplifier Assembly

Provides motor voltage based on demand from tachometer electronics.

Commutates the motor drive voltage. Provides hardware current limiting, brake drive, direct drive functions and enables backup drive. Provides BITE circuits and

BITE verification for MDA.

Filter Board Assembly

Filters 26V to SPA. Filters secondary voltages to position encoder, commutator and tachometer SCU. Provides backup relay to switch motor to backup drive.

Failure Mode: Loss of or Sluggish Backup Drive,

H/W Func. Screen Failures

Criticality:

Mission Phase: Orbit

Cause(s): Fifter Board Assembly

Motor Drive Amplifier Assembly

One or more backup relay contacts failed to normally closed position,

Breke permanently ON in backup. Lites of backup commutator enable.

Loss of output FET isolation in backup mode.

ure effect on init/end item:

> In Backup, joint brake may not be lifted. Joint drive may be stuggesh or joint will not drive. BDA fuse may be blown or BDA may shut down resulting in loss of Backup Orive for all joints. If fuse not blown BDA may be able to overdrive the brake.

Worst Case: Loss of Backup Drive Mode.

Redundant Paths: Computer Supported modes.

Direct Drive

etention Rationale

Design:

Relays are hermetically sealed types, conforming to MIL-R-39016 as dictated by the design application. In addition, all relays are screened to NASA ST-R-0001 requirements. Contact current and voltage stresses are reduced in accordance with the detailing rquirements of SPAR-RMS-PA.003. In the packaging design, emphasis has been placed upon relay mounting to ensure good heat transfer and immunity from vibration.

Discrets semiconductor devices are specified to at least the TX level of Mit.-S-19500. Samples of all procured lots/date codes are subjected. to destructive physical analysis (DPA) to verify the integrity of the manufacturing processes. Particle impact Noise Detection (PIND) screening is performed on microcircuits, translator and diodes that are mounted in a package with an internal cavity construction. The purpose of the test is to detect loose particles in the package, usually resulting from the assembly process. Device stress levels are denated in accordance with SPAR-RMS-PA.003 and verified by design review.

Resistors and capacitors used in the design are selected from astablished reliability (ER) types. Life expectancy is increased by ansuring that all allowable stress levels are denated in accordance with SPAR-RMS-PA.003. All ceramic and electrolytic capacitors are routinely subjected to radiographic inspection in accordance with the requirements of MSFC-STD-355.

14Oct97 by Hitz, Michael

Supersedes: N/A

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BRAMPTON ONTARIO L854J3

The SPA board is fabricated using Surface Mount Technology (SMT). This is a PWB assembly technology in which the components are soldered to the solder pada on the surface of the PWB. The significant advantage of this technology is to enable the parts on the board to be more densely packed, to reduce to overall volume and weight of the assembly.

The assembly process is highly automated. The parts are mounted on the boards using a computer controlled "pick and place" machine. The subsequent soldering operation is performed using a belt furnace, in which the time and temperature thermal profile that the FWB assembly is exposed to is tightly controlled and optimized to ensure proper part soldering attachment. The assembly is manufactured under documented procedures and quality controls. These controls are exercised throughout the assembly, inspection, and testing of the unit. This inspection includes workmanship, component mounting, soldering, and conformal coating to ensure that it is in accordance with the NHB 5300 standards.

The SMT line used for the SPA PWB assembly has undergone a full qualification program, and assembles produced on this line are used in other space programs.

The circuit board design has been reviewed to ensure adequate conductor width and separation and to confirm appropriate dimensions of solder pads and of component hold provisions. Parts mounting methods are controlled in accordance with MSFC-STD-154A, MSFC-STD-136 and SASD 2573751. These documents require approved mounting methods, stress relief and component security.

Test:

QUALIFICATION TESTS - The SPA is subjected to the following qualification testing:

VIBRATION: Each exis of the QM is subjected to Flight Acceptance Vibration Test (FAVT), Qualification Acceptance Vibration Test (QAVT), and Qualification Vibration Tests (QVT) in accordance with the SPA Vibration Test Procedure (826595). The level and duration for FAVT is as per Figure 6 and Table 2 of 826586; the level and duration for QAVT is as per Figure 7 and Table 2 of 828586; the level and duration for QVT is as per Figure 8 and Table of 826585. At the end of the three successive random vibration test in each axis, both directions (+/-) of each of the axis is subjected to a shock pulse test as per Figure 9 of 828686.

THERMAL/VACUUM: QM TVAC Test is in accordance with Figure 5 of the SPA TVAC Test Procedure (826598), with full Functional/Parametric Test performed at levels of +60 degrees C and -36 degrees C, and non-operating at -54 degrees C. The Qualification vacuum levele during TVAC is 1X10**-6 torr or less. The total test duration is 7 1/2 cycles. The QM SPA is subjected to a minimum of 1000 hours of fife testing and 1000 power On-Off cycles.

EMC: The QM is subjected to EMC Testing (tests CE01/CE03, CE07, C801, C802, CS06, RE02, RS02, and RS03) in accordance with the SPA EMC test Procedure (826477) based on MIL-STD-461A.

UNIT FLIGHT ACCEPTANCE TESTS - The FM SPA is subjected to the following acceptance testing:

VIBRATION: FM Acceptance Vibration Test (AVT) in accordance with the SPA Vibration Test Procedure (826566), with level and duration as per Figure 6 and Table 2 of 826588.

THERMALVACUUM: FM TVAC Test is in accordance with Figure 8 of the SPA TVAC Test Procedure (626588), with levels of +49 degrees and -25 degrees C for a duration of 1 1/2 cycles. The vacuum levels during Acceptance TVAC Test is 1X10**-5 torr or less.

JOINT SRU TESTS - The SPA is tested as part of the joints (ambient and vibration tests only). The ambient ATP for the Shoulder Joint, Elbow Joint, and Wrist Joint are as per ATP.2001, ATP.2003, and ATP.2005 respectively. The vibration test for the Shoulder Joint, and Elbow or Wrist Joint ere as per ATP.2002, ATP.2004 and ATP.2008 respectively. Through wire function, continuity and electical isolation tests are performed per TP.283.

MECHANICAL ARM REASSEMBLY - The SPA's/Joints undergo a mechanical arm integration stage where electrical checks are performed per 7P.2007.

MECHANICAL ARM TESTING - The outgoing split-arm is configured on the Strongback and the Manipulator Arm Checkout is performed. per ATP, 1932.

FLIGHT CHECKOUT: PDRS OPS Checkout (all vehicles) JSC 16987.

inspection:

Units are manufactured under documented quality controls. These controls are exercised throughout design procurement, planning, receiving, processing, fabrication, assembly, testing and shipping of the units. Mandatory inspection points are employed at various stages of fabrication, assembly, and test. Government source inspection is invoked at various control levels.

EEE parts inspection is performed as required by SPAR-RMS-PA.003. Each EEE part is qualified at the part level to the requirements of the applicable specification. All EEE parts are 100% screamed and burnad-in, as a minimum, as required by SPAR-RMS-PA.003, by the supplier. DPA is performed as required by PA.003 on a randomly selected 5% of parts, maximum 5 pieces, minimum 3 pieces for each lot number/date code of parts received. All cavity devices are subjected to 100% PIND. Whe is procured to specification MIL-W-22759 or MIL-W-81381 and inspected and tested to NASA JSCM5050 Standard Number 85A.

Receiving inspection varifies that all parts received are as identified in the procurement documents, that no physical damage has occurred to parts during shipment, that the receiving documents provide adequate traceability information and screening data clearly identifies acceptable Durbs.

Parts are inspected throughout manufacture and assembly as appropriate to the manufacturing stage completed. These inspections include: Ponted circuit board inspection for track separation, damage and adequacy of plated through holes, component mounting inspection for correct soldering, wire looping, strapping, etc. Operators and inspectors are trained and certified to NASA NHB 5300,4(3A-1) Standard. Conformal coating inapection for adequate processing is performed using ultraviolet light techniques. P.C. Board installation inspection includ checks for correct board installation, alignment of boards, proper connector contact mating, wire routing, strapping of wires etc. Post P.C. Board installation inspection includes cleanliness and workmanship (Spar/government rep. mandatory inspection point).

Critical Items List

SRM8

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Unit Pre-Acceptance Test inspection, which includes an audit of lower tier inspection completion, as built configuration verification to as design etc (mandatory inspection point). A unit Test Readiness Review (TRR) which includes verification of test personnel, test documents, test equipment callpration/validation status and hardware configuration is convened by QA in conjunction with Engineering, Reliability, Configuration Control, Supplier as applicable, and the government representative, prior to the start of any formal testing (Acceptance or Qualification). Unit level Acceptance Testing (ATP) includes ambient performance, thermal and vibration testing (Spar/government rep. mandatory inspection point).

Integration of unit to Joint SRU - Inspections include grounding checks, connectors for bent or pushback contacts, visual, cleanliness, interconnect wiring and power up test to the appropriate Joint Inspection Test Procedure (ITP). Joint level Pre-Acceptance Test Inspection, includes an audit of lower tier inspection completion, as built configuration verification to as design etc. Joint level Acceptance Testing (ATP) includes ambient and vibration lesting (Spar/government rep. mandatory inspection point).

Mechanical Arm Reassamply - the integration of mechanical arm subassemblies to form the assembled arm. Inspections are performed at each phase of integration which includes electrical checks, through wiring checks, wiring routing, interface connectors for bent or pushback contacts etc. Mechanical Arm Testing - Strongback and flat floor ambient performance test (Spartigovernment rep. mandatory inspection point).

OMRSD Offline: Drive each joint in Backup. Verify backup rate signature.

OMRSD Online None. Installation:

OMRSD Online Command each joint in Backup. Verify audible brake click and 10 KHz tone on driven joint.

Turneround:

Screen Failure: A: Pass

B: Pass

C: Pages

Crew Training: The crew will be trained to always observe whether the arm is responding properly to commands. If it ear't, apply brakes,

Crew Action: Remove the drive command. Select any other mode.

Operational Effect: Loss of next recundant path results in being one failure away from inability to cradie arm. Joint will not drive in Backup, if primary modes have

failed, the Backup system will not provide the capability to cradle the arm. EVA is available or arm can be jettisoned.

Constraints:

Mission. If Back-up is lost the mission is considered lost unless there is a flight specific exception.

provats:					
nctional Group	Name	Position	Telephone	Date Signed	Status
gineer	Hiltz, Michael	Systems Engineer	4534	27Feb98	Signed
llability	Molgaard, Lena	Reliability Engineer	4590	06Mar98	Signed
gram Management Offic	Rice, Craig	Technical Program Manager	4892	06Mar98	Signed
bsystem Manager	Glenn, George	RMS Subsystem Manager	(281) 483-1515	24Mar98	Signed
thnical Manager	Peck, John	Technical Manager (JSC)	713-483-1284	31 Mar 98	Signed
PETY + MIS NOW ASSURANCE COAN, DAVID		AMS SIMA ENGINEER	(251) W.S. 3499	30 APK 98	Deila Co