

**CRITICAL ITEMS LIST**

PROJECT: SRMS  
ASS'Y NOMENCLATURE: D&C PANEL

SYSTEM: D&C SUBSYSTEM  
ASS'Y P/N: 51140E391

SHEET: 1

FMEA REF.	FMEA REV.	NAME, QTY, & DRAWING REF. DESIGNATION	FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE	FAILURE EFFECT ON END ITEM	HOWR / FUNC. 2/1RB CRITICALITY RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE SCREENS: A-PASS, B-FAIL, C-PASS
350	1	END EFFECTOR AUTO/OFF/MANUAL MODE SWITCH QTY-1 P/N ME 452-0102-7306 ED 92020 SHEET 3	MODE: LOSS OF AUTO OR MANUAL EE CAPABILITY.  CAUSE(S): (1) SWITCH FAIL IN MANUAL OR AUTO POSITION.	LOSS OF ALL EE COMMANDS IN AUTO OR MANUAL.  WORST CASE ----- SUBSEQUENT FAILURE MAY CAUSE UNCOMMANDED RELEASE OR DERIGIDIZE, UNANNUNCIATED.  REDUNDANT PATHS REMAINING ----- TO RELEASE/CAPTURE PAYLOAD: MAN RHC RELEASE OR MAN DERIGID CONTACT OR AUTO MCIU RELEASE OR DERIGID COMMAND  TO RELEASE PAYLOAD: BACKUP EE RELEASE.	DESIGN FEATURES ----- TOGGLE SWITCHES USED ON THE D&C PANEL ARE HERMETICALLY SEALED, AND OF A MATURE AND PROVEN DESIGN. THESE SWITCHES ARE IN COMMON USE ON THE ORBITER VEHICLE.  THE SWITCHES ARE CONTROLLED BY ROCKWELL INTERNATIONAL SPECIFICATION MC 452-0102 AND HAVE BEEN QUALIFIED TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF THIS SPECIFICATION.  ELECTRICAL CONNECTIONS TO THE SWITCH ARE ACHIEVED BY MEANS OF SOLDERABLE TERMINALS.  WIRING TO SWITCH TERMINALS UTILIZES NICKEL PLATED CONDUCTORS WITH A POLYAMID INSULATION. SOLDERING OF THE NICKEL PLATED WIRE TO THE SWITCH TERMINALS IS CONTROLLED BY CAE PROCESS SPECIFICATION PD 91059.  THE WIRING HARNESS IS DESIGNED TO BE CAPABLE OF SEPARATE TESTING (FOR INSULATION RESISTANCE, DIELECTRIC STRENGTH, AND CONTINUITY).  MOUNTING OF THE SWITCH TO THE D&C PANEL IS BY MEANS OF A 15/32 NUT WHICH ENGAGES A THREADED BUSHING ON THE SWITCH. A KEYED WASHER PROVIDES ROTATION RESTRAINT. AFTER INSTALLATION AND TORQUING, THE NUT IS STAKED TO THE PANEL BY A BLOB OF EPOXY ADHESIVE. A STAINLESS STEEL GUARD PROTECTS THE SWITCH LEVER AGAINST DAMAGE OR INADVERTENT OPERATION.  ANALYSIS OF THE BASIC PANEL STRUCTURE HAS DEMONSTRATED THAT THERE ARE NO RESONANCES IN THE RELEVANT VIBRATION FREQUENCY SPECTRUM. THIS ANALYSIS HAS BEEN VERIFIED BY VIBRATION TESTING OF THE D&C PANEL ASSEMBLY.  APPLICATION ANALYSIS HAS CONFIRMED THAT ADEQUATE ELECTRICAL STRESS MARGINS ARE ACHIEVED.  AT THE PART LEVEL, QUALIFICATION/CERTIFICATION TESTING IS DEFINED BY ROCKWELL INTERNATIONAL SPECIFICATION MC452-0102. THIS TEST REQUIREMENT INCLUDES: INSULATION RESISTANCE, DIELECTRIC STRENGTH, CONTACT RESISTANCE, RANDOM VIBRATION (48 MINUTES PER AXIS), LEAKAGE AT ONE ATMOSPHERE DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE, TOGGLE STRENGTH. FOR SWITCH OPERATIONAL CYCLES REFER TO TABLE 13.  ALL UNITS ARE SUBJECTED TO ACCEPTANCE TESTS WHICH INCLUDE PRE-ACCEPTANCE RUN-IN, DIELECTRIC STRENGTH, INSTALLATION RESISTANCE, CONTACT RESISTANCE, ACCEPTANCE VIBRATION, SEAL TEST, VISUAL EXAMINATION, AND RADIOGRAPHIC INSPECTION.

