CRITICAL ITEMS LIST

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REFERENCE DESIGNATOR: F3

PROJECT: IFM BREAKOUT BOX

SUBSYSTEM: NONE **EFFECTIVITY All Orbiters**

characteristics. The tests and

inspections done on a periodic.

basis for qualification include do resistance, case leakage,

time current characteristics.

NAME / QUANTITY: FUSE / 1

LRU NAME / QUANTITY: FM BREAKOUT BOX / 2

LRU PART NUMBER: SE039121772 DRAWING REFERENCE: 10120-20022 **FAILURE MODE NUMBER** CRITICALITY FAILURE EFFECT RETENTION RATIONALE 5 2/1R **FUNCTION ENDITEM** A. DESIGN – The part is a miniature cartridge fuse with leads. Fuse outlet 1 provides fuse protection for the IFM breakout. No power output at outlet 1: It is rated at 5 A, with a box (outlet 1) and downstream equipment loss of redundant power to capacity to interrupt 1,000 A at CWE 60 V, and is not to exceed 3 q. The current load used to power the CAW System is nominally .7 A. FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE Mode: Fuse opens prematurely TESTS - The part is screened MISSION Cause: Defective material and qualified to the requirements of Rockwell Inter-None national specification MC451-0010. Tests and inspections are done on the entire product to check burn-in (100 percent rating, 2-hr minimum), ter-CREW / VEHICLE minal strength (2 in-lb, 1 min) examination of product vibra-This failure followed by tion (sinusoidal sweep), leakfailure of the remaining age, doresistance, and radio-Orbiter essential bus powering the CWE would graphics. Tests and inspections create an undetected fuel celt are done on a sample from REDUNDANCY SCREENS REMAINING PATHS emergency due to loss of fuel each lot to check terminal cell coolant pump Replace fuse A - Pass strength, vibration (random), Use backup IFM box B - Pass leakage, do resistance, radio-C - Pass graphics, and time current INTERFACE

PREPARED BY: Luis Vazquez

MISSION PHASE

Orbit/Landing

KEYISION: Basic

TIME TO CORRECT

Immediate

TIME TO EFFECT

Minutes:

SUPERSEDING DATE: #791

DATE: 8/41

See "End Item" and

"Crew/Vehicle"

HEFERENCE DESIGNATOR: F2
NAME/QUANTITY: FUSE/1
DRAWING REFERENCE: 10120-30022

PROJECT: IFM BREAKOUT BOX

LRU NAME / QUANTITY: IFM BREAKQUT BOX / 2

IRU PART MIMBER: SED39121772

SUBSYSTEM: NONE EFFECTIVITY: All Orbiters

RETENTION RATIONALE (Concluded)

terminal strength, thermal shock, humidity, interrupting capacity, mechanical shock, and vibration. A visual and mechanical examination is also performed.

- C. INSPECTION The part is inspected according to the requirements of Rockwell International specification MC451-0010, which includes visual inspections and burn-in and screening tests as described in item 2. In addition, Rockwell International periodically audits the device manufacturer to ensure that the design, processing assembly, inspection, and testing of devices are adequately controlled.
- D. FAILURE HISTORY None. There have not been any documented failures of a fuse to function on the Orbiter program.
- E. OPERATIONAL USE -
 - Fuse failure would be annunciated in Orbiter failure scenario 2. The fuse failure may be detected in Orbiter failure scenario 1
 by indicator lights on the IFM breakout box. The fuse could then be replaced.
 - 2. The second failure, loss of the Orbiter essential bus, would be detected by the ground except during LOS. There would be 5-10 min (9 min nominal) available to shut down the affected fuel cell.

PREPARED BY: Luis Vazquez

REVISION: Basic

SUPERSEDING DATE: 8/91

DATE: 8/91

ATTACHMENT -

IFM BOX - 8