

CRITICAL ITEMS LIST

PROJECT: SRMS
 ASS'Y NOMENCLATURE: BACK-UP

SYSTEM: BACK-UP
 ASS'Y P/N:

SHEET: 1

FMEA REF.	REV.	NAME, QTY & DRAWING REF. DESIGNATION	FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE	FAILURE EFFECT ON END ITEM	HBM / FUNC. 2/IR CRITICALITY	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE
4540	3	POWER SIGNAL CONTROLLER SCHEMATIC 2563737 QTY-1	<p>MODE: LOWER THAN DEMANDED MOTOR VOLTAGE OUTPUT.</p> <p>CAUSE(S): (1) FALSE OUTPUT FROM CSA DECODER CCT.</p>	<p>THE JOINT MOTOR WILL DRIVE AT A LOWER RATE OR WILL STOP.</p> <p>WORST CASE ----- BACKUP INOPERATIVE.</p> <p>REDUNDANT PATHS REMAINING ----- SINGLE AND DIRECT</p>		<p>DESIGN FEATURES -----</p> <p>THE DESIGN UTILIZES PROVEN CIRCUIT TECHNIQUES AND IS IMPLEMENTED USING CMOS LOGIC DEVICES.</p> <p>CMOS DEVICES OPERATE AT LOW POWER AND HENCE DO NOT EXPERIENCE SIGNIFICANT OPERATING STRESSES. THE TECHNOLOGY IS MATURE, AND DEVICE RELIABILITY HISTORY IS WELL DOCUMENTED. ALL STRESSES ARE ADDITIONALLY REDUCED BY DERATING THE APPROPRIATE PARAMETERS IN ACCORDANCE WITH SPAR-RMS-PA.003. SPECIAL HANDLING PRECAUTIONS ARE USED AT ALL STAGES OF MANUFACTURE TO PRECLUDE DAMAGE/STRESS DUE TO ELECTROSTATIC DISCHARGE.</p> <p>ALL RESISTORS AND CAPACITORS USED IN THE DESIGN ARE SELECTED FROM ESTABLISHED RELIABILITY (ER) TYPES. LIFE EXPECTANCY IS INCREASED BY ENSURING THAT ALL ALLOWABLE STRESS LEVELS ARE DERATED IN ACCORDANCE WITH SPAR-RMS-PA.003. ALL CERAMIC AND ELECTROLYTIC CAPACITORS ARE ROUTINELY SUBJECTED TO RADIOGRAPHIC INSPECTION.</p> <p>THE SIGNALS FROM THE BDA CONNECTOR ARE HARD WIRED TO THE POWER SIGNAL CONTROLLER BOARD.</p>

PREPARED BY: HEMG

SUPERCEDING DATE: 01 OCT 87

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SHEET: 2

FREA REF.	REV.	NAME, QTY, & DRAWING REF. DESIGNATION	FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE	FAILURE EFFECT ON END ITEM	HOWR / FUNC. 2/IR CRITICALITY	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE
4540	J	POWER SIGNAL CONTROLLER SCHEMATIC 2561737 QTY-1	<p>MODE: LOWER THAN DEMANDED MOTOR VOLTAGE OUTPUT.</p> <p>CAUSE(S): (1) FALSE OUTPUT FROM CSA DECODER CCT.</p>	<p>THE JOINT MOTOR WILL DRIVE AT A LOWER RATE OR WILL STOP.</p> <p>WORST CASE</p> <p>BACKUP INOPERATIVE.</p> <p>REDUNDANT PATHS REMAINING</p> <p>SINGLE AND DIRECT</p>		<p>ACCEPTANCE TESTS</p> <p>-----</p> <p>THE BDA IS ACCEPTANCE TESTED FOR THE FOLLOWING ENVIRONMENTS AS AN SRU.</p> <p>0 VIBRATION: LEVEL AND DURATION - REFERENCE TABLE 4</p> <p>0 THERMAL: +70 DEGREES C TO - 25 DEGREES C (1 1/2 CYCLES)</p> <p>THE BDA IS INTEGRATED INTO THE SHOULDER JOINT AND EXPOSED TO THE JOINT ACCEPTANCE ENVIRONMENTS (VIBRATION AND THERMAL VACUUM).</p> <p>THE SHOULDER JOINT IS THEREAFTER TESTED AS PART OF THE RMS SYSTEM TESTS (TP518 RMS STRONGBACK AND TP552 FLAT FLOOR TESTS) WHICH VERIFIES THE ABSENCE OF THE FAILURE MODE.</p> <p>QUALIFICATION TESTS</p> <p>-----</p> <p>THE BDA HAS BEEN QUALIFICATION TESTED TO THE FOLLOWING ENVIRONMENTS AS AN SRU. THE BDA IS FURTHER TESTED ON THE SHOULDER JOINT QUALIFICATION TESTING.</p> <p>0 VIBRATION: LEVEL AND DURATION - REFERENCE TABLE 4</p> <p>0 SHOCK: 20G/11MS - 3 AXES (6 DIRECTIONS)</p> <p>0 THERMAL: +81 DEGREES C TO -36 DEGREES C (6 CYCLES) 1 X 10⁻⁶ TORR.</p> <p>0 HUMIDITY: TEST IN SHOULDER JOINT HUMIDITY TEST</p> <p>0 EMC: MIL-STD-461 AS MODIFIED BY SL-E-0002 (TESTS CE01, CE03, CS01, CS02, CS06, RE01, RE02 (N/B), RS01)</p> <p>FLIGHT CHECKOUT</p> <p>-----</p> <p>PDRS OPS CHECKLIST (ALL VEHICLES) JSC 16987</p>

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SHEET: 3

FREA REF.	REV.	NAME, QTY, & DRAWING REF. DESIGNATION	FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE	FAILURE EFFECT ON END ITEM	HDMR / FUNC. 2/IR CRITICALITY	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE
4540	3	POWER SIGNAL CONTROLLER SCHEMATIC 2563737 QTY-1	<p>MODE: LOWER THAN DEMANDED MOTOR VOLTAGE OUTPUT.</p> <p>CAUSE(S): (1) FALSE OUTPUT FROM CSA DECODER CCT.</p>	<p>THE JOINT MOTOR WILL DRIVE AT A LOWER RATE OR WILL STOP.</p> <p>WORST CASE</p> <p>BACKUP INOPERATIVE.</p> <p>REDUNDANT PATHS REMAINING</p> <p>SINGLE AND DIRECT</p>	QA/INSPECTIONS	<p>UNITS ARE MANUFACTURED UNDER DOCUMENTED QUALITY CONTROLS. THESE CONTROLS ARE EXERCISED THROUGHOUT DESIGN, PROCUREMENT, PLANNING, RECEIVING, PROCESSING, FABRICATION, ASSEMBLY, TESTING AND SHIPPING OF THE UNITS. MANDATORY INSPECTION POINTS ARE EMPLOYED AT VARIOUS STAGES OF FABRICATION ASSEMBLY AND TEST. GOVERNMENT SOURCE INSPECTION IS INVOKED AT VARIOUS CONTROL LEVELS.</p> <p>EEE PARTS INSPECTION IS PERFORMED AS REQUIRED BY SPAR-RMS-PA.003. EACH EEE PART IS QUALIFIED AT THE PART LEVEL TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE APPLICABLE SPECIFICATION. ALL EEE PARTS ARE 100% SCREENED AND BURNED IN, AS A MINIMUM AS REQUIRED BY SPAR-RMS-PA.003, BY THE SUPPLIER. ADDITIONALLY, EEE PARTS ARE 100% RE-SCREENED IN ACCORDANCE WITH REQUIREMENTS, BY AN INDEPENDENT SPAR APPROVED TESTING FACILITY. DPA IS PERFORMED AS REQUIRED BY PA.003 ON A RANDOMLY SELECTED 5K OF PARTS, MAXIMUM 5 PIECES, MINIMUM 3 PIECES FOR EACH LOT NUMBER/DATE CODE OF PARTS RECEIVED.</p> <p>WIRE IS PROCURED TO SPECIFICATION MIL-W-22759 OR MIL-W-81381 AND INSPECTED AND TESTED TO NASA JSC8080 STANDARD NUMBER 95A.</p> <p>RECEIVING INSPECTION VERIFIES THAT ALL PARTS RECEIVED ARE AS IDENTIFIED IN THE PROCUREMENT DOCUMENTS, THAT NO PHYSICAL DAMAGE HAS OCCURRED TO PARTS DURING SHIPMENT, THAT THE RECEIVING DOCUMENTS PROVIDE ADEQUATE TRACEABILITY INFORMATION AND SCREENING DATA CLEARLY IDENTIFIES ACCEPTABLE PARTS.</p> <p>PARTS ARE INSPECTED THROUGHOUT MANUFACTURE AND ASSEMBLY AS APPROPRIATE TO THE MANUFACTURING STAGE COMPLETED. THESE INSPECTIONS INCLUDE,</p> <p>PRINTED CIRCUIT BOARD INSPECTION FOR TRACK SEPARATION, DAMAGE AND ADEQUACY OF PLATED THROUGH HOLES.</p> <p>COMPONENT MOUNTING INSPECTION FOR CORRECT SOLDERING, WIRE LOOPING, STRAPPING, ETC. OPERATORS AND INSPECTORS ARE TRAINED AND CERTIFIED TO NASA NHD 5300.4(3A) STANDARD, AS MODIFIED BY JSC 08800A.</p> <p>CONFORMAL COATING INSPECTION FOR ADEQUATE PROCESSING IS PERFORMED USING ULTRAVIOLET LIGHT TECHNIQUES.</p> <p>POST P.C. BD. INSTALLATION INSPECTION, CLEANLINESS AND WORKMANSHIP (SPAR/GOVERNMENT REP. MANDATORY INSPECTION POINT)</p> <p>P.C. BD. INSTALLATION INSPECTION, CHECK FOR CORRECT BOARD INSTALLATION, ALIGNMENT OF BOARDS, PROPER CONNECTOR CONTACT RATING, WIRE ROUTING, STRAPPING OF WIRES ETC.,</p> <p>PRE-CLOSURE INSPECTION, WORKMANSHIP AND CLEANLINESS (SPAR/GOVERNMENT REP. - MANDATORY INSPECTION POINT)</p> <p>PRE-ACCEPTANCE TEST INSPECTION, WHICH INCLUDES AN AUDIT OF LOWER TIER INSPECTION COMPLETION, AS BUILT CONFIGURATION VERIFICATION TO AS DESIGN ETC., (MANDATORY INSPECTION POINT).</p>

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FMEA REF.	REV.	NAME, QTY, & DRAWING REF. DESIGNATION	FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE	FAILURE EFFECT ON END ITEM	HWR / FUNC. 2/1R CRITICALITY	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE
4540	3	POWER SIGNAL CONTROLLER SCHEMATIC 2563737 QTY-1	<p>MODE: LOWER THAN DEMANDED MOTOR VOLTAGE OUTPUT.</p> <p>CAUSE(S): (1) FALSE OUTPUT FROM CSA DECODER CCT.</p>	<p>THE JOINT MOTOR WILL DRIVE AT A LOWER RATE OR WILL STOP.</p> <p>WORST CASE</p> <p>-----</p> <p>BACKUP INOPERATIVE.</p> <p>REDUNDANT PATHS REMAINING</p> <p>-----</p> <p>SINGLE AND DIRECT</p>		<p>A TEST READINESS REVIEW (TRR) WHICH INCLUDES VERIFICATION OF TEST PERSONNEL, TEST DOCUMENTS, TEST EQUIPMENT CALIBRATION/ VALIDATION STATUS AND HARDWARE CONFIGURATION IS CONVENED BY QUALITY ASSURANCE IN CONJUNCTION WITH ENGINEERING, RELIABILITY, CONFIGURATION CONTROL, SUPPLIER AS APPLICABLE, AND THE GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVE, PRIOR TO THE START OF ANY FORMAL TESTING (ACCEPTANCE OR QUALIFICATION).</p> <p>ACCEPTANCE TESTING (ATP) INCLUDES AMBIENT PERFORMANCE, THERMAL AND VIBRATION TESTING. (SPAR/GOVERNMENT REP. - MANDATORY INSPECTION POINT).</p> <p>INTEGRATION OF UNIT TO JOINT SRU - INSPECTIONS INCLUDE GROUNDING CHECKS, CONNECTORS FOR BENT OR PUSHBACK CONTACTS, VISUAL, CLEANLINESS, INTERCONNECT WIRING AND POWER UP TEST TO THE APPROPRIATE JOINT INSPECTION TEST PROCEDURE (ITP) ETC.</p> <p>JOINT LEVEL PRE-ACCEPTANCE TEST INSPECTION, INCLUDES AN AUDIT OF LOWER TIER INSPECTION COMPLETION, AS BUILT CONFIGURATION VERIFICATION TO AS DESIGN ETC.</p> <p>JOINT LEVEL ACCEPTANCE TESTING (ATP) INCLUDES AMBIENT, VIBRATION AND THERMAL-VAC TESTING. (SPAR/GOVERNMENT REP. - MANDATORY INSPECTION POINT).</p> <p>SRMS SYSTEMS INTEGRATION, THE INTEGRATION OF MECHANICAL ARM SUBASSEMBLIES AND THE FLIGHT CABIN EQUIPMENT TO FORM THE SRMS. INSPECTIONS ARE PERFORMED AT EACH PHASE OF INTEGRATION WHICH INCLUDES GROUNDING CHECKS, THRU WIRING CHECKS, WIRING ROUTING, INTERFACE CONNECTORS FOR BENT OR PUSH BACK CONTACTS ETC.</p> <p>SRMS SYSTEMS TESTING - STRONGBACK AND FLAT FLOOR AMBIENT PERFORMANCE TEST. (SPAR/GOVERNMENT REP. - MANDATORY INSPECTION POINT)</p>

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FMEA REF.	REV.	NAME, QTY, & DRAWING REF. DESIGNATION	FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE	FAILURE EFFECT ON END ITEM	HWR / FUNC. 2/1R CRITICALITY	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE
4540	3	POWER SIGNAL CONTROLLER SCHEMATIC 2563737 QTY-1	MODE: LOWER THAN DEMANDED ROTOR VOLTAGE OUTPUT. CAUSE(S): (1) FALSE OUTPUT FROM CSA DECODER CCT.	THE JOINT ROTOR WILL DRIVE AT A LOWER RATE OR WILL STOP. WORST CASE BACKUP INOPERATIVE. REDUNDANT PATHS MAINTAINING SINGLE AND DIRECT	FAILURE HISTORY THERE HAVE BEEN NO FAILURES ASSOCIATED WITH THIS FAILURE MODE ON THE SRMS PROGRAM.	

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SHEET: 6

P/N REF.	REV.	NAME, QTY & DRAWING REF. DESIGNATION	FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE	FAILURE EFFECT ON END ITEM	HOWR / FUNC. 2/IR CRITICALITY	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE
4540	3	POWER SIGNAL CONTROLLER SCHEMATIC 2563737 QTY-1	MODE: LOWER THAN DEMANDED MOTOR VOLTAGE OUTPUT. CAUSE(S): (1) FALSE OUTPUT FROM CSA DECODER CCT.	THE JOINT MOTOR WILL DRIVE AT A LOWER RATE OR WILL STOP. WORST CASE BACKUP INOPERATIVE. REDUNDANT PATHS REMAINING SINGLE AND DIRECT		<p>OPERATIONAL EFFECTS</p> <p>-----</p> <p>LOSS OF NEXT REDUNDANT PATH RESULTS IN BEING ONE FAILURE AWAY FROM INABILITY TO CRADLE ARM. JOINT WILL NOT DRIVE IN BACKUP ONCE PRIMARY NODES HAVE FAILED. THE BACKUP STANDBY SYSTEM WILL NOT PROVIDE THE CAPABILITY TO CRADLE THE ARM. ARM CAN BE JETTISONED.</p> <p>CREW ACTION</p> <p>-----</p> <p>PERFORM AN EVA TO STOP THE ARM OR JETTISON.</p> <p>CREW TRAINING</p> <p>-----</p> <p>NONE</p> <p>MISSION CONSTRAINT</p> <p>-----</p> <p>ARM SHOULD NOT BE MANEUVERED TO POSITION WHERE JETTISON CANNOT BE SAFELY PERFORMED.</p> <p>SCREEN FAILURES</p> <p>-----</p> <p>N/A</p> <p>OMRSD OFFLINE</p> <p>-----</p> <p>OPERATE ANY JOINT IN BACKUP. VERIFY JOINT MOTION.</p> <p>OMRSD ONLINE INSTALLATION</p> <p>-----</p> <p>NONE</p> <p>OMRSD ONLINE TURNAROUND</p> <p>-----</p> <p>OPERATE WRIST ROLL. VERIFY JOINT MOTION.</p>

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