PREPARED BY: MFUG

SUPERCEDING DATE: 11 SEP 86

APPROVED BY:

DATE: 26 JUL 91

CIL REV: 1

**CRITICAL ITEMS LIST**

PROJECT: SRMS  
ASS'Y NOMENCLATURE: D&C PANEL

SYSTEM: D&C SUBSYSTEM  
ASS'Y P/N: 51140E391

SHEET: 2

FMEA REF.	FMEA REV.	NAME, QTY, & DRAWING REF. DESIGNATION	FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE	FAILURE EFFECT OR END ITEM	HDWR / FUNC. 2/1RB CRITICALITY RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE SCREENS: A-PASS, B-FAIL, C-PASS
350	1	END EFFECTOR AUTO/OFF/MANUAL MODE SWITCH QTY-1 P/N ME 452-0102-7306 ED 92020 SHEET 3	<p>MODE: LOSS OF AUTO OR MANUAL EE CAPABILITY.</p> <p>CAUSE(S): (1) SWITCH FAIL IN MANUAL OR AUTO POSITION.</p>	<p>LOSS OF ALL EE COMMANDS IN AUTO OR MANUAL.</p> <p>WORST CASE</p> <p>SUBSEQUENT FAILURE MAY CAUSE UNCOMMANDED RELEASE OR DERIGIDIZE.</p> <p>REDUNDANT PATHS REMAINING</p> <p>TO RELEASE/CAPTURE PAYLOAD: MAN RHC RELEASE OR MAN DERIGID CONTACT OR AUTO MCIU RELEASE OR DERIGID COMMAND</p> <p>TO RELEASE PAYLOAD: BACKUP EE RELEASE.</p>	<p>ACCEPTANCE TESTS</p> <p>THE HARDWARE ITEM IS SUBJECTED TO THE FOLLOWING ACCEPTANCE ENVIRONMENTAL TESTS AS PART OF THE D&amp;C PANEL ASSEMBLY.</p> <p>O VIBRATION: LEVEL AND DURATION - REFERENCE TABLE 1</p> <p>O THERMAL: +110 DEGREES F TO PLUS 10 DEGREES F (2 CYCLES - 9.5 HRS/CYCLE.)</p> <p>THE D&amp;C PANEL ASSEMBLY IS FURTHER TESTED AS PART OF THE RMS SYSTEM TESTS (TP516 RMS STRONGBACK TEST AND TP552 FLAT FLOOR TEST) WHICH VERIFIES THE ABSENCE OF THE FAILURE MODE.</p> <p>QUALIFICATION TESTS</p> <p>THE SWITCH ITEM HAS BEEN QUALIFIED FOR ORBITER USE. THE D&amp;C PANEL ASSEMBLY HAS BEEN SUBJECTED TO THE FOLLOWING QUALIFICATION TEST ENVIRONMENTS.</p> <p>O VIBRATION: LEVEL AND DURATION - REFERENCE TABLE 1</p> <p>O SHOCK: 20G/11 MS - 3 AXES (6 DIRECTIONS)</p> <p>O THERMAL: 130 DEGREES F TO -23 DEGREES F (12 HRS PER CYCLE) (6 CYCLES)</p> <p>O HUMIDITY: 95% (120 DEGREES F TO 82 DEGREES F CYCLE IN 16 HRS) 10 CYCLES TOTAL.</p> <p>O ENC: MIL-STD-461 AS MODIFIED BY SL-E-0002 (TEST CE01, CE02, CE03, CS01 (DC/AC), CE03, CS01 (DC/AC), CS02, CS06, RE02 (B/M), RS02, RS03, RS04)</p> <p>FLIGHT CHECKOUT</p> <p>PDRS OPS CHECKLIST (ALL VEHICLES) JSC 16987</p>

PREPARED BY:

MFVG

SUPERSEDING DATE: 11 SEP 86

APPROVED BY:

DATE: 24 JUL 91

CIL REV: 1

**CRITICAL ITEMS LIST**

PROJECT: SRMS

ASS'Y NOMENCLATURE: D&C PANEL

SYSTEM: D&C SUBSYSTEM

ASS'Y P/N: 51140E391

SHEET: 3

FMEA REF.	FMEA REV.	NAME, QTY. & DRAWING DESIGNATION	FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE	FAILURE EFFECT ON END ITEM	NDNR / FUNC. 2/1RB CRITICALITY	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE SCREENS: A-PASS, B-FAIL, C-PASS
350	1	END EFF AUTO/OI// MANUAL MODE SWITCH QTY-1 P/N ME 452-0102-7306 ED 92020 SHEET 3	MODE: LOSS OF AUTO OR MANUAL EE CAPABILITY.  CAUSE(S): (1) SWITCH FAIL IN MANUAL OR AUTO POSITION.	LOSS OF ALL EE COMMANDS IN AUTO OR MANUAL.  WORST CASE ----- SUBSEQUENT FAILURE MAY CAUSE UNCOMMANDED RELEASE OR DERIGIDIZE. UNANNUNCIATED.  REDUNDANT PATHS REMAINING ----- TO RELEASE/ CAPTURE PAYLOAD: MAN RNC RELEASE OR MAN DERIGID CONTACT OR AUTO MCIU RELEASE OR DERIGID COMMAND  TO RELEASE PAYLOAD: BACKUP EE RELEASE.	QA/INSPECTIONS ----- HERMETICALLY SEALED TOGGLE SWITCHES ARE PROCURED TO ROCKWELL SPECIFICATION MC452-0102. ROCKWELL PART NO. ME452-0102-.... QUALIFICATION AND ACCEPTANCE TESTING OF SWITCHES IS PERFORMED TO R.I. SPEC. MC452-0102.  RECEIVING INSPECTION VERIFIES THAT SWITCHES RECEIVED ARE AS IDENTIFIED IN THE PROCUREMENT DOCUMENTS, THAT NO PHYSICAL DAMAGE HAS OCCURRED TO SWITCHES DURING SHIPMENT, THAT THE RECEIVING DOCUMENTS PROVIDE ADEQUATE TRACEABILITY INFORMATION AND ACCEPTANCE TEST DATA IDENTIFIES ACCEPTABLE PARTS.  PARTS ARE INSPECTED THROUGHOUT MANUFACTURE AND ASSEMBLY AS APPROPRIATE TO THE MANUFACTURING STAGE COMPLETED. THESE INSPECTIONS INCLUDE,  COMPONENT MOUNTING TO FRONT PANEL INSPECTION, SOLDERING OF WIRES TO SWITCH CONTACTS, WIRE ROUTING STRESS RELIEF OF WIRES ETC., OPERATORS AND INSPECTORS ARE TRAINED AND CERTIFIED TO NASA NHB 5300.4(3A) STANDARD, AS MODIFIED BY JSC08800A.  PRE-TEST INSPECTION OF D&C PANEL ASSY INCLUDES AN AUDIT OF LOWER TIER INSPECTION COMPLETION, AS BUILD CONFIGURATION VERIFICATION TO AS DESIGN ETC. (SPAR/GOVERNMENT REP. - MANDATORY INSPECTION POINT)  A TEST READINESS REVIEW (TRR) WHICH INCLUDES VERIFICATION OF TEST PERSONNEL, TEST DOCUMENTS, TEST EQUIPMENT CALIBRATION/ VALIDATION STATUS AND HARDWARE CONFIGURATION IS CONVENED BY QUALITY ASSURANCE IN CONJUNCTION WITH ENGINEERING, RELIABILITY, CONFIGURATION CONTROL, SUPPLIER AS APPLICABLE, AND THE GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVE, PRIOR TO THE START OF ANY FORMAL TESTING (ACCEPTANCE OR QUALIFICATION).  ACCEPTANCE TESTING (ATP) INCLUDES AMBIENT PERFORMANCE, THERMAL AND VIBRATION TESTING, (SPAR/GOVERNMENT REP. : MANDATORY INSPECTION POINT).  INTEGRATION OF D&C PANEL, RNC, TNC AND MCIU. INSPECTIONS ARE PERFORMED AT EACH STAGE OF INTEGRATION, WHICH INCLUDES GROUNDING CHECKS, INTER CONNECT CABLE VERIFICATION, CONNECTOR INSPECTION FOR BENT OR PUSHBACK CONTACTS ETC.  SUB-SYSTEM PERFORMANCE TESTING (ATP), INCLUDES AN AMBIENT PERFORMANCE TEST. (MANDATORY INSPECTION POINT).  SRMS SYSTEMS INTEGRATION. THE INTEGRATION OF MECHANICAL ARM SUBASSEMBLIES AND THE FLIGHT CABIN EQUIPMENT TO FORM THE SRMS. INSPECTIONS ARE PERFORMED AT EACH PHASE OF INTEGRATION WHICH INCLUDES GROUNDING CHECKS, THRU WIRING CHECKS, WIRING ROUTING, INTERFACE CONNECTORS FOR BENT OR PUSH BACK CONTACTS ETC.  SRMS SYSTEMS TESTING - STRONGBACK AND FLAT FLOOR AMBIENT PERFORMANCE TEST. (SPAR/GOVERNMENT REP. - MANDATORY INSPECTION POINT)	

