

EMEA
EMU FAILURE MODE, EFFECT ANALYSIS

07/02/99 SUPERSEDES / /

ANALYSIS:

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NAME P/N QTY	FUNCTION	FAILURE MODE & CAUSES	MISSION PHASE	FAILURE EFFECT	FAILURE DETECTION FLIGHT/GROUND	TIME TO EFFECT/ ACTIONS	CRI1	REMARKS/ HAZARD	REF
DISPLAY AND CONTROLS ELECTRONICS, STEM 350 ----- SV792290 C15	Provides current limiting for EVC, feedwater solenoid and CLBY solenoid power. Provides optical isolation and discrete signal conditioning for OIS input discretes and EVC bus discretes. Contains battery current and voltage sense circuits, DCN display, and provides secondary power to DCN display, OIS, and sensors.	SSOFMS2: Electrical short (input to output) in secondary EVC current limiter. CAUSE: Electronic component failure.	PREEVA EVA	EMU STEM: Loss of over current protection for DCN for short circuits in EVC power circuit. CIE INTERFACE: None for single failure. Any subsequent short in the EVC power lines would cause laming of EMU power return P.C. trace in DCN. This would result in loss of all EMU electrical power. MISSION: None for single failure. Terminate EVA for second failure which results in loss of EMU power. CREW/VEHICLE: None for single or double failure. Possible loss of crewman with loss of SOP.	FLIGHT: No. GROUND: Yes. FEMU-R-001, Para. 7.3.3.2.1.1; 3 EVC and FM Valve Current Limiters Test.	None required. TIME AVAILABLE: N/A TIME REQUIRED: N/A	3/18 A-PASS B-PASS C-PASS	The redundant path is the SDP. Circuit breakers (current limiters) are standby redundant.	None.

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ATTACHMENT -
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