

DISCUSSION DURING  
CONFERENCE Meeting  
Date Case Number: 000001000001

**LC** OFFICIAL LETTERS **31**

STORY  
SUSPECT

DATE  
0-7-5

ITEM	ITEM REF.	ITEM REF. AND ITEM NUMBER OR DESCRIPTION	ITEM	FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE	FAILURE EFFECT OR THE ITEM	RECOMMENDATION FOR ACCEPTANCE
5.1.24		BAG ASSEMBLY Ref ID: 000001000001	2/20	Failure Mode:  Leakage at heat sealed area of molded flange heat seal]  Cause:  Design load exceeded Material failure Heat seal failure	Orbital leakage into the Orbital	<p>(1) Design Bag materials and the heat seal method of sealing/joining were selected to provide the strength, flexibility, and durability to obtain leak proof seals.</p> <p>(2) Acceptance  <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Each bag assembly is pressure proof tested at 30 psi and leak tested at 2 psig during DUCP PMA.</li> <li>- Manufacturing inspection history, including a burst test of one lot sample is reviewed.</li> </ul> </p> <p>(3) Certification The DUCP was certified by analysis based on review of drawing Ref ID: 000001000001.</p> <p>(4) Turnaround Used DUCP's are disposed of. Unused DUCP's undergo PMA visual inspection and leak test at 2 psig prior to reuse.</p> <p>(5) Manufacturing In-process Inspection includes RPP's to verify heat seal margins setbacks conform to T.O. and seam thickness is within tolerance.</p> <p>(6) Inspection Unused DUCP's undergo visual inspection at PMA.</p> <p>(7) Failure History A failure occurred on SIS 41-C, Ref. FAM No. LDC-H-0001. (corrective action completed):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Scrapped entire lot from which failed unit was part.</li> <li>- Burst test one unit from each lot.</li> <li>- Added 10 psig proof test to PMA and 2 psig leak test to PMA.</li> </ul> <p>(8) Operational Use  <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) Effects of Failure Termination of EVA (abort) may be necessary.</li> <li>b) Crew Action Determine cause of problem; continue EVA or return to orbital</li> <li>c) Crew Training Orientation includes discussion of possible failures, effect on PSS, possible need to abort.</li> <li>d) Mission Constraints None</li> <li>e) Inflight Checklist None</li> </ul> </p>