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**CRITICAL ITEMS LIST**

PROJECT: SRMS  
 ASS'Y NOMENCLATURE: D&C PANEL

SYSTEM: D&C SUBSYSTEM  
 ASS'Y P/N: 51140E301

SHEET: 4

FMEA REF.	FMEA REV.	NAME, QTY, & DRAWING REF. DESIGNATION	FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE	FAILURE EFFECT ON END ITEM	HOWR / FUNC. 2/1RB CRITICALITY	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE SCREENS: A-PASS, B-FAIL, C-PASS
350	1	END EFFECTOR AUTO/OFF/ MANUAL MODE SWITCH QTY-1 P/N ME 452-0102-7306 ED 92020 SHEET 3	MODE: LOSS OF AUTO OR MANUAL EE CAPABILITY.  CAUSE(S): (1) SWITCH FAIL IN MANUAL OR AUTO POSITION.	LOSS OF ALL EE COMMANDS IN AUTO OR MANUAL.  WORST CASE ----- SUBSEQUENT FAILURE MAY CAUSE UNCOMMANDED RELEASE OR DERIGIDIZE, UNANNUNCIATED.  REDUNDANT PATHS REMAINING ----- TO RELEASE/ CAPTURE PAYLOAD: MAN RHC RELEASE OR MAN DERIGID CONTACT OR AUTO MCIU RELEASE OR DERIGID COMMAND  TO RELEASE PAYLOAD: BACKUP EE RELEASE.		FAILURE HISTORY -----  THERE HAVE BEEN NO FAILURES ASSOCIATED WITH THIS FAILURE MODE ON THE SRMS PROGRAM.

PREPARED BY: MFUG SUPERCEDING DATE: 11 SEP 86 APPROVED BY: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: 24 JUL 91 CIL REV: 1

**CRITICAL ITEMS LIB**

PROJECT: SRMS  
ASS'Y NOMENCLATURE: G

SYSTEM: D&C SUBSYSTEM  
ASS'Y P/R: 51140E391

SHEET: 5

FMEA REF.	FMEA REV.	NAME, QTY, & DRAWING REF. DESIGNATION	FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE	FAILURE EFFECT ON END ITEM	HOWR / FUNK 2/1RB CRITICALITY	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE SCREENS: A-PASS, B-FAIL, C-PASS
350	1	END EFFECTOR AUTO/OFF/MANUAL MODE SWITCH QTY-1 P/N ME 452-0102-7306 ED 92020 SHEET 3	MODE: LOSS OF AUTO OR MANUAL EE CAPABILITY.  CAUSE(S): (1) SWITCH FAIL IN MANUAL OR AUTO POSITION.	LOSS OF ALL EE COMMANDS IN AUTO OR MANUAL.  WORST CASE ----- SUBSEQUENT FAILURE MAY CAUSE UNCOMMANDED RELEASE OR DERIGIDIZE. UNANNUNCIATED.  REDUNDANT PATHS REMAINING ----- TO RELEASE/ CAPTURE PAYLOAD: MAN RHC RELEASE OR MAN DERIGID CONTACT OR AUTO MCIU RELEASE OR DERIGID COMMAND  TO RELEASE PAYLOAD: BACKUP EE RELEASE.		OPERATIONAL EFFECTS ----- LOSS OF EITHER MANUAL OR AUTO EE OPERATION. SUBSEQUENT FAILURE MAY CAUSE PAYLOAD TO BE RELEASED WITH NO OPERATOR COMMAND OR ANNUNCIATION. IF THIS OCCURS WHILE THE ARM IS BEING DRIVEN, THE PAYLOAD WILL BE RELEASED AND WILL TAKE AN UNEXPECTED TRAJECTORY. SUBSEQUENT FAILURE MAY CAUSE CARRIAGE TO DERIGIDIZE WITHOUT OPERATOR COMMAND OR ANNUNCIATION. THE GRAPPLE FIXTURE/EE INTERFACE MAY BE PARTIALLY RIGID. THE CARRIAGE COULD BE COMPLETELY EXTENDED. IF THIS OCCURS WHILE THE ARM IS BEING DRIVEN, THE PAYLOAD MAY TAKE AN UNEXPECTED TRAJECTORY.  CREW ACTION ----- USE AVAILABLE MODE.  CREW TRAINING ----- CREW TO BE TRAINED TO MANEUVER AWAY FROM FREE FLYING PAYLOAD AT ANY TIME DURING ARM OPERATIONS.  MISSION CONSTRAINT ----- NONE  SCREEN FAILURES ----- B: NO ORBITER ANNUNCIATION OR DISPLAY. THIS FAILURE IS DETECTABLE BY GND.  OHRSD OFFLINE ----- EXERCISE D&C PANEL E/E AUTO/MANUAL MODE SWITCH. VERIFY EE MODE COMMAND BITS IN MCIU/D&C PANEL DATA BUS.  OHRSD ONLINE INSTALLATION ----- NONE  OHRSD ONLINE TURNAROUND ----- EXERCISE ALL D&C PANEL EE MODES VERIFY CORRECT OPERATION OF EE AND EE TALKBACK FLAGS

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