REVISED 5-7-87 Cable UN L 2293287-503 DWG NO. SHUTTLE CCTV N 4, 16. 1 FNEA WO. CRITICAL ITEMS LIST 1SSUED 10-14-06 SHEET CRITICALITY _ 2/18 FAILURE MODE AND FAILURE EFFECT RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE CAUSE ON END ITEM .oss of Pwr ON/OFF CMD (Power Off) 1) No Video **DESIGN FEATURES** 2) No PTU Control Ipen/Short to GMU The M4 PTB cable is a 44-isch long, 25-wire assembly terminated by 37 pin connectors at Worst Case: each end. The video and sync/cmd wires are shielded Twinax shielded and twisted pairs of #24 wire. The cable connects the TVC and PTU. Connector types KJG66: ANJ65N16 have 40 PIU control of elbow been selected. camera to permit arm stawage. The cable design is taken from the successfully flown Apollo program. The design is a cable-connector assembly in which the wire terminations are protected from excessive flexture at the joint between the wire and the connector terminal. The load concentration is moved away from the conductor connection and distributed axially along the length of the conductors encapsulated in a potted-taper profile. This technique also protects the assembly from dirt and entrapped moisture which could cause problems in space. The cable and its components meet the applicable requirements of MASA, Military and ACA specifications. These requirements include: General/Mechanical/Electrical Features Design and Construction Materials Terminal Solderability Environmental. Qualification Marking and Serialization Traceability and Documentation

REVISED 5-7-87 Cable IME NOT 2293287-503 SHUTTLE CCTV H 4.16. 1 FMEA RD. ISSUED TO-14-86 CRITICAL ITEMS LIST SHEET 2/1R CRITICALITY FATLIRE EFFECT FAILURE MODE AND RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE ON END TIEN CAUSE QUALEFECATION FEST iss of Pwr ON/DFF CMO (Power Off) 1) No Video 2) Mo PTU Control Qualified by 1.) similarity to previous successful space programs and 2.) by use during en/Short to GND qualification tests of CCTV LAUs. Morst Case: ACCEPTANCE TEST No PTU control of elbow camera to permit arm The cable acceptance test consists of an olummeter check to assure that each wire stowage. connection is present and intact. Results are recorded on data sheets. OPERATIONAL TEST The following tests verify that CCTV components are operable and that the commands from the PHS (A7A)) panel switch, through the RCO, through the sync lines to the Camera/PTU, to the Camera/PTU command decoder are proper. The tests also verify the camera's ability to produce video, the VSU's ability to route video and the monitor's ability to display video. A similar test verifies the MDN command path. Pre-Launch on Orbiter Test/[n-Flight Test Power CCTV System. Select a nomitor via the PMS panel, as destination and the camera under test as source. Send "Camera Power On" command from PHS panel. Select "External Sync" on monitor. Observe video displayed on monitor. If video on monitor is synchronized (i.e., stable raster), then this indicates that the camera is receiving composite synt From the ROJ and that the camera is producing synchronized video. Send Pan, Tilt, Focus, Zoom, ALC, and Bamma commands and visually (either via the monitor or direct observation) verify proper operation. Select Downlink as destination and camera under test as source. Observe video routed to downlink. Servi "Camera Power Off" command via PHS page). Repeat Steps 3 through 9 except issue commands via the MOH command math. This proves that the CCTV enulpment is operational if video is satisfactory.

9-57

REVISED 5-7-87 Тавте OMG NO. 2293287-503 ISSUED 10-14-06 SHUTTLE CCTV W 4.16.1 FMEA NO. CRETICAL ITEMS LIST SHEET CRITICALITY 2/1R FATEURE MODE AND FAILURE EFFECT RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE ON EMD ITEM CAUSE oss of Pwr ON/OFF CMD (Power Off) 31 Mo Video QA/INSPECTION 2) No PTU Control Procurement Control - Wire, connectors, solder, etc. are procured from approved vendors men/Short to END and suppliers which meet the requirements set forth in the CCTV contract and Quality Worst Case: Plan Work Statement (NS-2593176). No PIU control of elbow camera to permit arm Incoming Inspection & Storage - Incoming Quality inspections are made on all received stowage. materials and parts. Results are recorded by lot and retained in file by drawing and control numbers for future reference and traceability. Accepted items are delivered to Material Controlled Stores and retained under specified conditions until cable fabrication is required. Mon-conforming materials are held for Material Neview Board (MRB) disposition. (PAI-307, PAI IQC-53). Assembly & Test - Prior to the start of assembly, all items are verified to be correct by stock room personnel as the items are accumulated to form a kit. The items are verified again by the operator who assembles the kit by checking against the as-bullt-parts-list (ABPL). Specific instructions are given in assembly drawing notes and applicable documents called out in the Fabrication Procedure and Record (FPR-2293287). These are 2290800 -Process Standard crimping flight connector contacts, 2280801 - Process Standard in-line splicing of standard interconnecting wire using Raychem solder sleeves, 2280876 -Process Standard marking of parts or assemblies with epoxy colors, 2280876. Potting materia) and test procedure (TP-AT-2293287). Quality and OCAS Inspections are performed at the completion of key operations. Preparation for Shipment - When fabrication and test is complete, the cable assembly is packaged according to 2280746, Process Standard for Packaging and Handling Guidelines. All related documentation including assembly drawings. Parts List. ABPL, Test Data, els. is gathered and held in a documentation folder assigned specifically to each cable assembly. This folder is retained for reference.

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FNEA NO. N 4.16.1 CRITICALITY 2/1R		SHUTTLE CCTV CRITICAL ITEMS LIST	UNIT EASTE DNG NO. 2293287-503 ISSUED 10-T4-86 SHEET 4 OF 5	
FATCURE MODE AND CALISE	FATIURE ESFECT ON END ITEM	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE		
.ass of Pwr OM/OFF CHD (Pawer Off))pen/Short to 6ND	i) No Video 2) No PTU Control Norst Case: No PTU control of elbow camera to permit arm stowage.	FATLURE HISTORY There have been no reported failures during RCA testing,	pre-flight or flight.	
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REVISED 5-7-87

FMEA NO. H 4.16.1 CRITICALITY 2/1R		SHUTTLE CCTV CRITICAL ITEMS LIST	UNTT Cable DWG NO. 2293287-503 1SSUED 10-14-86 SHEET 5 OF 5	
FAYLURE MODE AND CAUSE /	FATLURE EFFECT ON END ITEN	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE		
Loss of Pwr ON/OFF CMD (Power OFF) Open/Short to GND	1) No Video 2) No PTU Control Worst Case: No PTU control of elbow camera to permit arm stowage.	Descripinal effects Loss of ability to position the Elbow camera. Possice low camera physically interferes with a payload. payload bay door cannot be closed. Loss of crew and CREW ACTIONS Perform EVA to reposition the elbow camera, use RMS jettison the RMS. CREW TRAINING Crew should be trained in contingency EVA and RMS op MISSION CONSTRAINT Do not manifest Elbow camera for any flight where the interfere with each other (for any pan or tilt angle not change the camera position until the interfering	If RMS cannot be stowed the port vehicle. motion to reposition the camera, or erations procedures. e payload and the elbow camera can). If the camera must be flows do	
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