

FAILURE MODE EFFECTS ANALYSIS/CRITICAL ITEMS LIST

FMEA NUMBER: EC-STBD2-4 ORIGINATOR: ISC PROJECT: EDFT-03

PART NAME: PFRWS SOC RESTRAINT LRU/ORU PART NUMBER: SED39126343-301 QUANTITY: 1
 PART NUMBER: SED39126343-301 LRU/ORU PART NAME: BAY 2 STED ASSY SYSTEM: GFE
 LSC CONTROL NO: N/A DRAWING/REF DESIGNATOR: SEE P/N SUBSYSTEM: EVA
 ZONE/LOCATION: STBD-2 EFFECTIVITY/AFFECT STAGE: STS-72

CRITICALITY:

CRITICAL ITEM: No SUCCESS PATHS: 3
 CRITICALITY CATEGORY: 1R/3 SUCCESS PATH REMAINING: 2

END ITEM NAME: N/A
 END ITEM FUNCTIONAL: N/A
 END ITEM CAPABILITY: N/A
 END ITEM FAILURE TOLERANCE: N/A

REDUNDANCY SCREENS:

- 1. C/O PRELAUNCH: Pass
- 2. C/O ON ORBIT: N/A for NSTS
- 3. DETECTION FLIGHT CREW: N/A
- 4. DETECTION GROUND CREW: N/A
- 5. LOSS OF REDUNDANCY FROM SINGLE CAUSE: Pass

FUNCTION: Launch/landing restraint for the PFRWS probe.

FAILURE MODE CODE: N/A for NSTS

FAILURE MODE: Inadvertently opens at launch/landing.

CAUSE: Piece part failure, contamination.

REMAINING PATHS: Latch locks.

EFFECT/ MISSION PHASE:
 Launch/Landing.

CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

-FAILURE EFFECTS-

END ITEM/LRU/ORU/ASSEMBLY: Latch could open if double lock failed.

SUBSYSTEM/NEXT ASSEMBLY/INTERFACE: N/A

SYSTEM/END ITEM/MISSION: Partial loss of DTO objectives.

CREW/VEHICLE : None for double failure, the over center latch is prevented from opening by 2 locks on the latch. If the locks failed and latch rotated, one of the PWP restraints would be opened. This may overload the remaining restraints. Possible loose equipment in PLB may collide with vehicle.

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HAZARD INFORMATION:

HAZARD: N/A

HAZARD ORGANIZATION CODE: N/A

HAZARD NUMBER: N/A

TIME TO EFFECT: seconds

TIME TO DETECT: N/A

TIME TO CORRECT: immediate

FAILURE DETECTION/FLIGHT: None

REMARKS:

-RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTABILITY-

(A) DESIGN: N/A

(B) TEST: N/A

(C) INSPECTION: N/A

(D) FAILURE HISTORY: N/A

(E) OPERATIONAL USE: N/A

(F) MAINTAINABILITY: N/A

PREPARED BY: G. Wright

REVISION:

DATE: 8/10/95

WAIVER NUMBER: